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 This report documents a systems engineering and design capstone project undertaken by 
students in the Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) program at the United States Naval 
Postgraduate School and performed over two academic quarters.  The project was under the 
direction of Professors C. N. Calvano and R. Harney.  The design team consisted of: LT Neil 
Meister, USCG; LT Jim Melvin, USN; LT Thuy Do, USN; LT Eric Legear, USN, LT Kathryn 





 In the era since World War II, the aircraft carrier has arguably been the type of naval 
combatant that has undergone the least innovation.  With the end of the Cold War, the shift of 
focus from blue water engagements to littoral operations and the stark realities of fiscal 
conservatism, a fresh look at the basic design and operation of the modern aircraft carrier is  
warranted.  In addition, major advances in computers and information systems, short take-off and 
vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft, automated handling systems and robotics provide new 
challenges and opportunities to  the basic shape and functioning of the aircraft carrier.  In the 
design study reported here, we examine these often conflicting constraints and technologies and 
by means of a systems engineering approach we offer a totally new carrier design which we feel 
best suits the requirements we were given for the next generation aircraft carrier.  Our central 
goal in this design was to provide a ship that can meet all of the current mission requirements of 
the existing Nimitz class carriers but in a platform that is significantly cheaper in life cycle costs.  
The outcome of our effort is a ship based on a concept we call “super-island”; a large island 
structure that can provides drive-through “pit-stops” for aircraft refueling and rearming as well 
as other major functions.  Other areas where we made major innovations include: weapons 
handling, information processing and distribution, engineering layout and manning.   
Following an introduction, the first part of this document outlines the requirements which 
constrained our design.  These requirements include both the prescribed requirements in our 
Mission Need Statement (MNS) as well as a list of derived requirements generated through our 
review of the MNS and other requirements documents.  The second part of the report outlines the 
initial design decisions and trade-off analyses which led to our proposed ship.  The final section 
of the report provides an overview of the major ship systems as well as detailed discussions of 
selected design areas.  The sheer magnitude of an aircraft carrier design and the limited time 
frame available prohibit us from presenting detailed discussions of all design areas.  The selected 
areas that are presented, however, are an attempt to present those systems that had the most 
impact on meeting our design goals. 
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 In the year 2015, the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) is scheduled to retire from service.  
Unless another carrier is built and ready to enter service on that date, the United States will fall 
below the nation’s stated need of twelve carrier battlegroups.  The easiest solution would be to 
continue building Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.  This, however, is rapidly becoming an 
impractical solution.  The Nimitz was designed for blue-water engagements between fleets and 
long range (potentially nuclear) air strikes.  The mission today is much more varied and focused 
on the littorals.  This Nimitz-class is also the most expensive ships in the fleet to procure and 
operate.  The challenge then is to reinvent the aircraft carrier to meet today’s mission needs at a 
much more affordable life-cycle cost.  The CVX Program Office is currently tasked with 
resolving this dilemma.  The 1997 student class in the Total Ship System Engineering (TSSE) 
Program undertook to complete a design for the new carrier as our capstone design project.  This 
document is the product of our efforts.  To avoid confusion, throughout this document we refer 
to our resulting design as the Short Take-off  and Vertical Landing (STOVL) CVX or S-CVX.  
This reflects our use of a STOVL airwing and avoids confusion when referencing the Program 
Office’s ongoing CVX design efforts. 
 
2 Requirements 
2.1 Mission Need Statement and Supplemental Guidance 
At the start of this design effort the student team was presented with a Mission Need 
Statement (MNS) and a sheet of Supplemental Faculty Guidance that delineated the requirements 
of the design effort and provided boundaries for the scope of the task.  These two documents are 
provided below.   
 
The intent was to provide a MNS which was as close as possible to the NAVSEA CVX  
Mission Need Statement.  Indeed, some paragraphs are copied verbatim.  However, for reasons 
given below, some changes had to be made.  Many of the modified requirements contained in 
these documents are neither obvious as to origin nor are they entirely consistent with the current 
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thoughts of the Navy’s CVX program office.  The TSSE capstone design project is first and 
foremost an educational experience for the students.  Development of innovative concepts for 
serious consideration by naval ship designers is desirable but secondary.  Design of a ship that 
will actually be built has never been a goal, although design realism is stressed throughout the 
project.  The faculty leaders of this project strove to create a project that would challenge the 
students to think out of the box, to generate alternative approaches to problems with accepted 
conventional solutions, and to address issues which may run contrary to the conventional party 
line.  The design presented herein was forced to address the faculty-provided guidance.  Any 
perceived shortfalls relative to a “practical” design that arise from the imposition of these 
constraints are the fault of the faculty and not of the students. 
 
Although the primary desire in developing the MNS and supplemental guidance was to 
create a problem that was interesting & challenging, yet sufficiently bounded for a small design 
team to tackle in a limited time frame, many of the requirements do have a rationale to them and 
are not pulled from thin air.  In some cases the rationale may simply be to reopen an issue that 
has been declared settled (any good solution can always stand up favorably to further review).  In 
others, the faculty may feel that changes in technology or threats that have occurred since the 
initial decisions were made warrant a revisiting of those decisions.  In others the faculty may 
simply disagree with the conventional solution path.  In still others there is a desire to quantify 
through design the implications of selecting an unconventional alternative.  In the guidance 
documents that follow, the faculty have added annotations in italicized typeface which document 
their rationale.  This rationale was not initially provided to the students, so as to avoid distraction 
during the crucial initial steps in the project.  However, most of it eventually became apparent as 
a result of student questioning of various requirements. 
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In the remainder of this section, the italicized portions are faculty comments added 
at the time of the printing of this report, which were not in the guidance provided to the 
students at the beginning of the project. 
 
MISSION NEED STATEMENT FOR A 
TACTICAL AVIATION SHIP (CVX) 
TS4002                  7/15/97 
1.  Mission.  The general missions of the Tactical Aviation Ship (CVX) are to: 
(a)  Perform missions currently assigned to Nimitz class carriers, and be interchangeable 
with a Nimitz class ship in any battle group. 
The CVX class carriers will begin replacing Nimitz class carriers on a one-for-one basis 
as soon as they are introduced.  Since the missions of the Nimitz class carriers are not 
disappearing, it is essential that the replacement carriers have a minimum capability 
which is comparable to the Nimitz class.  
(b)  Be much more adaptable to the littoral warfare environment likely to be encountered 
in a Major Regional Conflict or in Operations Other than War (OOTW). 
Current projections of the threat indicate a much reduced probability of blue water 
engagements between U. S. carrier battle groups and either enemy surface action groups 
or enemy carrier battle groups.  Much more of the fighting will be conducted near the 
coastlines of adversary nations.  Because of the economic importance of littoral waters, 
other nations may be more disposed to contesting shared littoral regions.  In addition, the 
reduction in the need to be able to forcibly maintain control of the seas coupled with our 
desires to have operating forces in the forward areas, places naval forces in the position 
of being available to perform other missions, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian 
operations. 
(c)  Perform all missions independently of forward-based land facilities. 
As the defense budget continues to shrink and as other nations feel the presence of U. S. 
forces on their territories is not in their best interests, our access to forward bases will 
continue to decrease.  In times of hostilities, countries wishing to maintain a degree of 
neutrality may close normal airfield and port facilities to our military forces.  Any new 
  11
combatant must not require the existence of forward bases which may not exist when 
needed. 
 
2.  Threat.  The CVX battle group will face threats from 
(a)  nuclear and diesel submarines; 
The magnitude of this threat has not changed, although ownership of assets has changed 
considerably. 
(b)  long-range land-based aircraft, naval aviation, theater ballistic missiles, sea skimming 
missiles, high speed high altitude cruise missiles, and mines.  (Rockets and missiles are 
assumed not to carry nuclear weapons, although chemical, biological, radiological 
warheads and EMP (nuclear or conventional) are a possibility.); 
Traditional threats have not disappeared.  New threats such as ballistic missiles with 
terminal guidance capable of hitting moving surface combatants are under development 
(prior to the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, the U. S. possessed an 
intrinsic capability to perform this mission in the Pershing 2 weapon system).  The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may result in their use against U. S. forces 
in times of conflict (especially if the enemy is in possession of a strategic nuclear 
retaliatory capability).  The requirement to address all kinds of advanced warheads 
(except nuclear) will result in a highly survivable design without attempting to solve the 
virtually insoluble problem of hardening a ship against nuclear weapons exploded at 
close range.  Addressing radiological and EMP warheads will result in a ship capable of 
surviving nuclear explosions more than a few kilometers distant. 
(c)  Surface ships ranging from cruiser-type ships to missile patrol boats and small craft; 
(Organization of threat craft may vary from a disciplined surface action group, possibly 
including a STOVL-aircraft-equipped carrier, to organized swarm attacks from smaller 
vessels to kamikaze-type raids by individual small craft); 
For the next few decades the U. S. will undoubtedly face foes pursuing asymmetrical 
warfare.  However, before the first CVX reaches its midlife point, at least one potential 
adversary may have developed a blue water navy comparable to our own (by 2015 the 
defense budget of China is expected to exceed that of the United States in real dollars). 
(d)  Naval special forces. 
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Special forces become most effective when their capabilities are underestimated and 
adequate preparations are not made to resist them. 
 
3.  Capabilities.  The primary function of the CVX is to shelter, transport, launch, recover and 
maintain multi-mission tactical aircraft.  The core capabilities required are: 
(a)  Strategic mobility - the ability to independently deploy/respond quickly and operate 
with sufficient tactical flexibility, whenever and wherever required, to enable joint 
maritime expeditionary force operations.  The sustained speed will be 25 kts. 
Although the MNS does not explicitly require gas turbine propulsion, the students were 
strongly encouraged to use this technology in their design.  Nuclear propulsion was 
allowed, but only if gas turbines could be shown to be inadequate.  One of the primary 
advantages of nuclear carriers is their ability to transit any distance at high speed (30+ 
kts) and immediately engage the enemy.  Although no conventionally powered carrier 
can hope to equal this performance, the sustained speed and range requirements in (b) 
below will permit the S-CVX to arrive within 4 days of a nuclear carrier’s arrival time 
from any point on the globe with only one en-route refueling.  San Diego to the Straits of 
Hormuz is approx. 11,500 nmi. or 16 days at 30 kts for a nuclear carrier.  The same 
distance for the S-CVX can be covered in less than 20 days at 25 kts even with a half-day 
stop for refueling.  Transit time differences for Norfolk to the Straits of Hormuz via Suez 
are only 2 days. 
(b)  Sustainability - it must have the capacity to sustain itself, its aircraft and escort for 
extended periods without access to shore facilities.  The ship will carry sufficient fuel for 
16000 nm (at 20 kts) plus twice the air wing fuel carried by a Nimitz class carrier.  The 
ship must be able to refuel (at a limited rate) from any commercial tanker in an 
emergency (limited to sea state 4 or less).  Food and stores endurance will be equal to the 
Nimitz class, except that emergency rations for 2500 persons for 30 days will be carried 
in addition.  Ordnance storage capacity will be 50% larger than that of the Nimitz class, 
with one magazine capable of storing nuclear weapons. 
One of the major arguments used against conventional (vice nuclear) carriers is that they 
are incapable of transiting from home ports to operational areas at high speeds and 
immediately engaging in combat operations without stopping to refuel (see above).  This 
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can be ameliorated by forcing the design to accommodate an extra fuel load.  An added 
concern is that when operations are contemplated in littoral environments, the enemy 
may be able to deny the unrestricted movement of resupply ships.  For example, if the 
carrier were operating in the Persian Gulf and a hostile power were to massively mine 
the Straits of Hormuz, oilers and ammunition ships might be denied to the fleet for the 
days to weeks it would take to clear the mines.  A 2X reserve of bunker fuel, 2X reserve of 
aviation fuel, and 1.5X reserve of ordnance would allow full combat operations to 
continue for a number of days even if resupply was cut off.  The ordnance and aviation 
fuel reserves would also reduce the need for almost daily resupply when massive 
operations are underway (as was often the case during the Vietnam war).and 1.5X 
reserve of ordnance would allow full combat operations to continue for a number of days 
even if resupply was cut off.  The ordnance and aviation fuel reserves would also reduce 
the need for frequent resupply when massive operations are underway (as was often the 
case during the Vietnam war). 
(c)  Survivability - it must be able to operate aircraft in hostile environments, protect 
itself from attack by threat weapons, and if hit, degrade gracefully and survive.  The ship 
must be capable of transit through any sea state (including hurricane/typhoon seas) 
without suffering significant damage and be capable of launching/recovering aircraft 
under the same conditions as a Nimitz class carrier.  The ship will be capable of 
withstanding at least one mine strike, one torpedo hit or two Harpoon-equivalent missile 
impacts without sustaining damage which prevents flight operations; the ship will be 
capable of withstanding hits from double the number of any of these threats (or any 
appropriately ratioed combination of these hits) without sinking. 
The mass of weaponry that can be brought to bear against any combatant operating in 
littoral environments will almost guarantee some hits.  A  carrier for littoral warfare 
must be capable of taking hits from any of the major littoral threats (mines, torpedoes, 
cruise missiles) and continuing to fight or it will not be allowed to sail in harm’s way. 
(d)  Ability to deliver precise, high-volume firepower - it must be able to operate an air 
wing of 60 aircraft, consisting of approximately 45 STOVL, 10 tiltrotor and 5 rotary 
wing.  Ordnance will consist of the versions available in 2015 of current programs, 
including Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) with unitary, antiarmor submunition, and 
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cluster warheads, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), HARM, Harpoon, Sidewinder 
and AMRAAM.  Unmanned air vehicles may be utilized to perform some mission 
functions. 
With aircraft costs continuing to increase and defense budgets expected to continue to 
decrease (or at least not increase significantly), the Navy will be unable to procure as 
many aircraft as it has in the past.  Carrier air wings will be smaller in the future.  Wings 
as small as 40 airplanes are being discussed.  A 60-aircraft wing is intermediate between 
today’s 80+ aircraft wings and the lowest number.  A smaller airwing should 
theoretically result in a smaller carrier with lower procurement and operational costs.  
This would help to maintain a twelve carrier Navy in times of decreasing procurement 
budgets.  The approximate aircraft mix was selected to provide STOVL or VTOL 
alternatives to each aircraft currently in the aggregate airwing on a carrier:  STOVL 
strike fighters instead of F/A-18’s;  tiltrotor aircraft  instead of S-3, C-2, E-2C, and EA-
6B support aircraft;  rotary wing platforms comparable to existing platforms.  Carrier 
designs dedicated to handling only STOVL aircraft are often dismissed because the Navy 
will have legacy CTOL aircraft for many years.  However, the navy will have CTOL 
aircraft carriers for many years after legacy aircraft have all been relegated to the 
boneyard.  Because of this less-than-logical objection, STOVL carrier designs have not 
been investigated as thoroughly as they deserve.  Another objection has been based on a 
putative inability of STOVL aircraft to perform the support aircraft functions.  The 
faculty do not completely concur with this assessment.  It is their belief that more 
concerted design efforts incorporating new technologies (especially in sensors and 
powerplants) will result in support aircraft designs that are adequate to perform their 
roles, even if their performance may be less than current aircraft.  The benefits of an all-
STOVL design may outweigh the penalties accrued to the support aircraft.  This can only 
be investigated by postulating the successful development of STOVL support aircraft and 
proceeding with the carrier design.  It is expected that cost and efficiency concerns will 
result in a rather limited selection of basic weapon types with variants to accommodate 
different mission requirements.  This “standardization” should facilitate automation of 
weapons handling with subsequent important savings in required manpower.  Unmanned 
air vehicles will be increasingly used by the military of the future.  If functions currently 
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performed by manned aircraft can be adequately performed by unmanned air vehicles, 
their use should be encouraged and facilitated.  This will allow the reduced number of 
manned aircraft assets to concentrate on those tasks that they alone can perform.  
(e)  Joint command and control - it must be interoperable and its communications suite 
must be fully compatible with other naval, expeditionary, interagency, joint, and allied 
forces. In addition, it must be able to operate as a Command and Control center, integrate 
information to develop a coherent tactical picture to support Joint Force, Battle Force, 
Battle Group and Air Wing planning, coordinate actions with other forces, and 
communicate the force's actions to appropriate commanders.  The ship must have the 
capability to fully support a Joint Force Commander (JFC) and under limited 
circumstances be able to host an embarked JFC.  Connectivity must include seamless 
integration of both organic and off-ship sensor inputs for power projection actions. 
Aircraft carriers are key components of any major command.  As such they may be 
employed in many roles, coupled with many other kinds of forces.  Connectivity must be 
assured with any and all of  the other forces with which they must operate.  Dedicated 
Command & Control centers such as shore installations or Command & Control ships 
may not always be available.  The aircraft carrier is the obvious choice among 
combatant vessels for serving as the force Command & Control center, regardless of 
force size or composition, including a Joint Force Command. 
(f)  Flexibility and growth potential - it must have the versatility to support current and 
future sea-based STOVL aircraft. It must have the ability to perform simultaneous multi-
mission taskings and readily adapt to changing operational needs. In addition, it must 
have the flexibility to adapt to changes in future threats, missions and technologies. 
Just as the missions assigned to carrier aviation and aircraft carriers have changed 
substantially in the 50 years since World War II, they will likely change even more 
radically in the 50 years of operational life of the new carriers.  To the extent practical, 
the carrier must not be prevented from, or hindered in, performing these new and 
unplanned missions by avoidable design choices.  Technology and threat capabilities will 
also significantly improve over the life of the carrier.  The design must facilitate rapid 
and cost-controlled incorporation of new technologies and new defensive weaponry as 
they become available. 
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(g)  Humanitarian Operations and OOTW – The ship will provide empty shelter space for 
accommodating as many as 2500 non-combatants in an emergency (this space may be 
used for crew recreation or enhanced survivability; it must not interfere with the ability of 
the ship to conduct normal functions, even with the additional passenger load onboard).  
Freshwater and sanitation systems must support the crew plus non-combatants for a 30 
day period.  Meals may be accommodated from the emergency rations required in 
paragraph 3(b). 
It is possible that humanitarian operations will become one of the major missions of the 
Navy.  Because of the size of an aircraft carrier, it becomes the obvious (and possibly 
only suitable) candidate for housing large numbers of non-combatants such as might 
become necessary during a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation or during relief of 
islands devastated by hurricanes, typhoons, or volcanic eruptions.  Although this was not 
anticipated at the time this document was generated, the student design is amenable to 
allowing the carrier to be used as an emergency hospital ship facility (without halting 
combat operations) – a mission now being discussed for CVX. 
 
4. Constraints.   
(a)  Architecture. The ship design must employ a total ship, aircraft and weapons system 
architecture/engineering approach that optimizes life cycle cost and performance; permits 
rapid upgrade and change in response to evolving operational requirements; allows 
computational and communications resources to keep technological pace with 
commercial capabilities and allows for full realization of the command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) for the warrior (C4IFTW) concept; 
and provides the capability to survive and fight hurt.  More specifically this implies 
physical element modularity; functional sharing of hardware (across all services); open 
systems information architecture; shipwide resource management; automation of 
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4I), combat, aircraft support, 
ordnance handling, management; automation and minimization of maintenance and 
administrative functions; integrated systems security; and embedded training.  The 
approach should also promote commonality with other ship designs.  The ship will have a 
low observable design with radar signatures (to sea skimming missiles at all ranges and to 
  17
high altitude missiles at 50 km range), infrared signatures and acoustic signatures that are 
no larger than those of a DD963 class ship.  Design trade studies will include at least one 
concept which does not have an “island”.   
Most of this paragraph is good systems engineering practice and common sense and 
requires no further justification.  Commonality with other ship designs is desirable 
because it should promote reduced construction costs.  Signature reduction is desirable 
in any new design.  Since it is impossible to make a ship as large as an aircraft carrier 
invisible to sensors in multiple frequency bands, the next best step is to make it 
indistinguishable from its many escorts (thus the choice of a relatively small ship as a 
comparison standard).  Cruise missiles are seen as the primary threat in the radar 
spectrum, although both sea-skimming and high-altitude diving missile designs may be 
encountered.  Radar cross section reduction is more difficult if multiple aspects must be 
considered.  Overhead radar assets (radar ocean reconnaissance satellites or terminal 
seekers on ballistic missiles) were not included as it is virtually impossible to obtain a 
low radar cross section at normal incidence to a very large, flat flight deck.  As the island 
is a major source of aircraft carrier radar cross section and infrared signature, the 
faculty wished to see if the island could be completely eliminated in a fully functional 
design. 
(b)  Design. Consideration should be given to the maximum use of modular construction 
design in the ship’s infrastructure.  Emerging technologies must be accounted for during 
the developmental phase.  Modern, flexible information processing must be built into any 
new weapons system.  Since communication and data systems hold the greatest potential 
for growth, and therefore obsolescence, their installations must be modularized as much 
as possible to allow for future upgrades.  Use standard man-to-machine interfaces among 
the systems onboard.   
Modular design considerations and pre-planned growth paths may eliminate the costly 
and lengthy mid-life upgrade aircraft carriers currently undergo by allowing minor 
upgrades every time the ship returns to home port. 
(c)  Personnel. The platform should be automated to a sufficient degree to realize 
significant manpower reductions in engineering, damage control, combat systems, ship 
support and Condition III watchstanding requirements.  Reduced manning concepts used 
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by other Navies should be reviewed to leverage advanced technologies and future 
advanced technology concepts in an effort to minimize shipboard manning requirements. 
Preventive maintenance manpower requirements must be reduced by incorporating self-
analysis features in equipment designs, and by selecting materials and preservatives 
which minimize corrosion.  Tradeoffs which reduce Manpower, Personnel and Training 
(MPT) requirements will be favored during design and development.  It is especially 
desired to minimize or entirely eliminate the need for flight deck personnel.  Total crew 
size (including the  air wing) will be less than half that of a Nimitz class carrier 
(including air wing).  The ship will be cashless and paperless. 
Manpower is one of the largest contributors to life cycle cost of any ship acquisition.  As 
a consequence, Pareto analysis suggests that vigorously attempting to reduce manpower 
is one of the best ways to reduce life cycle cost.  Naval manpower levels are also likely to 
continue to decrease as defense budgets shrink (or even remain static).  Ship manning 
must decrease or the permissible number of ships will decrease.  Prior estimates of 
achievable manpower reductions on CVX did not predict achievable reductions that 
would have any dramatic effect on life cycle costs.  Examination of these studies 
indicated that a lack of significant reductions in airwing manpower and less than 
aggressive incorporation of manpower-saving technology were major contributors to the 
limited manpower reductions achieved.  To force a total reassessment of this problem, 
the faculty arbitrarily set a goal of a maximum of 50% manpower relative to a Nimitz 
class carrier including the airwing.  Flight deck personnel are significant limiters of 
sustained combat operations.  These positions are also among the most hazardous on an 
aircraft carrier.  When the added safety concerns associated with the extreme power of 
the STOVL JSF engines are considered, it makes sense to attempt to totally eliminate 
flight deck personnel, if practical.  SMARTship has shown that cashless and paperless 
ships are practical.  This will likely be a requirement of all new Navy ship designs. 
(d)  Aircraft.  Aircraft will have footprints and fuel consumption comparable to planned 
JSF STOVL aircraft and existing V-22 and SH-60 aircraft.  The CVX must be able to 
perform all mission functions using the airwing addressed in paragraph 3(d); novel 
concepts must be developed to permit some mission functions (such as AEW) to be 
accommodated; no additional manned aircraft will be permitted to perform any function. 
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The faculty expect that all three of these aircraft (JSF, V-22, and SH-60) will be available 
in air wing quantities by 2015.  They further expect that the V-22 will undergo at least 
one major improvement (probably re-engining) to provide improved range, payload, and 
fuel efficiency.  Budgetary concerns will limit the number of new aircraft programs that 
will begin in the next few decades.  The Common Support Aircraft postulated by 
conventional CVX proponents may be one of the many potential new starts that does not 
occur in a timely fashion.  The faculty believe that aircraft like the V-22 can be adapted 
to fulfill many of the support missions if requirements are scrubbed to the bare minimums 
and innovative concepts are developed for the mission equipment packages.  For 
example, if fuel tanks and a crew-controllable refueling drogue are incorporated into the 
V-22 cargo spaces, that aircraft can refuel a substantial quantity of JSFs.  The somewhat 
reduced airspeed of the V-22 is a limitation, but not an overwhelming one (if a KC-10 
can refuel an MH-53D in flight, a V-22 can refuel a JSF, even a damaged one).  Similar 
solutions can be envisioned for anti-submarine warfare, airborne early warning, 
electronic countermeasures, and carrier on-board delivery.  There is also a possibility of 
performing some missions using unmanned air vehicles.  Although the faculty recognize 
that some performance penalties may be incurred by forcing an all STOVL solution, they 
also recognize that the Navy may not be able to afford more Nimitz-like conventional 
carriers in addition to several new classes of aircraft. 
(e)  Sortie generation.  Given at least 40 flightworthy aircraft and at least twice that 
number of qualified flight crews, the CVX shall be capable of indefinitely maintaining a 
fixed-wing sortie generation rate of 160/day, surging to 240 sorties/day for a period of 48 
hours.  The CVX must be capable of turning around (taxiing, repairing all electronic 
failures, refueling, rearming, pre-flight inspecting and preparing for takeoff) any and all 
fixed wing aircraft within one hour of their touchdown, even at surge sortie generation 
rates.  The ship must be capable of launching at least two aircraft simultaneously and 
capable of launching eight ready aircraft within ten minutes.   
Recent exercises have demonstrated that a Nimitz-class carrier with an 80 aircraft air 
wing with extra flight crews can maintain 160 sorties/day for extended periods and surge 
to 240 sorties/day.  It is desired that CVX maintain at least the Nimitz-class capability 
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even though the number of aircraft in the airwing is reduced.  To facilitate these rates, 
rapid aircraft turnaround and rapid launch rates must be achievable.   
(f)  Other.  The CVX must be capable of trapping any fleet aircraft in an emergency, as 
well as providing refueling and one-time take-off capability for those aircraft.  The ship 
will employ gas turbine propulsion, using the same fuel for air wing and ship propulsion. 
Although the CVX in this study will carry only STOVL aircraft in its airwing, there will 
be some carriers in the fleet which will still be flying conventional take-off and landing 
(CTOL) aircraft.  In a major conflict more than one carrier may be operating in a theater 
and because of the prior interchangeability requirement, the second carrier may be 
CTOL.  Should that second carrier be sunk or severely damaged, it is desirable to be able 
to prevent the loss of otherwise undamaged aircraft and aircrews by providing for the 
emergency landing and take-off of CTOL assets.  Although most studies indicate that 
nuclear propulsion is superior to conventional propulsion, many of these studies are 
based on comparison between existing carrier designs.  The faculty wished to determine 
if a design specifically tailored to overcome the usually stated drawbacks (excessive size 
and/or inability to transit and engage without resupply) could be achieved.  Once a 
conventional power plant is mandated it makes sense to permit the captain the option to 
trade maneuver for flight operations and vice versa (remember in a STOVL carrier, it is 
not essential to always steam into the wind to accommodate flight operations).  Use of a 
common fuel permits this flexibility.   
(g)  The CVX IOC will be 2015.   
This is consistent with current CVX requirements. 
 
5. Operational Constraints 
(a) The CVX must remain fully functional and operational in all environments 
regardless of time of day, whether conducting independent or force operations, in heavy 
weather or in the presence of electromagnetic, nuclear, biological and chemical 
contamination and/or shock effects from nuclear and conventional weapon attack. 
The ship must be survivable and not suffer a mission kill from any of these threats.  The 
list goes beyond Navy survivability policy (OPNAVINST 9070.1 dated 23 Sept 1988) by 
including chemical and biological contamination.  The faculty feel that aircraft carriers 
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are exceedingly tempting targets for chemical and biological attack due to the large 
numbers of personnel on current flight decks and the large, virtually uncleanable hangar 
spaces.  Chemical or biological contamination would be difficult to remove and flight 
operations would slow to a standstill if all flight, flight deck, and hangar deck personnel 
were required to wear MOPP 4 gear for an extended period.  In many areas of the world 
it would be virtually impossible to prevent contamination if a suicide attack were 
executed.  Due to continuing proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, they are 
currently possessed in substantial quantities by most nations which are potentially hostile 
to the United States. 
(b)  The CVX must meet the survivability requirements of Level III as defined in 
OPNAVINST 9070.1. Topside systems components shall be decontaminated through use 
of a countermeasure wash down system and portable Decontamination (DECON) 
methods. 
This requirement is the minimum consistent with the comments of 5(a) above. 
(c)  The CVX must provide landing and hangar facilities, and ammunition storage for 
operational support of required aviation assets. 
 
(d)  The ship must be able to operate in U.S., foreign, and international waters in full 
compliance with existing U.S. and international pollution control laws and regulations. 
The students were encouraged to provide hangar space for all aircraft.  This eliminates a 
major source of radar and infrared signatures since even stealthy aircraft have large 
signatures with their wheels down.  Hangaring aircraft would also significantly reduce 
corrosion problems and associated maintenance.  However, hangar space for all aircraft 
was not treated as an absolute requirement. 
 
(e)  All ship and combat system elements must make use of standard subsystems and 
meet required development practices. The CVX must be fully integrated with other U.S. 
Navy, Marine Corps, joint and allied forces, and other agencies (e.g., Theater Air 
Defense Architecture) in combined, coordinated operations. For example, linkage with 
standard data bases from the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) will minimize ancillary 
costs and promote maximum interoperability with the widest number of weapons and 
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sensor systems. Joint goals for standardization and interoperability will be achieved to the 
maximum feasible extent. 
These fairly straightforward requirements were levied on the students to force them to 
ascertain what standardization and interoperability goals are currently being considered 
(f)  The ship must be able to embark Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Joint Forces 
when required for selected missions.   
(g)  The CVX, when part of a battle group, will be accompanied by at least two Aegis 
class cruisers or destroyers, one or more nuclear attack submarines and other surface 
combatants.  
It is virtually impossible and certainly inefficient to design any ship to be capable of 
performing every naval mission on a stand-alone basis.  Air defense (against cruise 
missiles and ballistic missiles) and anti-submarine warfare are more efficiently 
conducted from specialized platforms.  Since any aircraft carrier is subject to missile and 
submarine attack, it is reasonable to off-load the defenses against those threats to 
specialized escort platforms. 
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Supplemental Faculty Guidance 
MISSION NEED STATEMENT FOR A 
TACTICAL AVIATION SHIP (CVX) 
TS4002          7/15/97 
 
1.  The guidance provided herein is intended to supplement or expand on the information in the 
draft Mission Need Statement of the same date. 
 
2.  The MNS specifies an air wing of 60 aircraft, with an approximate breakdown.  One of the 
studies you should do is to determine the optimum mix among these aircraft types.  If unmanned 
air vehicles are used, they may be in addition to the 60, unless they exceed 10 in number or they 
require significantly more deck space.  The tradeoffs involved must be included in the aircraft 
mix study. 
The 45 STOVL/10 tiltrotor/5 rotary wing mix was merely an educated guess on the part of the 
faculty.  The optimum mix in any carrier wing depends on the missions to be performed.  Some 
time after the promulgation of this document, the faculty specified that the air wing mix be 
determined from a mission analysis of a very stressing mission: support of an amphibious 
invasion of a fortified coastline using a single carrier without any nearby supporting land bases 
as one element of a major regional conflict.  Bandar y Abbas in Iran was specified as the target 
and reasonable projections of Iranian force levels were provided. 
3.  The MNS calls for the CVX to be able to trap and take off any fleet carrier aircraft in an 
emergency.  You should explore options to meet this need which minimize the impact on the 
design of what will be, essentially, a STOVL carrier.  
It is obvious that a conventional flight deck carrier can handle both STOVL and CTOL aircraft.  
The faculty wanted the students to design a STOVL flight deck carrier that incidentally could 
handle CTOL emergencies 
4.  When examining the required sortie rates assume a sortie consists of a take-off-to-touch-down 
duration of 2.5 hours. 
This is roughly the amount of time required to fly a strike mission on targets at 400 nm range. 
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5.  In examining ways to minimize manpower, explore the concept of “wing-level” maintenance, 
with all aircraft logistics and maintenance functions organized at the carrier air wing, rather than 
the squadron, level. 
Currently each squadron assigned to an air wing has its own organic maintenance unit.  When 
almost a dozen kinds of aircraft are carried on the carrier, this has merit.  However, when the 
number of aircraft types is reduced to three, it makes less sense.  Why have three separate 
maintenance teams and shops to service three squadrons of identical JSF aircraft?  Manpower 
and support equipment can be reduced in a wing maintenance concept (if only a few aircraft 
types exist in the wing). 
6.  In examining a ship design without an island, you will need to address and develop viable 
concepts for monitoring flight deck operations, navigation under high traffic conditions, 
communications and radar/electronic warfare operations. 
These are all functions currently requiring elevated locations on the island.  They are still 
required so an alternative means of performing them must be devised. 
 
 
A Faculty Assessment of Design Innovation appears at the end of this report, on page 109. 
  25
2.2 Analysis and Implications 
2.2.1 STOVL / Emergency CTOL Capability 
 The MNS calls for the basic airwing to be fully STOVL capable while the ship still 
retains the capability for emergency landing and launching CTOL aircraft from legacy aircraft 
carriers.  This allows us to examine elimination of the catapult  and arresting gear systems.  The 
embarked STOVL aircraft should present no problems with eliminating the catapults.  The only 
remaining issue is whether or not the emergency CTOL launch capability can be achieved 
without catapults.  In the Future Aircraft Carrier Study performed by the Naval Air Engineering 
Center [1] it was shown that the F/A-18 using a 6 degree ramp can take-off at maximum weight 
with only a 400 foot roll out.  Assuming this to be our worst-case-need roll out, it shows that 
eliminating the catapults is indeed feasible.  With regard to the arresting gear, no known 
alternative exists for trapping multiple CTOL aircraft even on an infrequent basis.  Thus the 
arresting gear will have to be retained. 
2.2.2 Aircraft Weapons Load Out 
 The MNS calls for the S-CVX to be capable of carrying versions available in 2015 of all 
current aircraft weapons programs and goes on to list many of the weapons this should include.  
Based on discussions we had with G-3 Division supervisory personnel on board U.S.S. Nimitz, 
we noted that all of the weapons explicitly listed either currently exist as or expected to be “all 
up rounds.”  By this we mean that the weapons arrive in a shipping canister fully assembled and 
fused and require no physical assembly prior to use.  Iron bombs, by contrast, require a great deal 
of assembly prior to use.  One of our major initiatives in this study was to examine an automated 
weapons handing system.  To ease our analysis we did not consider standard iron bombs.  If iron 
bombs are still to be used on S-CVX we assume that they would be used much less often 
(requiring fewer to be stored on ship) and those that are needed could come pre-assembled and in 
canisters. 
2.2.3 Humanitarian Relief Capabilities 
 Owing to the changing nature of expected operations, the MNS calls for the S-CVX to be 
capable of accommodating 2500 non-combatants for 30 days and provide emergency rations and 
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sanitation services for these people.  Obviously adding permanent berthing and services for such 
a large, seldom-encountered, contingent would lead to a very inefficient ship design.  Instead we 
must devise a means to reuse existing parts of the ship temporarily.  The challenge is to minimize 
the impact the loss of this space has on full combat operations.  Our requirements state that we 
must at least maintain “normal” functions during this period.  We interpret this to mean at least 
the ability to maintain a full defensive posture while maintaining as much offensive capability as 
possible.  The main area where we expect to take degradation is in aircraft cycle throughput.   
2.2.4 Gas Turbine Propulsion 
 In order to limit the scope of our study and examine alternatives to the current nuclear 
propulsion option, the MNS forces us to select gas turbines for our propulsion system.  This 
selection also opens many other possible variations of the standard propulsion layout including 
electric dive, engine locations, and propulsor type. 
2.2.5 Decreased Manning 
 The MNS levies a requirement that the S-CVX manning (including airwing) must be less 
than 50% of the current Nimitz manning (including airwing).  Several of our other requirements 
assist in meeting this manning goal.  First, by not having nuclear power, we can significantly 
decrease the engineering manning requirements.  Secondly, large numbers of flight deck 
personnel are involved with catapults and arresting gear operations.  The requirement for a 
STOVL airwing gives us the potential to eliminate the catapults entirely and requires operation 
of the arresting gear only on an emergency basis for landing CTOL aircraft.  Since this will be an 
ad-hoc evolution, we could eliminate dedicated personnel for this effort and rely on cross 
training of other crew members.  More details of our manning analysis are presented in section 
4.7. 
2.3 Derived Requirements 
2.3.1 Airwing Mix 
 The MNS lists a firm upper bound of 60 aircraft for the airwing size and provides a 
notional breakout for the mix between JSFs (45), V-22s (10) and SH-60s (5).  One of our tasks 
was to validate or modify this notional airwing mix or to justify changes.  To do this we 
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generated what we considered to be a worst-case for S-CVX aircraft utilization.  The proposed 
scenario is one in which an S-CVX carrier battle group must support an expeditionary force 
amphibious landing in southern Iran.  The year is 2020, and Iran has launched a massive invasion 
of its southern neighbors.   The tactical situation is that the defending forces (Arab nations and 
US forces) have halted the initial Iranian invasion forces.  These friendly forces and a CV battle 
group (in central Arabian Gulf) are busy halting southward flow of Iranian troops and aircraft. 
The strategic objective is to halt the invasion by Iran and then eliminate its capabilities to repeat 
such aggression at any point in the succeeding ten years.  The tactical objective of the S-CVX 
battle group is to enable the landing of a brigade-sized expeditionary force in southern Iran.  This 
force must seize and hold a major port facility (Bandar-E-Abbas) to facilitate debarking 
conventional infantry forces and equipment in preparation for a major land offensive.  Friendly 
and hostile force structure and composition are listed in appendix A-1. 
 During the scenario, S-CVX aircraft must be capable of performing these minimum 
operations: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), offensive counter-air 
(OCA), and strike operations.  An iterative analysis of the scenario concluded that an air-wing 
composition of 45 JSFs, 10 V-22s, and 5 SH-60s was sufficient to perform all scenario 
requirements.  Table 2.3-1 describes the sortie rate for each aircraft in the different missions of 
the scenario. The actual peak sortie rates occur during the OCA operations, requiring 215 sorties.  
A minimum of 45 JSFs is required to perform the OCA operation.  Three V-22s will be 
configured as AEW platforms and the other 7 V-22s will be multi-role support aircraft, 
performing ASW, tanker, and COD missions.  To perform these disparate functions, we envision 
the V-22 payload bay being redesigned with different “plug and play” modules.  These modules 
are end loaded in the rear of the aircraft and could even include the rear door/loading ramp on the 
V-22.  The three modules required are:  
· an ASW electronics suite including rear ejected sonobouys (ASW torpedoes would be 
wing mounted or rear ejected) 
· an airborne tanking module containing a drogue/probe reel-able tanking system and extra 
fuel tanks 
·  a cargo/transport module with extra seats and tie down points.     
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The SH-60s provide ASW, plane guard and SAR missions and are the aircraft with the 
highest daily sortie rate of 4.1 per aircraft.  The scenario mission analysis and the resulting 
aircraft sorties required are described in Appendix A-2. 
 With a sortie defined as 2.5 hours, and assuming 1 hour between sorties, the originally 
proposed 45 JSFs can perform a theoretical 308 sorties per day.  This is 6.9 sortie/JSF/day, 
which is more than the sortie rate required during the surge operation of an Alpha strike during 
the OCA operational phase of the scenario.  
 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) was determined to require 32 sorties per day.  This was based 
on a three hour CAP (two JSF per CAP).   Therefore S-CVX will have two CAP (a total of 4 
JSF) in the air at all time.  The total numbers of CAP were increased to 48 per day once the 
amphibious force was landed.  This was in anticipation of additional rapid response requirements 
from the Marines (i.e. hostile helicopters or close air support). 
 A total of 40 sorties per day were required for ASW operations (patrol and prosecution).  
Seven V22s and 3 SH60s provided these sorties.  An aircraft was assumed not to leave its station 
until a replacement has arrived.  Using these parameters, 42 ASW sorties per day will maintain 
three ASW aircraft on station at all times.  This high rate of ASW requirement was necessary 
during the first seven days of the scenario when hostile submarine neutralization was a high 
priority.  The strategy was to neutralize the submarine threat before the arrival of the amphibious 
force.  A detailed analysis of this peak ASW requirement is given in Appendix A-2.  To control 
the threat from any surviving or new-arrival submarines, an ASW sortie rate of 24/day was 
maintained after the initial ASW phase.  It should be noted that during the first 7 days of the 
scenario, the multi-role V-22s had few available sorties to support functions other than ASW.  
This led us to rely upon the buddy tanking capability of the JSF to augment tanker services 




Sortie Rate Requirements By Aircraft for S-CVX Defining Scenario 
 
 
2.3.2 Landing Rate 
 One of the requirements levied in the MNS is that we be able to land an aircraft, fully 
prepare it for its next mission and launch the aircraft within one hour, even at surge sortie rates.  
The worst-case scenario for meeting this goal is a returning alpha strike that must be followed up 
by immediate additional sorties.  The returning strike needs to land as soon as possible in order 
to avoid wasting fuel orbiting the carrier.  The faster the landing rate, however, the higher the 
demand on the carrier facilities to turn around the aircraft.  For our analysis we settled on a 
sustained landing rate of 1 aircraft per minute.  In discussions with current Navy pilots, we felt 
that this was comparable to the current capabilities of the Nimitz class.  The actual maximum 
landing rate achievable by the S-CVX may be higher though, since vertical landing offers the use 
of multiple, simultaneous landing zones. 
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3  Initial Design Decisions 
3.1 Design Philosophy 
 The top level objective of this project is to explore the feasibility and conduct a 
conceptual design of a U. S. Navy Tactical Aviation Ship designed around Short Take 
Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft, specifically the STOVL version of the Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF).  Due to the complexity of an aircraft carrier design and the limited manning and 
time frame of this project, not all areas will be examined with the same level of detail.  After 
reviewing our MNS, we decided to concentrate our design efforts on the following issues: 
3.1.1 Improved Flight Deck Operations 
 Current flight deck operations are extremely manpower intensive, fraught with personnel 
hazards and not necessarily efficient.  With the introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to 
the airwing, an additional safety hazard (excessive engine noise) must now be overcome.  It is 
predicted that the JSF engine noise will be loud enough to cause physical injuries to personnel in 
its immediate vicinity who are not equipped with active noise cancellation protection and body 
armor.  We believe that this new danger poses an undue burden on personnel safety and 
efficiency in completing traditional flight deck operations.  For this reason, one of our major 
design initiatives is to eliminate the need for exposed personnel on the flight deck. 
3.1.2 Automated Aviation Weapons Handling 
 Beyond flight deck operations, the next most manpower intensive activity on an aircraft 
carrier is the handling of aviation weapons.  In order to achieve our reduced manning 
requirements, this is an area that must be addressed.  The CVN 76 Workload Analysis and CVX 
Baseline Analysis Initial Manning Estimate [2], proposed several initiatives on how to automate 
the weapons handling process.  For our project, we undertook better definition of these 
automated systems to assess their possible impacts on manning and tactical operations. 
3.1.3 Increased Sortie Rate 
  When military planners of today and the foreseeable future factor in an aircraft carrier to 
their plans, they are assuming a ship with the capabilities of the Nimitz class.  Since CVX and by 
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extension our S-CVX is supposed to be a one-for-one replacement of the retiring large deck 
aircraft carriers we must be able to match or exceed the sortie rate of the Nimitz. 
3.1.4 Reduced Signatures  
 Modern, high technology anti-ship missiles, mines, and torpedoes are becoming 
increasingly available to third world nations.  With these nations representing the bulk of  
potential threats in the littoral environment, more needs to be done to protect our ships against 
these threats.  Per our requirements in the MNS, we strive to reduce the signatures (radar, 
infrared and acoustic) of S-CVX to the level of an existing Spruance class destroyer (a ship 
about one tenth the projected displacement of our design for S-CVX). 
3.1.5 Life Cycle Affordability  
 The entering argument for all ship designs in the new era of budget cuts is life cycle 
affordability.  This is especially true for the CVX program.  The Nimitz class aircraft carriers are 
a proven effective design but they are also extremely expensive to build and operate.  Therefore 
all of our design efforts in S-CVX must strive to decrease life cycle costs and produce a more 
affordable ship. 
3.2 Design Assumptions 
 In several areas time constraints, lack of technical resources and other factors limited the 
scope of our design efforts.  In these areas we either found other Navy studies relevant to the 
issue and extrapolated information as needed or we found information regarding the Navy’s 
current trends and accepted the results at face value.   
3.2.1 Integrated Computer/Communication Network 
 All new construction ship designs within the Navy are utilizing Fiber Optic backbones 
with Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) protocols.  These designs have been migrating much 
of the current point to point copper communications for tactical systems as well as ship 
monitoring and control onto the networks.  We plan to continue this trend and expand it to 
include adding voice communications and ship’s entertainment systems to the network as well 
(currently this is done in separate networks).  The ATM format was designed with full 
multimedia (voice, video and data).  The commercial industry is already moving towards fully 
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integrated ATM networks and we are confident that this technology will be mature by in time for 
use in S-CVX.  In order to size and layout the network topology of the S-CVX 
Computer/Communications Network we relied heavily upon studies performed by the New 
Attack Submarine (NSSN) program in 1994-1995 [3] [4] [5] [6]. 
3.2.2 Communications Suite 
 For our design we plan to accept Navy’s current Copernicus design initiatives for 
communications suite equipment.  Our design only assumes that by 2015 a great deal more 
automation will be achieved to allow reduced manning in the system. 
3.2.3 Self Defense Weapons System 
 The Navy’s self defense weapons system of the future is the Evolved Sea Sparrow 
Missile (ESSM) [7].  After consultations with the program office designing the system we 
concluded that this system would meet our self protection needs and be ready in time for the 
ship. 
3.3 Design Trade Spaces/Feasibility Studies 
 As part of the design process we examined several areas in detail to develop a set of 
optional trade spaces from which to choose.  These options were then compared against one 
another and the best choice for that design area was selected for incorporation in the final ship.  
It should be noted, however, that these early studies and decisions were  sometimes expectedly 
modified during later stages of the process as greater understanding of the overall ship design 
was acquired.  The following sections detail the feasibility studies conducted and their results.  
Section 4 of the report then expands on these design decisions (and any needed changes) with 
regard to the final ship. 
3.3.1 Flight Deck Studies 
In investigating the design feasibility of an aircraft carrier, we found that the flight deck 
arrangement is the one variable that lends itself most to manipulation.  To ensure the viability of 
our ASSET ship design model, we constrained ourselves to exploring only monohull designs, 
thus eliminating the need to study alternate hull forms.  This decision was bostered by our belief 
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that departure from the monohull form offered  no significant advantages.  This then let us 
devote most of efforts into designing alternate flight deck arrangements.  
For a first order look, we began with a 1000 ft x 250 ft rectangle (Nimitz equivalent flight 
deck size)  and started to layout the features that all the designs would have in common [8];  
· Take-off area  JSF: two 450 ft runs, one 750 ft run 
V-22/SH-60: 100 ft diameter dedicated VTOL area 
CTOL:  850-1000 ft w/ski jump (JATO assist as required)  
·  Landing areas JSF: 60 ft diameter Jet Blast Collectors (see below) 
V-22/SH-60:  100 ft diameter dedicated VTOL are 
CTOL: 800 ft run-out w/three arresting engines 
·  Pit stops  JSF: five required 
V-22/SH-60: one required 
·  Gas turbine inlet/exhaust locations 
four gas turbines 
·   Elevators  60 ft x 70 ft, handles all aircraft (see below) 
·   Ski-jump 
 
This led us to three alternative layouts that we investigated in more detail: 
1. Longitudinal Super Island 
2. Athwartships Island  
3. Island-less 
 
Further study found that two requirements are the primary drivers for the overall size of 
the carrier.   One is the requirement to launch and recover Conventional Take-off and Landing 
(CTOL) aircraft on an emergency basis.  This immediately drives the minimum length of the 
carrier out to 800 feet to accommodate the arrested run-out of legacy aircraft.  The other is the 
requirement to hangar all aircraft below decks (65 total); the current carriers only hangar 40-50 
percent (less than 40 total).  This requirement alone would make the ship at least 1000 feet long 
to accommodate this huge hangar.  
All of the designs we studied have the following attributes in common; 
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1. Pit Stops: We completed an aircraft flow-through study to determine the minimum 
number of pit stops required to meet the most demanding mission requirement, the 
alpha strike.  Our initial study suggested that five JSF pit stops are needed to handle 
an alpha strike with a maximum aircraft turn-around time of one hour.  Therefore all 
of our designs include five JSF pit stops and one V-22/SH-60 pit stop  (further 
analysis later reduced the required number of JSF pit stops to four and allowed us to 
eliminate the dedicated V-22/SH-60 pit stop and this is described further in section 
4.1.1).  All pit stops will be serviced with weapons from below in the weapons 
gallery. 
2. Elevators: The elevators are located on the deck-edge, but are completely enclosed 
outboard to help reduce signature.  They do not travel vertically in the trunk, but 
operate at an angle to match the flare of the sponsons.  They are sized at 60 ft x 70 ft 







Figure 3.3-1 Proposed S-CVX Elevator 
 
3.  Jet Blast Collectors:  The JSF will land vertically on the carrier and it is estimated that 
the jet blast from the engine will require a minimum safe distance of 90 feet around the 
aircraft as it lands.  This places a serious constraint around each landing zone which 
slows aircraft recovery.  Each landing zone will have a 60 foot diameter jet blast collector 
that has a flow-through grid structure on the deck which covers an exhaust collector 
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Design Alternative Characteristics Evaluated 
 
We evaluated three alternative designs at the feasibility study level.  They are described below: 
3.3.1.1 Longitudinal Super Island Design 
Design features: 
· 1000 ft x 250 ft flight deck 
· 680 ft x 80 ft Super Island which starts 300 ft aft of bow, offset 20 ft to port to allow 
proper CTOL landing area. 
· Four elevators total, two each side with access to forward and aft segregated hangars. 
· Starboard of island is STOVL launch area, two 450 ft runs and one 750 ft run, all 
backed by Jet Blast Deflectors (JBDs).  A twelve degree ski jump is located at the 
bow with all take off runs aligned to its center. 
· Starboard side is also the CTOL landing area with an 800 ft x 100 ft landing run out, 
three arresting wires and ship’s engines are located aft.  The long deck run (1000 ft) 
and ski jump precludes the need for catapults to launch CTOL aircraft; any additional 
thrust required may be provided by JATO rockets. 
The Super Island houses all ship and air control spaces.  Two engine rooms with two 





spaces and just forward of the V-22/SH-60 pit stop.  Five fully enclosed JSF pit stops and one V-
22/SH-60 pit stop are also housed in the island. 
To the port side of the island, three JSF vertical landing zones (60 ft diameter) with JBCs  
allow direct access to the pit stops and quick access to the elevators servicing both hangars. 
Port forward of the bridge is a safe parking area for up to 15 aircraft. 
The aft flight deck (120 ft x 250 ft) is a VTOL operating area with two 100 ft diameter 
simultaneous launch and recover circles and direct access to the VTOL pit stop.  
Two hangars, one forward and one aft, are segregated in the middle.  Each hangar is 
serviced by two elevators, one from each side of the ship.  The space between the hangars houses 
the weapons service elevator from the magazines. 
 
Design Advantages: 
· Fully enclosing pit stops in the island provide significant weather, acoustic, and weapons/jet 
blast protection during rearm, refuel, flight line repair and pilot change out evolutions.  No 
personnel are required on the flight deck. The enclosure also provides capability to use an 
overhead gantry crane for refueling and service.  Smooth flow of aircraft from landing zone, 
to rearm/refuel, to launch run is permitted. 
· Aligning pit stops along the center line enhances the use of a race track style weapons 
distribution system on the weapons gallery deck located immediately beneath the pit stops.  
The weapons will be loaded on to the aircraft from below. 
· Enhanced survivability through wide dispersal of prime movers, segregated hangars and 
multiple elevators servicing each hangar. 
· Locating prime movers in the island eliminates long intake and exhaust ducting runs which 
consume large amounts of internal volume and cause engine performance loss.  Exhaust 
gases and acoustic emissions are directed up and away from aircraft and personnel. 
· Enclosing elevators reduces radar signature. 
· Simultaneous launch and recovery of aircraft is easily accommodated. 
· Clear view of all ship and aircraft control evolutions is afforded, as is large amounts of high 





· Increased radar signature due to large size of island. 
· Reduced survivability of prime movers due to high up and exposed location. 
· Additional structure leading to higher initial and life cycle maintenance costs. 
 
3.3.1.2 Athwartship Super Island Design 
Design Features: 
· 850 ft x 250 ft flight deck 
· Three elevators (can hold 2 of any aircraft) 
· Two 750 ft STOVL take off 
· Two 450 ft STOVL take off 
· Three Jet Blast Collector JSF landing zones 
· Two V-22 landing zones 
· Three covered JSF pit stops, four exposed JSF pit stops  
· Starboard of island is 850 ft x 100 ft CTOL landing zone 
· Two sets of two engines (125 ft apart) are mounted on the island with no ducting 
requirements 




· Cylindrical feed design (should be faster than race track design and also should avoid any 
congestion problems.  It would be a parallel flow vice serial flow design) 
· Two independent pit stop areas should enhance survivability 
· The covered pit stops would allow fueling from above, exposed pit stop would not. 
· The center of each circular pit stop area can be a rotating disk that can quickly connect the 
aircraft to each pit stop.  The aircraft can also be moved to each pit stop on its own with the 
TowBot (described elsewhere).  This design feature should allow rapid movement of A/C to 
pit stops and require less landing zones. 
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· The three covered pit stops are safe for personnel to move around.  Three of the four outdoor 
pit stops fall within the 150 ft danger zone (outboard take off lane.) 
· The three covered pit stops (assume 20 min turn around time) should easily support normal 
cyclic operations.  High tempo operation would require the use of outdoor pit stops.  Body 
armor may be required by pilots at the outdoor pitting area.  Pilots should be exposed only 
for a short period of time for crew change out.  Furthermore the very unique situation of a 
complete A-strike turn around may be done by landing all A/C, servicing them, and then 
taking off again. 
· ** A second iteration of this design would raise the island by 10 ft and would allow a 
complete indoor V-22 servicing station that does not require the V-22 to be folded. 
 
Hangars: 
· Two level hangars 
· Total hangar area of 113,200 square ft. 
· Upper hangar has three elevators 
· Lower hangar has two elevators. 
· Total hangar area could be smaller because current design has two large maintenance area, 
aircraft are not parked on the elevators or in the indoor pit stop. 
 
Design Advantages: 
· Less RCS 
 Side Area Frontal Area 
Athwartship Island  45092 sq ft 14450 sq ft 
Longitudinal Island 70792 sq ft 15400 sq ft 
No Island 48592 sq ft 12100 sq ft 
· A smaller overall ship 
· More total pit stops 
· Direct and short A/C movements 
· Engine placements required minimal ducting and also reduces IR signature 
· Second iteration may have indoor non-folding V-22 servicing area 
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Design Concerns: 
· Ship may have to be lengthened to get more efficient speed design 
· Outdoor pit stop may be a safety concern  
· Current flight deck can only hold 42 JSF on deck for A-Strike, the other 3 JSF will have to 



























3.3.1.3 Island-less Design 
 The island-less design reduces radar cross section by removing the island used on current 
Navy designs.  The four main functions that had to be relocated in order to remove the island 
were: ship control, the antenna farm, flight deck control/observation and engine inlet/exhaust. 
Appendix B-1 provides more details on our analysis of these areas and potential alternatives.  
The driving design factor for the island-less design was that in order for the pit stops to not be 
enclosed they needed to be located 150 ft from any place a JSF may have an engine on (takeoff 
or landing zone).  This is due to the requirement for body armor inside a 150 ft radius.  By 
keeping the pit stops 150 ft away minor repairs and pilot change out can occur at the pit stop.  
Our studies analyzed two variants of the island-less carrier: a large ship about the size of a Nimitz 
class carrier and a smaller ship roughly the size of an old Midway class carrier. 
 
Large Variant 
Design Features : 
· Approximate 1000ft by 300 ft flight deck. 
· Four Gas Turbine inlets port side aft, exhaust blows off stern. 
· Six pit stops (flush with deck, not enclosed) on port side. 
· Four elevators, two port and two starboard. 
· Four JSF landing zones and two V-22/helicopter landing zones. 
· An enclosed antenna mast (radar cross section friendly -- similar to the one considered for  
SC-21) on the port side aft. 
· Camera mount amidships on the stern to view flight deck operations. 
· Pilot house located centerline under the bow of the ship. 
· Hangar deck area is 91000 square feet. 
· Two 400 ft runways for “light” JSF  
· One 750 ft runway for “heavy” JSF 
· CTOL landing of 800ft by 120 ft is supported. 
 
Positive Aspects of Design: 
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· No island means small radar cross section. 
· Six pit stops and four landing areas for JSF are more than any other design alternative. 
· Single deck hangar. 
 
Negative Aspects of Design: 
· JSF must use TowBots to pull into pit stop and then back out when done -- not a smooth flow 
of aircraft. 
· Port quarter is very vulnerable with the flight deck cameras, engine inlet/exhaust and antenna 
mast there. 
· People must get used to relying upon cameras to monitor flight deck operations. 
· Locating the engine inlets and exhausts without creating sea-water ingestion hazards for the 




· Approximate 850ft by 220 ft flight deck. 
· Four Gas Turbine inlets port side aft, exhaust blows off stern. 
· Five pit stops (flush with deck, not enclosed)on port side. 
· Four elevators, two starboard, one centerline and one port. 
· Three JSF landing zones and one V-22/helicopter landing zones. 
· An enclosed antenna mast (radar cross section friendly -- similar to the one considered for  
SC-21) on the port side aft. 
· Camera mount amidships on the stern to view flight deck operations. 
· Pilot house located centerline under the bow of the ship. 
· Two hangar decks total  hangar deck area is 90000 square feet. 
· Two 400 ft runways for “light” JSF  
· One 750 ft runway for “heavy” JSF 
· CTOL landing of 800ft by 120 ft is supported. 
 
Positive Aspects of Design: 
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· 20% less deck area than large island-less design (and other designs presented).  This means a 
smaller ship which will be cheaper to build.  It will also reduce the radar cross section. 
 
Negative Aspects of Design: 
· JSF must use TowBots to pull into pit stop and then back out when done -- not a smooth flow 
of aircraft. 
· Port quarter is very vulnerable with the flight deck cameras, engine inlet/exhaust and antenna 
mast there. 
· Double hangar decks uses a lot of volume and makes the elevator rides longer. 
· People must get used to relying upon cameras to monitor flight deck operations. 
· Locating the engine inlets and exhausts without creating sea-water ingestion hazards for the 






3.3.1.4 Selected Option and Rationale 
 After evaluation, we chose the Longitudinal Super Island design for further development.  
The key factors in this decision were the ability to refuel/rearm aircraft in a fully enclosed 
location and good aircraft flow from landing through servicing and take-off.  We were greatly 
encouraged, however, that the Athwartship Super Island and Small Island-less designs were able 
to meet the needed requirements with a ship significantly smaller than the Nimitz.  For our final 
design we undertook modifying the Longitudinal Super Island design to also meet a maximum 
ship length of 850 feet.  This in turn forced several changes which will be explained later. 
3.3.2 Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) Studies 
 There are numerous HM&E alternatives that provide satisfactory solutions prescribed by 
the Mission Need Statement (MNS).  The most feasible alternatives are described below and are 
subcategorized into hull, engines, drive train, propulsor, and electrical distribution. 
3.3.2.1   Hull 
Three types of hulls were considered feasible:  Single Monohull, Advanced Double 
Monohull, and a combination of the two. 
3.3.2.2 Single Monohull 
Single monohull ships are built with traditional transverse frames and longitudinal 
stiffeners.  Among the advantages are the facts that the single monohull has been previously 
tested on US aircraft carriers and there is knowledge in the industry of how to build this type of 
hull.  A disadvantage of this hull form is that the required method of fabrication is fairly 
expensive. 
3.3.2.2.1 Advanced Double Monohull 
 Advanced double monohull ships are constructed with inner and outer hulls connected by 
longitudinal web members.  Studies into this design are currently part of a project funded by the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) with involvement from the ship building industry.  The 
potential advantages of this design are: improved resistance to underwater explosions, improved 
damage control, and improved resistance to grounding damage.  The biggest disadvantage of the 
advanced double monohull is that the manufacturing process has not been tested [9].  
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3.3.2.2.2 Combination Single and Double Monohull 
A  hybrid single and double monohull ship utilizes the traditional single hull design 
throughout most of the ship, but incorporates double hull structure in critical areas. The critical 
areas to be housed within the double hull structure include all weapons magazines and machinery 
rooms.  This design incorporates the best of both hull features while mitigating their 
disadvantages [10]. 
3.3.2.2.3 Hull Selection 
 The combination of single/double hull was selected.  The improved survivability gained 
through the double hulled design in key areas was the major factor in the selection.  A complete 
double hull design was not opted for principally two reasons: accompanying loss of internal 
volume and technology risk.    
3.3.2.3 Main Engines 
 The MNS dictates the use of gas turbine engines for propulsion achieving 25 knots 
(sustained), which yields a requirement for 28 knots (maximum).  Using scaling laws provided as 
part of our TSSE curriculum [11] and assuming S-CVX has a displacement of 75,000 metric 
tons,  112 megawatts (150,000 horsepower) are needed to propel S-CVX to 28 knots.  In 
addition, the CVX program AOA states that a 60 plane air wing will need 32 megawatts (43,000 
horsepower) of electrical power [12].  Thus, a total of 144 megawatts (193,000 horsepower) of 
power are need from the prime movers.  The most feasible gas turbines are described below: 
3.3.2.3.1 LM2500 (20 megawatts, 27,000 horsepower) 
The LM2500 is the current gas turbine engine used by US Navy and other navies around 
the world.  Its advantages include long engine life, a well tested track record throughout the 
world, and its relatively small intakes and exhausts.  The LM2500’s disadvantages are its 
relatively low power and old (1960's) technology. 
3.3.2.3.2 LM6000 (45 megawatts, 60,000 horsepower) 
The LM6000 represents the latest version of marine gas turbine from General Electric 
and incorporates the latest technological advances.  The major advantage of the LM6000 over 
the LM2500 is its increased power with equal efficiency.  The disadvantages for this engine 
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include a high exhaust temperatures (400 F with 1:1.6 mixing educator), and a greater required 
mass flow rate ( which translates to larger intakes and exhausts per engine).  It should be noted 
that the LM-5000 (with power and fuel consumption ratings slightly below the LM-6000) was 
considered as an older technology variant of the LM-6000 and, therefore, not evaluated 
independently [13].  
3.3.2.3.3 LM-GE90 (75 megawatts, 100,000 horsepower) 
The LM-GE90 is the same engine that is on Boeing 777 but modified for marine 
applications.  This efficient, high-power engine burns cleaner thereby reducing hydrocarbon 
emissions and  the IR signature they produce.  Its advantages include a  large power output, 
improved IR signature, and advanced technology.  Even though it is listed as an advantage, a  
chief disadvantage of the LM-GE90 is also the unit's large power output.  In order to achieve 
maximum fuel efficiency, gas turbine engines need to be operated near their full loading.  The 
LM-GE90 is so powerful only two engines are required to satisfy ship power requirements.  
This, however, presents difficulties in matching incremental changes in ship’s load to engine 
output and results in less efficient operation requiring more fuel.  Another disadvantage of this 
engine is that the marine variant has not yet been fully developed [14].  
3.3.2.3.4 WR21-ICR (20 megawatts, 27,000 horsepower) 
The WR21-ICR uses an intercooled, regenerative cycle to improve cycle efficiency over 
the standard LM-2500.  Development of this engine is currently funded by US Navy but 
numerous problems have been encountered in testing the recuperator.  The advantage of 
intercooled and regenerative technology is increased cycle efficiency (40% compared to 33% in 
other engines) which means less fuel consumption.  This extra efficiency is gained at the expense 
of additional space due to extra equipment which serves as one of the engine’s disadvantages.  
Another disadvantage of the WR21-ICR is that it is an unproven design [15].  
3.3.2.3.5 Main Engine Selection 
Each of the main engines evaluated offers its own benefits and drawbacks.  Matching  
engine size to the desired power plant configuration drove the selection to the LM-6000.  The 
LM-6000's power output required four engines to meet load requirements, vice eight (LM-2500, 
WR21-ICR) or two (GE90).  Using four engines provides an acceptable level of redundancy 
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while limiting the volume of ducting and auxiliary equipment.  An added benefit of the selection 
is GE's proven track record for gas turbine engines.  
3.3.2.4 Transmission 
 Two types of transmissions were considered feasible and investigated 
3.3.2.4.1 Electric Drive 
In an electric drive ship the propulsion motors and ship's service electric distribution 
system receive power provided by a common prime mover from the same bus .  The common 
prime mover and electrical distribution are the foundation of the Navy's Integrated Power System 
(IPS) design.  The Navy currently plans to incorporate IPS architecture into the SC-21.  The 
advantages of electric drive include: flexibility in locating prime movers, potential to reduce 
volume for intakes and exhausts, short shafts, reduction in machinery noise, and elimination of 
reduction gears.  Electric drive has not been tested on modern US Navy ships, but has been 
widely used on Coast Guard and commercial vessels [16] [17] [18] [19] [20].  
3.3.2.4.2 Mechanical Drive 
In a mechanical drive scheme, separate prime movers are used for main propulsion and 
ship's service electricity.  The main engines are mechanically coupled via reduction gears to 
propulsion shafts.  This is the traditional US Naval Warship type of transmission, and it is well 
proven and accepted.  However,  because the engines must be mechanically linked to the shaft 
there is very little flexibility in location of the engines.  Another drawback to mechanical drive is 
the reduction gears themselves, which are large and heavy, and the need for lengthy shafts which 
comprise another major weight.  
3.3.2.4.3 Transmission Selection 
The flexibility in ship design afforded by the IPS architecture pushed the selection to the 
electrical transmission system.  Though there is a technology risk in choosing the electric drive 
system, its proven performance in the USCG and commercial industry makes success  likely.  
3.3.2.5 Propulsor 
 The propulsor is the device which imparts energy to the water  producing thrust which 
causes the ship to move.  The following propulsors were considered feasible: 
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3.3.2.5.1 Fixed Pitch Propeller (FPP) 
Fixed Pitch Propellers have been used on numerous naval vessels.  FPP are well tested, 
relatively cheap, and require smaller shafts (compared to the CRP described below).  
Disadvantages of FPP include a narrow speed-efficiency range and poor reverse performance 
[21].  
3.3.2.5.2 Controllable Pitch Propeller (CRP) 
Controllable Pitch Propellers alter pitch of the propeller blades for a given shaft speed in 
order to maximize efficiency in both the forward and reverse directions.  CRP's are the standard 
for modern Navy Surface combatants, excluding carriers.  Disadvantages of this design include: 
increased size of shaft, increased maintenance due to complex hydraulic system, and cost. 
3.3.2.5.3 Fixed Pods 
Pods are extensions outside of the ship's hull that house a motor which turns a fixed pitch 
propeller (FPP).  Due to the external configuration of their design, pods necessarily require 
electric drive transmission.  Fixed Pods have been built up to 40 megawatts and are currently 
used for commercial applications.  The external arrangement provides a better flow field which 
increases propulsive efficiency.  This arrangement also eliminates the need for long shafts.  
Disadvantages to the fixed pod design include increased navigational draft they create, the need 
for cooling air, and a limited stopping/reverse direction capability [22]. 
3.3.2.5.4 Azimuthing Pods 
Azimuthing pods have all the advantages of fixed pods, but provide greatly improved 
maneuverability.  Because the pods can rotate 360°, ship turn radius and stopping distance are 
both reduced.  Rotating pods eliminate the need for rudders and thrusters, thus decreasing 
appendage resistance and increasing propulsive coefficient (PC).  There are some disadvantages 
to azimuthing pods.  To date the largest pod to be built for commercial application is 25 
megawatts.  In addition, structural testing of the hull-pod mount may be required in order to meet 
Navy ship shock criteria [23].   
3.3.2.5.5 Water Jet 
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Water jets use an axial flow pump and nozzle to propel vessels.  They have been used in 
commercial applications up to 20 megawatts; however most water jets are used in lower power 
applications.  Water jets transmit less noise into the water than propellers.  They have never been 
tested on a ship as large as the S-CVX and thus their feasibility is questionable [24].  
3.3.2.5.6 Propulsor Selection  
Of the propulsor options considered, only the CRP and azimuthing pod can possibly 
provide both the power and maneuverability required for a vessel as large as the S-CVX.  
Though the CRP is the accepted Navy standard, the azimuthing pod offers much greater 
flexibility of internal arrangements and is also likely to provide better maneuverability.   There is 
an acknowledged technological risk in selecting the pod, however, the structural testing and 
motor improvements necessary should be obtainable over the next ten to fifteen years.  Further, 
the full benefits of the IPS electric transmission architecture may be realized with this selection. 
3.3.2.6 Electrical Distribution 
 All ship's systems that require electrical power are connected to the electrical distribution 
network.  The network includes all necessary power conditioning circuits, breakers, electric 
energy storage, switchboards, and electric wire cabling.     
3.3.2.6.1 Conventional Electrical Distribution System  
The standard Navy electrical distribution system consists of 60 Hz, 400 Hz,  and DC 
transmission lines throughout the ship.  Breakers, switchboards, and transfer stations are 
centrally located.  Electricity is derived from a mechanical power take-off connected to a high 
speed alternator and cyclo-converter.  Due to the multiple electrical current requirements and the 
centralized location, long and heavy cable runs exist throughout the ship.  The central location of 
electrical equipment also presents inherent vulnerability risks: a casualty in one compartment my 
affect numerous others.   
3.3.2.6.2 DC Zonal Electrical Distribution (ZED) System 
The DC ZED is a major component of the integrated power system (IPS) that is 
designated to be installed in SC-21.  Electricity is derived from a more affordable electrical 
power take-off (common electrical bus) via a solid state power converter system.  The ship is 
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divided into port and starboard federated zones, 1000 volt DC electricity for each zone is 
provided via a power conversion module (PCM).  Within each zone additional solid state PCMs 
are installed to provide the necessary electrical requirements, e.g., 60 Hz or 400 Hz.  Control and 
status monitoring of each zone may be performed locally or centrally via the Standard 
Monitoring and Control System (SMCS).  Using DC distribution  eliminates the need for large 
electromechanical switchgear by utilizing power electronics and semi-conductor technology.  
Another advantage achieved through the DC ZED is the decoupling of the main engine generator 
frequency and the ship service operation frequencies.  By separating the two, the generator is 
able to operate at its most efficient frequency [25].     
3.3.2.6.3 Electrical Distribution Selection 
The Navy's 21st century combatants will use the DC ZED.  With all the benefits 
described above and its likely use as the future Navy standard, the S-CVX will incorporate the 
DC ZED. 
3.3.2 Combat Systems Studies 
In our initial feasibility studies for the S-CVX combat systems, we attempted to examine 
the gamut of potential threats the carrier could be presented with and then identified several 
levels of organic and non-organic capabilities that could be used to defend against these threats.  
Table 3.3-3 describes our analysis and provides the recommendations for which level of defense 
should be implemented on S-CVX. 
For all air threats except the Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM), we opted for self protection 
systems only, rather than incorporating area defense capabilities directly on S-CVX based on the 
cost and size of an AEGIS Combat System.  For the TBM threat, we rely solely upon escorts.  
Given the current difficulty of hitting a moving ship with a ballistic missile, we consider this is 
justifiable. 
For surface threats, an Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile in surface-to-surface mode is ample 
[7][26]. 
Concerning torpedo threats, a Nixie-derivative decoy system is all that we originally 
foresee on the S-CVX.  The Navy, however, is currently developing an anti-torpedo system. 
Should this system become available for use on the S-CVX, the improved capabilities it would 
add would definitely warrant its inclusion in the combat system. To support this, ample weight  
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Table 3.3-3 Combat System Mix Analysis 
and volume margins should be provided to backfitting the anti-torpedo system when it has 
completed development [27]. 
While the chance of a carrier hitting a mine is low, the risk of losing such a high value 
asset is high.  For limpet mines and hostile takeover, low tech options are most reasonable.   
To defend against armed assaults on the S-CVX directly, we propose relying upon crew 
manned ship self defense forces.  Marine Detachments have been assigned to carriers in the past 
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with one of their main tasks being protection of the nuclear weapons.  Now that nuclear weapons 
are not regularly maintained on carriers we consider the Marine Detachment no longer warranted 
and adding the detachment back just to defend against a hostile takeover is not justified. 
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4 System / Ship Descriptions 
3.4 Arrangements of Selected Areas 
Arranging the spaces for an entire aircraft carrier was beyond the scope of our team’s 
resources, however, the arrangements of certain key spaces and novel design concepts  that were 
employed on S-CVX have been performed and are provided in this section. 
4.1.1 Flight Deck Layout and Operations 
The design of a purely STOVL aircraft carrier has been investigated numerous times by 
the Navy to answer critics who decry the large cost of conventional take off and landing, nuclear 
powered carriers.   The designs have never seemed to meet the capabilities of the status quo, and 
seldom do they project any real cost savings.  But, we are at the dawn of a new era where one of 
the main constraints of the past shows real promise in being overcome.  The next generation of 
STOVL aircraft promise performance capabilities that rival their conventional brethren.   The 
design challenge is then to leverage this aircraft performance capability and mate it with a new 
ship design that maximizes total system benefit.  Figure 4.1-1 is provided to help envision the 











Figure 4.1-1 S-CVX Flight Deck Layout 
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4.1.1.1 Aircraft Recovery  
Conventional arrested recovery requires maintaining a large landing area and the 
associated aircraft parking safe zones that consume a big piece of flight deck real estate. It is also 
a series process; only one aircraft can land at a time and the arresting gear must be realigned after 
each landing.  This limits the recovery rate and slows sortie generation. Vertical recovery of 
aircraft frees the carrier from this limitation.  With two dedicated JSF landing zones, recovery 
rate is at least doubled from that of a conventional take off and landing (CTOL) carrier and can 
realistically go higher.  One of the major concerns with using STOVL aircraft, however, is the 
heat, blast and noise generated by the engine when in vertical mode.  To overcome the heat and 
blast effects in hover, our design incorporates a Jet Blast Collector (JBC) at each JSF recovery 
circle on the aft end of the flight deck.  The JBC  (see figure 4.1-2) is an 18 meter diameter 
circular grid structure that allows the jet blast to flow through to a collector box below deck 
where it redirects the jet blast overboard.    Due to the high temperature of the exhaust gas 
(»1000 °C), the grid and collector will have to be actively cooled, just as the Jet Blast Deflectors 
are actively cooled on existing carriers.  Once on deck, the aircraft transit under their own power 
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4.1.1.2 Pit Stops  
The process of arming and fueling current aircraft is manpower intensive and time 
consuming due to the requirement to move the aircraft and/or equipment to different locations on 
the flight deck for each evolution.  This safety derived requirement is designed to separate these 
potentially risk filled operations on an exposed flight deck.  Our design rethinks this entire 
process by centralizing all tactical aircraft servicing evolutions into four enclosed pits contained 
within the island structure.  Arming, refueling, flight line repairs, and pilot change outs for the 
JSF can all be accomplished in one stop, eliminating additional aircraft movements.  Enclosing 
the pits within the island provides weather, acoustic, weapons fragment and CBR protection. 
 
· Arming:  Aircraft will enter the pits from the port side of the flight deck through the armored 
articulating doors.  Once positioned inside, the door is closed and the aircraft will be 
automatically armed by the weapons handling robots that load the weapons from the 
weapons gallery below. Weapons bays and external hard points on the JSF are equally 
accessible to the robots and are loaded as required.  De-arming of the aircraft is accomplished 
by reversing the process.   
· Fueling:  The aircraft will be fueled automatically via the in-flight refueling probe using an 
overhead gantry robot.  The aircraft can be fueled in 7.5 minutes using existing 200 gpm fuel 
pumps or in five minutes by reasonably increasing pump capacity to 300 gpm.   
· Flight Line Repairs: Diagnostics and maintenance can be performed out of the weather by 
squadron personnel. 
· Pilot Change Outs: Projected aircraft availability rates for the JSF indicate that pilot 
endurance will become the limiting factor in sustained operations, so 2.5 aircrews will be 
provided per aircraft.  The pilot swap can be accomplished in the protected pit environment. 
· Aircraft Washing: Corrosion control of the aircraft demands manpower intensive hand 
washing of the aircraft on a regular basis.  The aft pit therefore will be equipped with an 
automated aircraft washing system that will accommodate all the aircraft types. 
4.1.1.3 Launching 
 Once the aircraft is serviced, it departs the pit through the starboard side door and 
proceeds directly to the take off area using the aircraft transit safe lane on the starboard side of 
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the flight deck or it enters the queue for launch.  Two 450 foot take off runs are aligned with the 
six degree ski jump at the forward end of the flight deck.  The launch spots utilize Jet Blast 
Deflectors (JBDs) to protect the aircraft lined up behind.  The runs are spaced to allow near 
simultaneous launch of two aircraft, with a safe transit lane along the island to ensure 
uninterrupted flow of aircraft.  Two 750 foot take off runs are co-aligned to handle heavily laden 
aircraft.  Due to the aft placement of the 750 foot runs, no JBDs are required; the jet/prop blast is 
directed straight over the stern.  
4.1.1.4 On Deck Movement of Aircraft and Elevators 
  Safe and efficient  movement of aircraft once on deck is another manpower intensive and 
time consuming evolution.  Currently, aircraft are moved about using manually operated tractors 
(yellow gear) which must maneuver though the tight spaces and constant congestion of an 
operational flight deck.  Aircraft must also be chained down by hand after each movement.  To 
overcome these shortcomings and accomplish our goal of an unmanned flight deck we assumed 
that technology of the near future would support the capability of semi-autonomous robots that 
would attach to the aircraft and provide motive power and precision control during all on deck 
movements.  An automatic aircraft securing capability is built-in to eliminate the chain down 
gangs.  We have christened these vehicles TowBots.  As envisioned, the TowBots would mate 
with the aircraft shortly after landing, automatically meeting and attaching to the nose wheel to 
provide motive power and automatic directional control while the aircraft is on deck or in the 
hangar.  This permits securing of the aircraft’s engine from right after landing, to just before 
launch, thus significantly reducing jet blast and acoustic effects on other aircraft and personnel.  
Precise navigation and tracking by the TowBots and their control system could be accomplished 
numerous ways, including embedded guidance wires in the decks or the use of an onboard GPS 
type system that provides precise location information.  To secure the aircraft when not moving , 
the TowBot will attach itself to the deck using strong electromagnets and provide multi-axis 
stability through the extension of padded arms, much like shore side cranes use today.  To 
maintain the existing aircraft foot print, the TowBot would actually attach from behind the nose 
wheel and push the nose gear, vice pulling it.   
Aircraft are moved between the hangar decks and the flight deck using three deck edge 
elevators.  These elevators are completely enclosed on the outboard side to aid in signature 
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control, and transit vertically at an angle between the hangar and flight deck to match sponson 
flare. 
4.1.1.5 Recovery and Launch of Legacy Aircraft 
Our design required the capability to recover and launch all legacy (i.e. CTOL) aircraft 
on a one time basis in the event of the loss of flight deck capability of  a legacy carrier operating 
in the same theater.  We therefore have installed three conventional arresting wires between the 
#2 and #3 elevators on the starboard side.  The landing area and arresting wires match the 
dimensions and capabilities of the Nimitz class carriers.  We considered this an emergency 
evolution that would require the ceasing of all other air operations during CTOL recovery since 
the entire launch area would be used.  To launch the CTOL aircraft, a combination of light 
aircraft load, high wind over deck speed and the use of the entire 860 ft flight deck length and ski 
jump would permit CTOL launches without the use of catapults.  Aircraft requiring additional 
thrust would be equipped with JATO bottles as required.   
4.1.1.6 Aircraft Cycle Time 
 The battle scenario that we developed showed that the most stressing aircraft cycle occurs 
during back-to-back alpha strikes.  Our requirement was to meet a one hour turn around time 
from touch down to take-off.  Our time line study showed that with four pit stops the average 
aircraft cycle time was 52 minutes with each aircraft spending ten minutes in the pit plus a 
minute transit time on either end.  As expected, the first aircraft to land had shorter cycle times 
due to direct access to the pits, and as more aircraft arrived cycle times slowed as the queue to 
































160 sortie/day, 55 A/C è  3 
cycle/AC/day 
5.5 hrs/cycle X  3 cycle/AC/dayè 
16.5 hrs 




Table 4.1-3 S-CVX sustained sortie rate 
analysis 
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240 sortie/day, 55 A/C =4.3 
cycle/AC/day 
5.5 hrs/cycle X 4.3 cycle/AC/day= 
23.5 hrs 
of flight ops per day to meet 
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4.1.2 Hangar Deck Layout 
The S-CVX hangar is divided into two main sections, the forward and after hangar bays 
which can be separated by an articulating fire door.  The forward hangar bay also contains a 
smaller section which we label the forward aircraft repair facility.  In normal operations, aircraft 
requiring more in-depth maintenance would be positioned here because it imposes the least effect 
on movement in other areas of the hangar.  During humanitarian and operations other than war 
support missions, however, this area is given up for other uses as explained in the next section.  












Figure 4.1-5 S-CVX Hangar Deck Layout 
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12 JSF, 2 
V-22 
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32(hangar) + 2(fwd 
repair)+ 4 (pits) = 38 
aircraft 
 
Total percentage aircraft in 
covered parking = 63%  
Elevators:  3 each,  19.8m X 16.7m  (65 ft X 55 ft) 
 Capacity:  2 each JSF or SH-60 
                   1 each V-22 on diagonal 
Table 4.1-6 Overview of S-CVX Hangar Facilities 
4.1.3 Humanitarian & Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Support 
 The MNS states that the S-CVX must meet the following capabilities with regard to 
humanitarian and operations other than war support: 
· Provide empty shelter space for accommodating as many as 2500 non-
combatants in an emergency. 
· Remain fully mission capable with the additional passenger load. 
· Provide food, freshwater and sanitation systems to support the crew plus non-
combatants for a 30 day period. 
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Our design goals for meeting these requirements included: 
· Minimization of impact on ship activity due to non-combatants. 
· Ensuring that the space designated for the non-combatants could serve another  
purpose while the non-combatants are not onboard. 
 To implement these requirements and goals in the S-CVX design, the forward aircraft 
repair facility will be used to shelter and provide sanitation spaces for the non-combatants.  This 
area is quickly and directly accessible from the flight deck and the sponsons, reducing the 
logistics of trying to move these non-combatants throughout the ship.  The dimensions of the 
forward aircraft repair facility are 82 ft long by 65 ft wide by 46 ft high (figure 4.1-7).   Under 
normal operations, this area is storage space for only two aircraft thus moving the aircraft topside 










 The living space will be based on an 8-bunk module with the following dimensions: 6 ft 
long by 6 ft wide by 10 ft high (see figures 4.1-8 and 4.1-9).  The modules are stacked three high 
with ladder access provided between the levels.  The bunks themselves will be 6 by 2 ft and they 
will be stacked 4 high on one side.  A 2 ft wide passageway is located in the center and then 
another stack of 4 bunks is on the other side.  This is an adequate amount of space for the non-
combatants and is the space where they are expected to spend most of their time if the ship is 
engaged in full combat operations.  Each bunk module is assembled from a pre-packaged kit of 
lightweight pipes, sprint-tensioned wire mesh and pierced metal plank.  Parts slide together and 
are held in place by captive fasteners requiring no tools to tighten. 
4.1.3.2 Sanitation 
 Space has been allocated for approximately 82 commodes and 60 showers.  This will 
provide the adequate facilities for 42 non-combatants per shower and 31 per commode. The 
sanitation spaces can be partitioned as needed for privacy.  The necessary drainage and sanitation 
lines will be piped to the hangar deck and from there extended as needed to provide the 
appropriate amount of facilities. 
4.1.3.3 Subsistence 
 The noncombatants will be fed from the 30 day supply of emergency rations required in 
the mission needs statement.  One gallon of freshwater per person per day will be provided.  
4.1.3.4 Storage 
 As much as possible the structure for building the bunks will be stored in the overhead of 
the hangar.  This will provide for easy access when needed as well as keep the structure out of 
the way for day-to-day operations.  Current aircraft carriers already use portions of the hangar 
overhead for fuel tank storage so it appears viable to store the humanitarian support structure 
there as well.  The approximate size of an emergency ration is 8”x5”x2”.  The storage space 
needed for 225,000 ration packs (2500 people * 3 per day * 30days) is 10,400 ft3.  The space just 
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forward of the weapons magazines can be used for this storage and when the supplies are needed 
they can be loaded onto the weapons carts and transported to the hangar deck. 
 
Figure 4.1-8 Top view of bunk module 
 
Figure 4.1-9 Side view of bunk module 
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Finally, in our design analysis we fully understand that the area provided for the non-
combatants is highly cramped and uncomfortable.  If operations permit, the remaining 12 aircraft 
normally stowed in the forward hangar bay could also be moved up to the flight deck.  This 
would free up an additional large area just aft of the forward aircraft repair facility for use by the 
non-combatants as a recreation facility.  In this configuration air operations could still continue 
but not necessarily at the normal rate. 
4.1.4 Super-Island Arrangements   
The S-CVX’s island is one of the carrier’s more novel attributes.  Figure 4.1-10 shows the 
island’s location on the flight deck.  The island was moved from its conventional location for 
two reasons.  First, we wanted to maintain the traditional aircraft flow pattern of land left - 
launch right.  Second, the MNS requirement to launch and recover legacy CTOL aircraft in 
emergency situations necessitated a full clear deck take-off and landing zone; moving the island 




 103.8 m  
 
Figure 4.1-10:  Super-Island Location 
 
 
Though the island’s location has changed, the island still houses the bridge, and Pri-Fly, as 
well as all necessary communications and electronic arrays.  Because the MNS required a 
weapons payload of 1.5 x Nimitz and JP-5 tankage of 2 x Nimitz, we were forced to consider 
alternative locations and configurations for the main engine rooms.  As a result, the main engine 
rooms are located fore and aft of the four aircraft pits.  The super-island’s resulting configuration 
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is shown in Figure 4.1-11.  Pit doors, located port and starboard on the island, allow for aircraft 
“flow through.”  The pit areas are primarily designated for the rapid weapons loading and 
refueling of the JSF aircraft.  However, the SH-60 and V-22 aircraft can be housed in the pit 
areas, but they must be partially folded.   
The aircraft pit/super island concept provides three important benefits: acoustic protection 
from operating jet engines, protection from weather for air crews, and weapons effect protection.  
The benefits for the latter two are self explanatory.  The goal for our design was a man-less flight 
deck, but it is much more a requirement than goal.  Current manufacturer estimates indicate that 
when a JSF engine is operating the safety zone for unprotected personnel is a 100 ft radius.  Any 
crew within this radius would be required to wear body armor.  Enclosing the aircraft while the 
pit crew works and pilots swap greatly reduces the hazard posed by the JSF engine.  Weapons 
protection of the engine rooms and pit areas is provided by adding armor.  A Kevlar metal matrix 
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Figure 4.1-11:  Super-Island Layout 
 
An ASSET Final Report “Deckhouse Module” in Appendix C-3 provides an illustration of 
the coarse island design and its overall geometry 
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4.1.5 Bridge and Primary Flight Control and Engineering Operating Station (EOS) 
Arrangements 
The large pilot house at the forward end of the super island houses (among other 
functions) the ship’s bridge and the primary flight control or Pri-Fly station.  These two functions 
have intentionally been arranged in close proximity to each other to allow for better overall 
coordination between the OOD, the Air Boss and the ship’s command element (CO/XO) with 
regard to ship and air wing operations.  The design goals of the bridge and the Pri-Fly station 
layouts were: 
· Minimized manning 
· Integration of functions ( e.g. consolidation of the main Engineering Operation 
Station (EOS), navigation center and ship control functions into a single location) 
· Improved functionality 
· Enhanced survivability 
The decision to locate the bridge topside resulted from an in depth look at survivability vs. 
functionality.  Traditionally, the bridge and Pri-Fly are both located topside to provide 
watchstanders the ability to see what is going on.  The degree of automation used aboard the S-
CVX would allow locating the bridge and Pri-Fly below decks, which would have greatly 
enhanced the survivability of that space.  The super-island is an especially vulnerable place due 
to the infrared signatures of the engines.  A compromise was reached by locating the bridge and 
Pri-Fly topside but providing redundant capabilities in CVIC (which is located below the 
waterline) in case of a loss of the primary space. 
The bridge and Pri-Fly are located in the forward-most part of the super-island. The space 
is divided into two areas by an athwartships bulkhead, Pri-Fly is in the aft part and the bridge is 
forward.  Windows completely surround the space which allows the Officer of the Deck (OOD) to 
move to the Pri-Fly portion of the space to complete a 360 degree view of the horizon while still 
protected by the skin of the ship. 
The bridge integrates both navigation control and engineering control ship functions.  
Conceptually, there will be an experienced junior officer as the OOD and two less-experienced 
junior officers assigned as Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) and the Engineering Officer of the 
Watch (EOOW).  The JOOD will be the OOD’s assistant in matters pertaining to navigation and 
shipping and the EOOW will be the engineering assistant.  There will be three consoles 
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dedicated to the engineering functions on the bridge and a flat screen navigation table used for 
charts. 
In order to reduce the manning needed to perform the routine tasks on the bridge, S-CVX 
incorporates the latest computers and technology.  The Sperry Marine integrated control system 
is an example of the type of system which would be needed to support these minimally manned 
watch stations. 
The Sperry Marine system incorporates the following different types of console 
configurations (each system is Microsoft Windows NT based): 
· Voyage Management System (VMS)  
· Integrated Condition Assessment System  (ICAS) 
· Damage Control System  (DCS) 
· Standard Monitoring Control System (SMCS) 
The Voyage Management System provides all voyage planning, electronic charts, as well 
as autopilot capabilities.  It can also handle weather displays and log-keeping functions. 
ICAS is a diagnostic tool used to monitor machinery and provides information about the 
equipment such as symptom analysis, online documentation, failure trends and supply support.  
It will also schedule and document maintenance, provide online training, and handle all 
engineering log-keeping needs. 
The Damage Control System incorporates the ship’s drawings to make damage control 
plotting easier.  It also can allow wireless connectivity with damage control teams and can be 
integrated with the Main Space Fire Doctrine to recommend prioritized corrective actions. 
SMCS allows integrated, remote control of the engineering plant. 
Pri-Fly will incorporate the following aircraft control functions which were previously 
handled in separate spaces  on traditional carriers: 
· Fly One 
·   Fly Two 
· Fly Three 
· Flight Deck Control 
· Aircraft communications 
Pri-Fly consists of standard consoles used throughout the rest of the ship with special 
software installed to allow them to be also used for aircraft control.  In particular, the flight deck 
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control function will be handled by a flat screen display table which will be able to show the 
hangar and flight deck layouts with current aircraft locations. 
 
4.1.6 Engineering Operating Station (EOS) Layout 
Complete control of S-CVX’s IPS and main engines is conducted at the engineering 
operating station.  There are four EOS stations within the ship: 1 - Bridge; 2 - Forward Engine 
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Figure 4.1-12:  Engineering Operation Station Locations  
 
An EOS consists of three consoles: one Standard Monitor and Control System (SMCS), 
one Damage Control System (DCS), and one Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS).  
The multifunction SMCS which controls all the engineering operations is connected to the 
computer and communications system’s ship-wide or backbone network.  By linking the SMCS 
to the network the engineering officer watch can be performed in any of the locations shown.  
The DCS and ICAS stations are used to monitor damage control and equipment condition, 
respectively.  ICAS is used to help replace traditional maintenance practices; equipment 
conditions and operating parameters are monitored and recorded.  When an operating parameter, 
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e.g. rotor vibration, exceeds a predefined level the ICAS system informs the user so that the part 
may be replaced or repaired. 
 
During normal operations the IPS system will be controlled via the bridge EOS.  This 
facilitates a physical proximity to the ship’s operations officer and allows for efficient 
communication between engineering and operations.  Theoretically, one operator is capable of 
running the entire IPS system from an SMCS.  But, to reduce “information overload” on the user, 
two crew members will control the SMCS, DCS, and ICAS consoles.  An engineering officer will 
also be on duty.  To monitor and control the auxiliary equipment the Auxiliary Machinery Room 
will have a “slave” EOS station.  This station will be able to monitor all of the ships engineering 
operations, but will only be enabled to control the local auxiliary equipment.  
 
4.1.7 Carrier Information Center (CVIC) Layout 
 
Figure 4.1-13 S-CVX CVIC Layout 
 
We've located CVIC, Flag Plot & all Theater CINC command spaces on the same deck, 
below the water level, forward of the hangar.  CVIC will execute self-defense functions only, and 
requires just 8 watchstanders which includes 3 air controllers.  All 8 watchstanders sit at the 














the center.  The main personnel reduction concerns the Multi-Functional Arrays.  We see the 
current Radar, EW, Link, and ID Supervisors combined into just 1 watch station.  Six extra 
consoles are provided for Force Coordinators & extra air controllers.  Also, if Flag Plot or the 
Pilot House are  destroyed, those functions can move to CVIC with no loss in warfighting 
capability. 
4.2 Hull Design 
The S-CVX hull was developed using the Naval Sea Systems Command’s computer 
program Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool - ASSET, MONOCV version 4.1.0.  A 
complete set of ASSET generated reports is provided as Appendix C-3.  Hull plan, profile, and 
























Figure 4.2-1:  S-SCVX Hull plan, profile, and end views 
Stern 
LBP = 250 m 










4.2.2 Signature Reduction Efforts 
The MNS levied a requirement that S-CVX maintain the same ship’s signatures as the 
much smaller Spruance-class destroyers.  A great deal of effort was devoted during the course of 
our design to meet this challenge. The goal of these reductions was not to make the carrier 
invisible, but rather to make it indistinguishable from other Battle Group assets. 
4.2.1.1 Radar Cross Section (RCS) 
The RCS problem actually had two dimensions.  The MNS states that the S-CVX had to 
present minimal signatures against both sea skimming and high altitude cruise missiles at a range 
of 50 km or greater.  Since no RCS prediction codes were available for student use, a very 
simplified geometric analysis was the best that could be done.  Our approach was to model S-
CVX against both missile profiles using a spreadsheet, and then manipulate the shape until 
achieving RCS and functionality goals.  For comparison data for the DD, we were limited to a 
1990 NRL study (title classified) that used an I-band radar of 9.7 GHz.  We also had to make a 
number of assumptions: 
1.)  The ship’s surface is smooth & specular, and can represented by rectangles. 
2.)  There are no aircraft on the flight deck. 
3.)  All elevators to the hangar deck are enclosed (a missile can not look directly 
into the hangar. 
4.)  Missile seeker is beam on. 
Also, a similar hull geometry to that of a Nimitz class carrier is used for S-CVX.  The hull 
is assumed to make a 50 degree angle with the waterline for 2/3 of its length and a 80 degree 
angle for the remaining 1/3. 
To prevent a high flying (100K ft) cruise missile from seeing a normal reflected surface as it 
closes to a range of 50 km, we either had to design the super island and pilot house with a greater 
than 30 degree tumblehome or a flare of any angle.  Since available hangar space was limited 
within the super island, we went the maximum allowable flare: 9 degrees.  A 30 degree 
tumblehome was acceptable for the pilot house (plenty of room to spare). 
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By incorporating the described geometry into the S-CVX’s design, we reduced our RCS 
to a couple orders of magnitude below a Spruance for the sea skimmer case. This is not terribly  
surprising given the Spruance’s box-like design.  S-CVX is roughly the same order of magnitude  
however for the high flyer.  This is because the S-CVX’s large flight deck now becomes a factor 
in the RCS equation.  Given the simplicity of our model, the goal has been achieved.  However, 
as higher order effects are considered, such as adding appendages and aircraft on the flight deck, 
our numbers will most certainly rise. 
4.2.1.2 Infrared Signatures 
In order to meet our infrared signature goals, the S-CVX needed a contrast signature no 
larger than a Spruance class destroyer in both the 3-5 and 8-12 um bands.  In performing our 
analysis, we were limited to a 1982 MIT study (title again classified) that recorded a background 
temperature of 55F.  This is colder than normal, and it hurt our analysis. We also made two 
assumptions: 
1.)  Hull temperature is 70F for all spaces except engine rooms. 
2.)  Exterior engine room temperature is 100F. 
With these assumptions in mind, our results show that in the 3-5 um band the S-CVX  IR 
signature is less than a kW/str (kilowatt per steradian) above a Spruance.  Given the destroyer’s 
signature in order of magnitude, this is not tactically significant.   
In the 8-12 um band, though, our problem was worse.  S-CVX has a hull 4 times the size  
of a destroyer’s.  The problem is that this larger hull is (on average) 15F above the ambient 
temperature of 55F used in the MIT study.  So even without examining specific hot spots, the S-
CVX presents a much larger contrast signature than the DD.  However, as the ambient 
temperature rises, the S-CVX’s contrast signature decreases faster than the DD’s.  The gap in 
signatures therefore shrinks.  Unfortunately, further IR signature reductions required more than 
we were able to afford as part of this report.  In future design iterations, however, we would 
recommend exploring the use of an active cooling system.  This is where sea water is sent 
throughout the skin of the ship thereby cooling the exterior surface below 70o F. 
4.2.1.3 Acoustic Signature 
Getting a grip on this signature area is quite difficult.  Ship data is mostly empirical, and 
there is no baseline available for a combatant using propulsive pods.  Noise from shafting should 
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be almost completely eliminated using this scheme but the data is not there to confirm this 
hypothesis.  Finally, while advances in propeller design may provide some reduction in 
cavitation noise, this will remain as the weak point in signature reduction.  
4.2.2 Passive Protection Systems 
With the changing world politics has come ever expanding roles for the carrier battle 
group.  Littoral operations and the associated higher risks that they pose, are likely operating 
environments for the next generation carrier.  Thus protection from underwater weapons and 
surface missiles was a considerable concern.  Several measures were incorporated into S-CVX’s 
design to enhance its survivability.   
Topside the super island engine rooms and aircraft pits are fully armored with a Kevlar 
metal matrix composite, similar to what the U.S. Army uses on its M-1 tank.  This armor will 
likely not stop a direct hit, but it will prevent fragments and inhibit cascading damages.  Below 
the flight deck all vital compartments are shielded by a double hull or multiple bulkheads (for 
interior sections).  Those compartments considered vital include: the hangar, auxiliary machinery 
room, weapons magazines, and the emergency engine room.  The lowest deck on the ship is 
protected from the bottom via an inner bottom. 
4.2.3 Magazine Design 
The MNS for S-CVX required a weapons magazine of one and half times that of the Nimitz 
class.  This requirement proved most challenging to our design team.  Ultimately, housing all the 
weapons was one of the driving reasons for removing the engine rooms from the hull of the ship 
and locating them within the super island.  The total magazine volume was over 30,000 m3; this 
is approximately 15% of the total hull volume.  The weapons handling system elevators and rail 
system are not accounted for in this figure.  A special note must be made regarding the allocation 
of magazine volume within the ship.  ASSET will not allow the user to locate the engine room 
volume above the first deck.  Though ASSET placed the two main machinery rooms within the 
hull, the complete volume of these engine rooms was added to the weapons magazine volume, 
making workarounds necessary.  The compartment breakdown for magazine location is listed in 
“Hull Subdivision Module”  of Appendix C-3.  
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4.2.4 Tankage Design 
ASSET automatically allocates tank volume for ship’s own fuel once the main engines and 
endurance speed are input into the program.  But, tank volume for aircraft fuel must be allocated 
by the user.  Most of the space between the double hull compartments is allocated as tankage for 
JP-5.  This is a recognized potential hazard; however, this tank location is standard practice; 
most Navy ships store their fuel in compartments adjacent to the outer hull.  
 
4.3 Ordnance Handling System 
The methods of storage, assembly, transportation and mating of aviation ordnance to 
aircraft on board the current  Nimitz class aircraft carriers demands large numbers of  personnel, 
a large amount of deck space and can become the limiting factor in sortie rate generation.  The 
next generation of aircraft carrier is going to have to dramatically improve this process in order 
to meet the manning and mission requirements.   
The existing method has the weapons manually removed from the magazines, loaded on 
skids and moved to the assembly areas below-deck using the lower stage weapons elevators.  In 
the assembly areas, the weapons have aerodynamic surfaces and targeting systems installed 
(fuses and arming wires are installed on the flight deck) and then are staged in the assembly area 
or on the hangar deck.  Due to the amount of time it takes to move the large number of weapons 
skids from the assembly areas to the flight deck, some weapons may be stowed outboard of the 
island on the flight deck in what is called a “bomb farm”.  Loading of the aircraft is done 
manually and with the aid of bomb hoists.  This system requires 300 personnel to operate (200 in 
weapon assembly alone), limits the use of the aircraft elevators during surge operations and 
crowds the flight deck with dangerous amounts of explosives.   
The S-CVX must take a systems approach to improving this mission essential function.  
The aircraft, the ship, the weapons and the personnel must work together seamlessly to overcome 
the shortcomings of the existing system.  Utilizing Just-In-Time Delivery techniques, 
redesigning weapons flow paths, and leveraging robotics and automation technologies, the goal 
is to reduce manning by 50 percent and reduce aircraft turn-around time to less than one hour 
while maintaining or improving the existing levels of safety.   
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4.3.1 Assumptions 
Future technologies hold great promise to improve weapons handling.  Precision Guided 
Munitions (PGMs) promise greatly improved kill probabilities, which will lead to fewer weapons 
needed to destroy each target.  This allows fewer weapons to be carried by each aircraft; aiding 
signature control.  Though fewer weapons are required, the trade off is that they consume more 
volume, so magazines and weapons bays need to be sized appropriately.   Likely advances in 
each of the major component areas are outlined below, and the goal is to fuse these together to 
produce a new system that fulfills the mission requirement at an affordable cost.   
4.3.1.1 Weapons  
Air-launched weapons of the future will be completely self contained in what is known as 
an “All-Up Round”.  The weapon will be shipped and stored in the same container which will 
have an interactive capability with the Advanced Weapons Information Management System 
(AWIMS) to track its location and monitor its status throughout the handling process.  The 
container will be designed to interface with automated handling and transport robotics to 
minimize or eliminate the need for personnel in the magazines, transfer and loading areas.  Once 
the weapon is called for, it will be uncrated in the magazine and a self-diagnostic check will be 
performed.  The weapon will be moved out of the magazine to the mission weapons carrier, and 
moved to the ready service pit stop queue where mission data will be loaded.  No aerodynamic 
surfaces, fuses or guidance packages will need to be installed, they will be intrinsic in the 
weapon design.  From the pit stop queue, the weapons will be automatically loaded onto the 
aircraft using robotics.  Arming of the weapons will be accomplished with fail-safe electronics 
just prior to aircraft launch. 
4.3.1.2 Aircraft 
To maintain signature control, future aircraft will carry all weapons within internal 
weapons bays.  These bays will be compatible with automated weapons loading robots which 
will position the weapon for aircraft capture and hand-off of data links.  Additional hard-points 
will be provided on the wings to carry external stores and these areas will also be accessible to 
the loading robots.  Once on deck, the aircraft will be moved about by an semi-autonomous 
“TowBot” which will spot and secure the aircraft as required as it moves from pit stop, flight 
deck and hangar.  
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4.3.1.3 Ship   
One of the largest gains in weapons handling efficiency can be realized  by minimizing the 
physical movement of the weapon from the magazine to the aircraft. To this end we propose a 
series of design modifications to realize these gains. 
· One of the baseline requirements for our design was to increase the magazine area to 1.5 
times that of the current Nimitz class.  Our final design has 10,300 square meters of 
magazine area, 1.45 times the area of the Nimitz.   The flow paths to the elevators have 
been specifically designed to offset vertical alignment of the shafts from the flight deck to 
the magazines to prevent direct attacking weapon penetration. 
· The weapons capacity of the magazines is calculated as follows: 
(4 magazines/deck) X (78 weapons slots/magazine) X (3 decks) = 936 weapons slots 
Each weapons slot has the capability to store one large weapon (i.e. SLAM-ER, 
AMRAAM, JSOW, JASSM), or two smaller weapons (i.e. AIM-9X, MAVERICK, 
PENGUIN).  The S-CVX weapons load out  will be dictated by the mission need, and 
with the capability to store  two weapons per slot, an upper end  total of 1872 weapons 
could be carried. 
·  The future carrier will incorporate a fully automated magazine and weapons handling 
system.  Robots will automatically segregate and store the different types of weapons in 
accordance with use and safety compatibility.  Containerized weapons will be onloaded 
through the side of the ship to the hangar where they will be struck down below using the 
mission weapons carriers for transport to the magazine.  Expended weapons containers 
will be retrograded at the same time.  
· The magazines will be locatedalong the centerline of the ship, directly underneath and in 
line with the island.  This will allow alignment of the handling and transport elevators 
with the weapons gallery located directly below the island pits.  This vertical integration 
of the weapons handling system greatly reduces the distance weapons travel from 
magazine to the aircraft.  The system has also been designed so that the weapon always 
faces the same direction during handling and transport. 
· The magazines will be segregated longitudinally by the main subdivisions and will 
occupy three decks.   Due to the containerized nature of future weapons and the need to 
adapt to robotic handling, the magazines are designed around a six meter by one meter 
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weapons slot.  This slot will accommodate any one of the largest all-up weapons, or 
several smaller ones.  Each magazine contains two segregated storage areas, served by 
two magazine weapons shuttles.  These shuttles draw the required weapon from the 
container (which remains in the magazine) and transfer it to one of two weapons transfer 
elevators that will move the individual weapon up to the mission weapons carrier gallery.   
· The mission weapons carrier is designed to gather and transport all weapons needed by 
an individual aircraft for its next mission.  It travels along the mission weapons carrier 
gallery, located beneath the hangar, where it can access all the weapons transfer elevators 
from the magazines.   It stops at the necessary weapons transfer elevators to fill out the 
required weapons load and proceeds to the elevator for transport to the weapons gallery.   
· The elevators access the weapons gallery from underneath the forward and aft engine 
rooms.  The mission weapons carrier can access either track-way in the weapons gallery 
to ensure a smooth flow of full and empty carriers.  The carriers position themselves 
under one of the four pits to transfer the weapons to the aircraft weapons loaders, which 
then load the waiting aircraft. 
· Unloading of unexpended ordnance will follow a reverse procedure of the one above. 
 




























4.3.1.4 Just-In-Time Delivery (JITD) 
The right material, in the right amount, in the right place, at the right time is the central 
theme of this concept that was originally developed in a manufacturing environment.  Reducing 
product flow path lengths, eliminating stockpiling, reducing/combining assembly steps and 
minimal product handling are some of the methods that are embodied by this concept and are 
incorporated in the new ordnance handling system.  Ideally the weapons will be called up from 
the magazine, assembled and loaded onto the aircraft “in stride”, i.e. the aircraft will arrive at the 
pit at the same time as the weapons, load out, fuel up and be on its way in minimal time.  One of 
the main benefits of this will be the elimination of the “bomb farm” which will improve flight 
deck safety, reduce vulnerability and optimize flight deck area use.  
 
4.4 C4ISR Systems Descriptions 
4.4.1 Antenna Arrays 
Now we turn our attention to C4ISR.  JMCOMS, or the Joint Maritime Communications 
System will satisfy the Navy's vision of seamless worldwide data transfer from sensor to shooter. 
JMCOMS is split into 2 main thrusts.  First is Digital Modular Radio or DMR.  It will bring to 
the PC full communications capability in the HF, VHF & UHF spectrums.  DMR will use a 
smaller derivative of the current enclosed mast installed aboard USS RADFORD.  The 2nd half 
of JMCOMS is the Integrated Terminal Program or ITP.  It handles SHF, the commercial 
satellite bands & EHF.  In addition to their radar and EW responsibilities, the Multi-Function 
Arrays will also serve as antennas for all wideband applications. 
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Figure 4.4-1 S-CVX Antenna Layout 
 
As you can see, JMCOMS greatly simplifies topside design by incorporating all communications 
antennas into just 2 structures. 
4.4.2 External Connectivity 
Of all ship systems, C4ISR will evolve the most between now and S-CVX’s commissioning 
in the year 2015.  C4I For The Warrior (C4IFTW) is the DOD strategy to achieve seamless, 
worldwide communication.  Copernicus is the Navy’s vision to meet this goal using the Joint 
Maritime Communications System (JMCOMS).  JMCOMS splits the electromagnetic spectrum 
into two: DMR/SLICE (100 kHz to 2 GHz) and ITP (2GHz and above).  Each of these is detailed 
below [26].  According to the CVX C4I Shop, JMCOMS will save 50% weight and volume over 
existing CVN systems.  Also, power required will be no more than that for a CVN. 
Table 4.4-2 lists various systems and hardware to fulfill necessary C4ISR requirements.  This 
includes full support for an embarked Theater CINC.  All systems will be in place by 2015.  





Function System Hardware 
Communicate silently N/A Signal Flag / Flashing Light / NANCY 
Secure & unsecure phone DISN-DSN/DRSN ITP-SHF 
ITP-Commercial SATCOM 
Fax DISN-DSN/DRSN ITP-SHF 
ITP-Commercial SATCOM 
Email DISN-DMS DMR/SLICE-HSFB 
TV Commercial server ITP-Commercial SATCOM (C/Ku Band) 
Theater weather GLOBIXS via GBS ITP-SHF 
ITP-Commercial SATCOM 
Naval, Joint & Unified messages DISN-DMS DMR/SLICE-HSFB 
Merchant voice N/A DMR/SLICE-URC-80 (VHF) 
Civilian a/c voice N/A DMR/SLICE-ARC-211 (VHF) 
U.S & Unified ship/sub voice BCIXS DMR/SLICE-HSFB (HF) 
DMR/SLICE-MCIXS (Cellular) 
ITP-NESP (EHF) 




Navy, Joint & Unified a/c voice BCIXS DMR/SLICE-UHF, VHF, HF 
Navy, Joint & Unified a/c data BCIXS JTIDS via DMR/SLICE-MERS 
Combat forces ashore voice BCIXS DMR/SLICE-SINCGARS (VHF) 
ITP-NESP (EHF) 
Combat forces ashore data BCIXS JTIDS via DMR/SLICE-MERS 
DMR/SLICE-DWTS (UHF) 
ITP-NESP (EHF) 
Intel for Wing TADIXS-B, TDDS, TIBS, 
TRIXS 
DMR/SLICE-JTT-N (UHF) 
Intel for BG CO TADIXS-B, TDDS, TIBS, 
TRIXS 
DMR/SLICE-JTT-N (UHF) 
Intel for CINC DISN-JWICS ITP-SHF 
ITP-Commercial SATCOM 
Voice, data & video to FLT CO GLOBIXS or BCIXS ITP-SHF 
ITP-Commercial SATCOM 
Voice, data & video to CINC GLOBIXS via GBS ITP-SHF 
ITP-Commercial SATCOM 
Voice, data & video to NCA GLOBIXS via GBS ITP-SHF 
ITP-Commercial SATCOM 
 
Table 4.4-2 S-CVX C4ISR Requirements
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Defense Information System Network (DISN) - The DOD phone, fax, message and email  
system of the future.  Consists of Defense Switched Network (DSN), Defense Red Switch 
Network (DRSN), Defense Message System (DMS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS). 
Global Information Exchange System (GLOBIXS) - DOD system which connects the Theater 
CINC to his Tactical Command Centers (BG Commander, Amphibious Commander, JFAC, 
etc.). 
Battlecube Information Exchange System (BCIXS) - DOD system which connects all joint 
forces within the battlecube (i.e. theater of combat operations). 
 
Digital Modular Radio (DMR/SLICE): 
1. Handles everything from 100 kHz to 2 GHz. 
2. High Speed Fleet Broadcast (HSFB).  The HSFB system is a multifunctional system 
designed to provide more efficient RF bandwidth utilization and increased data throughput 
on the Fleet Broadcast System.  It will also significantly improve HF tactical 
communications between and among BG/ARG/JTGs and will interface with joint, Allied and 
NATO systems. 
3. Maritime Cellular Information Exchange Service (MCIXS).  MCIXS provides inter- and 
intra-BG/ARG/JTG telecommunications by way of cellular telephone trunking.  The user 
may employ either a standard desktop or cellular telephone to access the trunk. 
4. Multi-Functional Eletromagnetic Radiation System (MERS).  MERS merges multiple RF 
systems (UHF Communications, JTIDS, Combat DF, IFF) into a single, low cost, low 
observable, antenna structure.  
5. Digital Wideband Transmission System (DWTS).  The DWTS provides two UHF, secure, 
full duplex, digital wideband transmission links ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore.  These links are 
high data rate capable and interoperable with U.S. Forces ashore. 
6. Single Channel Ground to Air Radio System (SINCGARS). SINCGARS provides VHF-
Frequency Modulation (FM), anti-jam, and 2 channel airborne relay for over-the-horizon 
communications for Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) and amphibious operations. 
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7. Joint Tactical Terminal-Navy (JTT-N).  The JTT-N will be a single multi-configured 
terminal and will receive tactical intelligence via UHF communication links for TADIXS B, 
TRAP Data Dissemination System (TDDS), Tactical Intelligence Broadcast System (TIBS), 
Tactical Reconnaissance Information Exchange System (TRIXS) and transmitting tactical 
intelligence via UHF for TIBS and TRIXS. 
 
Integrated Terminal Program (ITP): 
1. Spectrum covers 2 GHz and above. 
2. Navy EHF SATCOM (NESP).  EHF SATCOM provides jointly interoperable low data rate 
and future medium and high data rate anti-jam, low probability of intercept/detection 
connectivity for submarines, ships and ashore. 
3. SHF SATCOM.  SHF SATCOM provides high capacity connectivity over the Defense 
Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and NATO SHF series satellites.  In the fleet, it is 
the primary military band ship to shore termination for providing two-way dialing voice for 
DSN access, DISN IP network services (SIPRNET, NIPRNET, JWICS), video 
teleconferencing and other point to point services. 
4. Commercial SATCOM.  The commercial SATCOM program provides for low to high 
capacity connectivity not supported by military satellite capacity to meet non-tactical, 
personal-use or official-use surge capacity requirements. INMARSAT, and transponded C, 
Ku and future Ka or Personal Communications Service (PCS) or Multiple Subscriber Service 
satellite connectivity will be implemented.  Commercial SATCOM normally supports ship to 
shore connectivity for point-to-point services similar to SHF SATCOM. 
5. Global Broadcast Service (GBS).  A joint program to field a very high capacity military 
broadcast service worldwide.  It is a three phase program.  Phase 1 uses commercial satellites 
to implement a Joint Broadcast Service (JBS).  Phase 2 launches GBS Ka band payloads on 
three satellites.  Phase 3 completes a worldwide satellite constellation.  Ship, ground and 
airborne terminal systems and shore based broadcast injection points will be fielded. 
6. Multifunction Radar. In addition to performing conventional radar, EW passive & active 
functions, these arrays will serve as antennas for all ITP systems.  According to the Office of 
Naval Research-Radar Division, these arrays will be approximately 3x3 meters. 
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Automated Digital Network System (ADNS): 
1. It is the network that connects the user to DMR/SLICE and/or ITP. 
2. User connects to ADNS via PCs using IT-21 architecture. 
3. Provides seamless, secure multimedia connectivity for voice, video, and data applications. 
4. Automates routing and switching functions. 
5. Multiplexes all traffic types over available Radio Frequency (RF) asset. 
Consolidates radio room space, equipment, and antennas. 
 
4.4.3 Defense Systems 
 Per the MNS, S-CVX will always operate in company with a minimum of two Aegis 
cruisers/destroyers and a least one SSN.  These escort assets and carrier air wing will provide the 
main component of the battle group defense, especially at long range.  S-CVX will only be 














                                                          Mine Avoidance Sonar 
 
Figure 4.4-3 S-CVX Defensive Systems Layout 
 
  In the area of AAW, the active defensive component will be the Evolved Sea Sparrow 
Missile (ESSM).  The ESSM is a ship self defense system that the US Navy, and  the navies of 
over 15 other nations are currently developing.  This system will replace all current self defense 
systems: CIWS, NATO Sea Sparrow, and RAM.   The ESSM will offer improvements in range, 
speed, maneuverability, warhead, guidance, and reliability over all current active defensive 
systems.  The projected fielding date of the missile system is 2002 and it is expected to provide 
ship defense against future anti-ship missile.  The ESSM is expected to defeat subsonic and 
supersonic missiles that are capable of high maneuverability.   
 The guidance for the ESSM will be Semi-Active and IR.  The missile can receive initial 
or continuous guidance from the ship’s four Multifunction Arrays.  ESSM will also be capable of 
receiving CEC (cooperative engagement concept) information  from S-CVX or other assets.   
 The ESSMs will be located in two fixed, low observable, launchers [7] [26].  The 
elevation of the launchers is 20 degrees.  These launchers will be located on the super island.  
The forward launcher will be located on the port side immediately aft of the forward engine 
exhausts, and will be point at 315oR.  The aft launcher will be located on the starboard side 
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 
Decoy Launchers Torpedo Decoy 
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immediately forward of the aft engine exhausts, and will be pointed at 135oR.  This large 
separation of launchers increases the survivability of this capability.  This launcher arrangement, 
and the high mobility of the ESSM will provide compete 360o coverage.  The launchers are 
trained along expected minimal ship radar cross section bearings.  In a defensive posture, S-CVX 
would maneuver to place the threat on these axes to minimize the ship’s signature and provide a 
direct line of fire for the ESSM.  These bearings are also the bearings that offer the passive 
decoys the greatest probability of success.  Furthermore, placing the launcher locations near 
existing structures will reduce overall ship RCS because the launcher and the RCS of nearby 
structures may overlap at certain angles of orientation.  The missile exhaust from the aft launcher 
may interfere with the aft engine intakes, and this area needs further investigation. 
 Each launcher is composed of four, quad missile packs providing a total of 32 ESSM.  
These missiles are in sealed canisters to increase their reliability (95%) and can only be reloaded 
in port.  A CVN76 study of ship defenses determined that this number of ready missiles was 
adequate protection for most scenarios.    
 The ESSM will also have a ASUW mode.  This should provide a quick defense against 
surface threats out to the maximum line of sight range.  The improved warhead of the missile 
should make it a credible weapon against most hostile threats, especially smaller combatants. 
 ASW defense will be provided by the escorts, but CVX will have a passive torpedo 
defense.  This passive defense will come from a decoy that is a NIXIE derivative. Other defenses 
including a possible active anti-torpedo defense and mine defensive system will be discussed in 
later sections. 
 
4.4.4 Decoy and Deception Systems 
 CVX will have an assortment of self-defense systems to counter the anti-ship missile 
threat.  The carrier will depend on its escorts for theater ballistic missile defense.  SLQ-32 V(X) 
(follow on variants or equivalent) will provide ESM, ECM, and ECCM functions.  Softkill 
decoys will be chaff, IR, NULKA and SLQ-49 (rubber duck).  All decoys will be supported by 
the MK 53 Decoy Launch System (DLS).  The MK 53 DLS has the following components: 
· MK 23 Decoy Launch Processor (DLP) 
· MK 174 Processor Power Supply (PPS) 
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· (2) MK 137 Mod 7 Launchers 
· (2) Ready Service Locker 
 Launcher controls are located on both the bridge and CIC. 
 All decoys systems will be integrated with the ESM/ECM system, which is an integral 
part of the Combat system suite.  The entire countermeasure system can be automated, semi-
automated, (automated response recommendation, but manual decision making), or completely 
manual [28].   
 The SLQ-32 will be integrated into the multi-array radar.  The MK 23 launcher will be 
located on the super island, starboard side, and will fire to starboard to minimize the possibility 
of hitting aircraft on landing approach.  The rubber duck launchers will be located on the 
quarters.  
 The current SLQ-32 system has deficiencies that should be overcome by the time they are 
fielded on the S-CVX.  Although the rubber duck offers good broadband RF deception, their lack 
of mobility makes them vulnerable to detection.  Current IR (TORCH) decoys are non-mobile 
and may not provide enough IR energy output to mask a carrier.  Possible solutions for 
countering the increasing threat from IR anti-ship missile are active IR jamming capability and 
additional passive IR deception technique.  One possible passive defense may be to use a 
controlled water screen over hot surface areas (engine compartments and stacks area) that will 
help reduce the overall ship IR signature.  This water screen system, in conjunction with stack 
gas cooling system, and the countermeasure wash-down system will reduce the ship’s IR 
signature and increase the effectiveness of IR decoys.  
 S-CVX will also employ decoys against torpedo threats.  These could include a SLQ-36 
Nixie or derivative and an active anti-torpedo torpedo system.  There is currently a strong push 
for the development of such an active torpedo defense system.  If such a system is developed by 
the time of the S-CVX, then it should definitely be part of the S-CVX defense system.  We 
estimate that such a system will require minimal space and weight requirements.  The arrays are 
mounted on the skin of the ship and would require minimal addition structural or space 
requirements.  The torpedo compartment where the defensive torpedo will be located will require 
a space approximately 10ft by 20ft.  This compartment will house the launchers, supporting 
equipment, and a ready service magazine.  Additional defensive torpedoes will be stored in the 
main magazines.  The system will consist of four passive arrays, one located on each ship quarter 
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and designed to listen for the high frequency of the torpedo screws and active sonar.  The active 
anti-torpedo torpedo will be located in (3X3) chaff style firing banks amidships.  The torpedo 
banks will be bottom firing to provide complete semi-hemispheric coverage.   
 
4.4.5 Mine Avoidance Sonar 
Traditionally aircraft carriers have not been equipped with an organic sonar system.  
Partly this was due to the limited mine threat posed by the blue water engagements for which 
they were primarily designed.  As operations are increasingly in the littorals, however, the 
danger of mine attacks is increased.  Some U.S. warships struck mines during the Gulf War and 
the events leading up to it and while none of them sank, they were damaged sufficiently to be 
considered a mission kill.  In our design for S-CVX we recognized that with the limited number 
of carrier assets, the loss of one carrier to a mine attack could provide the difference in future 
engagements.  We therefore endeavored to equip S-CVX with a state of the art mine avoidance 
sonar.  Yet before we could lock this system into the final design we needed to satisfy two basic 
questions: 
1. Could a mine avoidance sonar be deployed with the ability to detect projected surface 
and near surface mines at a range sufficient to allow the S-CVX to stop before 
detonating the mine? 
2. Could the same sonar be designed with a transmit power level low enough so as to not 
raise the detection probability of the carrier by submarine threats? 
These issues are addressed in detail in appendix D-1.  The final result was that, yes, a mine 
avoidance sonar is indeed feasible for the S-CVX and has been incorporated into the final design. 
4.4.6 Computer and Communications Architecture  
In order to provide the decreased manning levels and increased functionality proposed in 
the rest of the S-CVX design, an integrated and robust computer and communications 
architecture was required.  In designing our system, we based our efforts on existing initiatives in 
the New Attack Submarine (NSSN), LPD-17 and CVN-76 programs.  Our design goes beyond 
these systems in that we intend to also incorporate the ship’s interior communications (IC) and 
announcing systems and the ship’s entertainment systems (e.g. cable TV) into the same 
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infrastructure.  Our goal in S-CVX is to make one more redundant, flexible and more reliable 
network than the multiple independent networks of these previous designs.  
4.4.6.1 Topology 
To define the requirements for the S-CVX computer and communications architecture, 
we used studies from the NSSN computer architecture definition effort [3][4][5][6] to define the 
required topology needed for S-CVX and to scale the size of our expected network traffic flows.  
In performing these scaling operations, several assumptions about the computer and 
communications architecture were made.  These were: 
· OC-12 technology will be available. 
· A federated approach will be used in designing this system whereby all major subsystems 
will maintain their own LANs independent of the main computer and communications 
architecture.  
· The computer and communications architecture will be used mostly  for inter-systems 
communications. 
· Since sonar is not a main sensor source for the S-CVX the data rate required will be 
approximately the same as that needed for NSSN. 
· Data rate needed for communications will be approximately 100 times that of the NSSN to 
support the needs of S-CVX and the embarked staff. 
· The crew size of the S-CVX is roughly 20 times the size of NSSN so administration and 
training needs scale accordingly. 
· Command and control data rate will be approximately 20 times that of the NSSN to support 
the needs of S-CVX and embarked staff 
· S-CVX will need many cameras to view flight deck and pit operations remotely as well as 
the surrounding sea to enable remote operation of the ship.  The scale factor will be 
approximately 20 times the data rate of NSSN. 
· Navigation information will transmitted to more stations thus requiring approximately 10 
times the data rate of NSSN. 
· ESM will be used all of the time, thus requiring 50 times the data rate of the NSSN. 
· Engineering and monitoring includes the ICAS, DCS, and SMCS systems used on S-CVX 
requiring a factor of 100 to scale the data rate. 
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· There will be a large increase in the amount of radar data generated, requiring a scale factor 
of 100 from NSSN. 
 
Table 4.4-4 shows the results of our scaling analyses and the aggregate peak network load we 
forecast of 67.6 Gbps (67.6 x 109 bits per second). 
 








Sonar 1705 1 1705 
Communications 496 100 49600 
Administration 10 20 200 
Training 160 20 3200 
Command and 
Control 
100 20 2000 
Imagery 340 20 6800 
Navigation 170 10 1700 
ESM 8 50 400 
Engineering/monitor
ing 
14 100 1400 
Radar 6 100 600 
Total: 3009  67605 
 
Table 4.4-4:  Peak network load calculations for S-CVX 
 
 To support this required data load, we utilize a scaled version of the Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode (ATM) mesh network proposed for NSSN.  The NSSN studies recommend a 4 
ATM switch network to support their required traffic.  The S-CVX data load is about 22.5 times 
larger than that of the NSSN but NSSN assumes OC-3 (155Mbps) interconnection links between 
its switches while for S-CVX we assume OC-12 (622Mpbs) technology will be fully mature and 
available.  These two factors mandate an S-CVX network containing 22.5 ATM switches.  To 
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account for the addition of IC voice and announcing systems (low data rate but high priority 
traffic) and the ship’s entertainment system (high data rate but limited distribution and low 
priority traffic) as well as to leave room for growth we double the number of required switches to 
45. 
4.4.6.2 Reliability Considerations 
 To improve the reliability of the computer and communications architecture we employ 
several initiatives.  First, all links from the subsystems to the main network are balanced as much 
as possible between the various switches in the system.  This reduces the loss effects felt by any 
one switch being lost.  Second, all messages on the computer and communications architecture 
will contain a two bit priority code.  One of these bits is the priority bit already built into the 
ATM cell format.  The second is added by us by stripping off the highest address bit in the ATM 
cell format.  This is easily done because the number of addressable destinations on a ship is far 
below the address capacity for ATM switching. By employing this priority encoding scheme we 
can better utilize dynamic routing in the ATM switches.  Thus when the network becomes 
congested due to faults or battle damage, the switches can intelligently decide which messages to 
discard while minimizing overall impact to the ship.  Last, our proposed system will utilize a 
principle we call 2 near/2 far with regard to its inter-switch connection scheme.  Under this 
principle, every switch in the network will be connected to at least two other switches in the 
same general region of the ship as well as two other switches in more distant locations.  Thus if a 
single switch loses both of its links to the more remote switches, it could still reroute its 
messages through the local links and allow those switches to forward the message.  Another 
advantage of this layout is that under normal, non-fault conditions message latency is reduced as 
the number of switches a message must hop through to reach its destination is reduced. 
4.4.6.3 Future Growth  
Even though we attempted to account for growth in the sizing of our system, we fully 
realize that technology is constantly increasing the bandwidth demands of computer networks.  
To address this we intend to build the fiber optic cable plant that connects all of this networking 
hardware together with large amounts of extra bandwidth potential.  Protocols for transfer rates 
over fiber of up to 2 Gbps already exist but the switches to implement this are either not yet 
developed or prohibitively expensive.  By ensuring our installed fiber optic cables are capable of 
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these higher data rates, we can make future upgrades as easy as replacing the installed ATM 
switches (once they become available and affordable that is). 
 
 
4.5 Hull Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) Systems Design 
The S-CVX HM&E systems and their standalone capabilities were researched and 
determined by the TSSE design team. Once each system’s capabilities was decided its 
characteristics were used as inputs into the Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool - ASSET 
MONOCV version 4.1.0. For an overview of the systems considered for each HM&E area see 
Section 3.3.2 HM&E Feasibility Study. 
Conventionally powered by four LM-6000 gas turbine engines and utilizing the Integrated 
Power System (IPS) architecture, the S-CVX is capable of a maximum speed of 28 knots.  
General characteristic highlights are presented in Table 4.5-1.  A complete set of ASSET 
generated systems reports is provided as Appendix C-3.  
S-CVX General Characteristics 
Displacement 80,374 LT 
LBP 250 m (820 ft) 
Max Beam 40 m (131 ft) 
Draft 13.2 m (43 ft) 
Flight Deck Dimensions 262.2 m x 72.2 m (860 ft x 240 ft) 
Hangar Area 4820 m2 
Max Speed 28 knots 
Endurance Speed 20 
Range @ Endurance Speed 16,000 nm 
 
Table 4.5-1:  S-CVX General Characteristics 
4.5.1 Integrated Power System 
S-CVX uses an Integrated Power System (IPS) to produce power for propulsion and ship’s      
services.  There are four power generation modules (PGM) consisting of a General Electric LM-
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6000 gas turbines, each driving a 45 megawatt generator producing AC power.  Two of the 
PGM’s are located in the forward engine room, the other two in the aft engine room.  Two 
Caterpillar 3616 Diesel engines, each driving a 4 megawatt generator, provide emergency power 
[29].  After going through a rectifier, DC power is distributed by the Zonal Electrical 
Distribution System.   
4.5.2 DC Zonal Electrical Distribution System 
S-CVX distributes electricity via the DC Zonal Electrical Distribution System (DC 
ZEDS).  DC ZEDS uses two widely separated primary bus ducts to connect zones.  This allows 
for modular construction and testing of each zone and reduces longitudinal cables (savings in 
cost and weight).  At maximum speed, the four propulsion motors require 152 megawatts, this 
still leaves 11 megawatts of power for ship’s services.  A complete load analysis is available in 
an ASSET Report “Machinery Module”  in Appendix C-3. 
4.5.3 Auxiliary Systems 
Auxiliary systems onboard S-CVX, like the Reverse Osmosis water makers, Air 
Conditioning plants, Fire pumps, Sea Water Service pumps, etc., are of modular construction as 
part of the Navy’s Affordability Through Commonality Program.  This program should be 
implemented before construction on S-CVX begins, and will make auxiliary systems more 
affordable by standardization. 
4.5.4 Propulsor System 
A novel design aspect of the S-CVX is the propulsor.  Figure 4.5-2 shows one of the four 
360° azimuthing podded electrical propulsion units on S-CVX.  Each unit has a 38 megawatt 
motor that turns a fixed pitch propeller.  Azimuthing pods eliminate the need for long shaftlines, 
rudders, thrusters, controllable pitch propellers, and reduction gears while providing tighter 
turning circles and greater stopping capability.  By operating pods in a pulling mode, a better 
wake field is seen resulting in a higher propeller efficiency.  In addition, the better wake field 
decreases propeller induced vibration and noise levels.  Azimuthing pods are a relatively new 
concept, but have been used with 20 megawatt motors on passenger vessels.  Fixed pods with 40 
megawatt motors have been used on European tankers.  Therefore, the design team of S-CVX 
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believes that the increase in technology to 38 megawatts for azimuthing pods is feasible at a 
moderate risk.  
 
 
Figure 4.5-2:  Azimuthing Electric Propulsion Drive 
4.5.5 Power Analysis 
S-CVX can achieve its endurance speed, 20 knots, on two propulsion motors.  Four 
propulsion motors are needed to achieve sustained (26 knots) and maximum (28 knots) speed.  
Propulsive coefficients for endurance, sustained, and maximum speed are 0.681, 0.680, and 
0.675,  respectively.  A detailed power analysis is available in an ASSET Report “Performance 
Analysis”  in Appendix C-3. 
4.5.6 Resistance Analysis 
The total resistance of the hull at maximum, sustained, and endurance speeds are 6.75, 
5.16, and 2.86 meganewtons, respectively.  A complete resistance analysis is available in an 
ASSET Report “Resistance Module” in Appendix C-3.   
4.6 Damage Control Design Efforts 
4.6.1 Overview 
Damage control on the S-CVX will be based on three main systems, the Damage Control 
System (DCS), the Standard Machinery Control System (SMCS), and the Integrated Condition 
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Assessment System (ICAS).  These systems will enhance S-CVX’s ability to quickly and 
effectively respond to any battle damage that it may receive.  Furthermore, the automation 
associated with these systems and their automated interaction will reduce manning requirements. 
4.6.2  Fire Suppression Systems 
Three zonal AFFF sprinkler systems will be on the flight deck.  These same systems will 
also serve as the ship’s CBR countermeasure washdown system by eliminating foam injection 
and using only seawater.  In addition there will be remotely operated water cannons on the 
superstructure and flight deck edge to augment the sprinkler system.  The aircraft salvage crane 
will be stowed in Hangar #1 to minimize its impact on the ship RCS.  To provide personnel 
protection, the stand-by flight deck fire fighting team and its associated trucks and gear will be 
positioned in the spaces below the pilothouse [30]. 
The hangar area will be divided into two compartments by blast doors.  Each compartment 
will have independent overhead AFFF sprinkler systems [31].  This system increases the ship 
survivability by containing any battle damage to only one hangar compartment and minimizing 
the possibility of cascading damages.  This is especially critical because of the long longitudinal 
length of the hangar.  The weapons gallery is also divided into several compartments, each with 
independent sprinkler systems and separated by quick acting blast doors.  This system will help 
contain any battle damage to the weapons gallery and prevent mass detonation or expansion  of 
the casualty into other weapons locations or magazines.  There are also installed sprinkler system 
along all weapons movement routes and in the magazine compartments. 
Each engine room, emergency diesel room, and auxiliary machinery room will have an 
overhead sprinkler system as well as other installed fire-fighting equipment.  The gas turbine 
engines are further enclosed in airtight modules with automatic installed CO2 systems. 
4.6.3 DC Deck Location and Flooding Concerns 
Our initial design iteration has the waterline midway up the 4th or damage control deck. 
This creates a potential flooding danger that is unacceptable.  A second design iteration would 
investigate options for increasing the freeboard of the ship to bring the DC deck above the water 
line. 
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4.6.4 Chemical, Biological and  Radiological Defense Systems 
The CBR protection of the S-CVX is extremely challenging because of the large enclosed 
volume of the hangar.  The primary CBR protection will be from the counter-measure wash 
down system and the Collective Protective System (CPS).  The CPS system is composed of two 
independent systems, one dedicated to maintaining positive ventilation by providing filtered air 
to all enclosed areas of the ship with the exception of the hangar.  The second system will 
support only the aft hangar compartment.  During increased MOPP level the forward hangar 
compartment will be secured and the aft hangar will support all air operations.  Personnel access 
to the aft hangar will be minimized and full CBR suit required.  Positive ventilation in the aft 
hangar will minimize contamination of this area.  Aircraft returning to the aft hangar will first go 
through decontamination wash down in pit stop number four.  This pit stop will have installed 
washing equipment that will be used for normal aircraft wash down as well as CBR 
decontamination wash down.  Three personnel decontamination compartments will service the 
forward hangar, aft hangar, and all pit stops.  If the tactical situation requires the operation of the 
forward hangar, full decontamination of this compartment will be required afterward.   
4.7 Manning Analysis 
The goal for S-CVX manning was a 50% reduction below that of a current Nimitz-class 
carrier (including its airwing).  To reach our manning estimate we utilized existing documents 
provided by the CVX program office and NAVAIR.  Specifically these studies included a study 
of crew manning performed by the John J. McMullen Associates (JJMA) for the CVX program 
[2] and a Notional CVX Airwing Manning Estimate  provided by NAVAIR [32].  Appendix D-1 
provides detail into how our manning estimate was reached.  Table 4.7-1 shows the top level 
results of our analysis.  The second entry in the table, which we call  CVX Baseline (B/L) shows 
the results of the JJMA study incorporating all of the low risk manning reduction initiatives they 
proposed.   
Platform Officers  Enlisted Total 
CVN-76 411 4796 5207 
CVX B/L 311 3715 4026 
S-CVX (proposed) 322 2123 2445 
Table 4.7-1 Top-Level S-CVX Manning Comparisons 
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As appendix D-1 points out, we used the JJMA study as our own starting point in preparing the 
manning estimate for S-CVX.  After accepting all of the low risk manning reductions as given, 
we then looked for other areas where the unique requirements of S-CVX (e.g. STOVL aircraft, 
and gas turbine propulsion) and opportunities (e.g. super-island) afforded to the S-CVX design 
allowed us to make further significant reductions.  By examining table 4.7-1, the fact that we met 
our manning goal becomes apparent.  S-CVX manning is 53% below that of the current CVN-76 
and is also 39% below that of the CVX baseline.  With regard to the number of officers, we show 
an increase above that of the CVX baseline.  This is due to the fact that our airwing assumes a 
crew to aircraft ratio of 2.5 vice the more common ratio of 1.5 aircrews per aircraft.  This 
addition was needed to support the S-CVX’s higher required sortie rates.  Table 4.7-2 shows a 
finer breakout of our manning numbers compared department by department with the CVX 
baseline.  
 
Enlisted:   Officers:  
Department CVX B/L S-CVX  CVX B/L S-CVX  
Operations 321 223  20 19 
Air 583 160  19 11 
Weapons 146 124  8 7 
Supply 272 180  8 8 
Engineering (+reactor) 567 189  29 11 
Legal 3 3  2 2 
Chaplain 4 4  3 3 
Maintenance Mgmt. 11 11  2 2 
Safety 7 7  2 2 
Navigation 10 10  1 1 
Medical 31 31  6 6 
Dental 13 13  5 5 
Communications 38 14  3 1 
Deck 99 99  5 5 
AIMD 199 113  6 6 
Air Wing (Note 1) 1369 918  186 229 
Command/Admin 42 24  6 4 
Totals: 3715 2123  311 322 
Table 4.7-2 CVX Baseline Manning Study Comparison 
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As you can see, in many areas we simply accepted the results of the baseline study as is -- 
usually because the size of the department was so small as to have little impact on the overall 
manning of the ship.  Some areas of particular interest, however, should be noted.   
The 72% reduction in Air Department is due primarily to use of STOVL aircraft on S-
CVX.  By eliminating catapults and relegating arrestor gear operations to emergency CTOL 
aircraft landing evolutions only, we greatly reduced the required manning numbers.  A point to 
make here is the arrestor gear, when needed, are manned as collateral duties for personnel from 
other divisions.  This said, a small contingent of personnel are retained specifically to handle 
maintenance issues for the arrestor gear.  The other major flight deck initiatives, the use of 
TowBots to maneuver aircraft on deck and an automated weapons loading system, also account 
for significant manning reductions in the air department. 
The 66% reduction in the Engineering Department is due mostly to the use of gas turbine 
propulsion by S-CVX.  The CVX baseline study still assumes nuclear propulsion for their ship.  
Using numbers provided by a separate Navy study, Marine Gas Turbine Propulsion for the  Full 
Battle Group [33], we were able to radically reduce the required manning.  In fact we even added 
back 39 enlisted personnel to the number provided by this study because we believed it may have 
inadequately addressed needs such as monitoring of electrical distribution and overall system 
maintenance. 
The proposed airwing for S-CVX is 26% smaller than that suggested in the NAVAIR 
Notional CVX Airwing Manning Estimate.  Our reductions are gained almost equally as the 
result of two factors.  First we assumed a lower need for maintenance personnel since S-CVX 
will be carrying newer and fewer types of aircraft.  Our reduction based on this factor (28.5% of 
maintenance personnel) is based on an extrapolation of reductions already seen when one 
compares existing F-14 and F/A-18 squadrons.  The second reduction initiative we propose is 
consolidation of the three embarked JSF squadrons into one JSF wing.  Again extrapolating 
values from an existing study (this time a NAVAIR study on a composite 12 plane CSA 
squadron [34]) we believe a 21.5% decrease in overall squadron manning can be achieved. 
In comparing the S-CVX weapons department against the CVX baseline you see only 
about a 15% decrease even though we discuss earlier in this paper how the automated weapons 
handling system we propose will greatly reduce needed manning.  Although this may appear 
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paradoxical it in fact is not.  This is because many of the same initiatives we describe in this 
report were also assumed in the CVX baseline manning analysis. 
Finally, we realize that any manning reduction effort usually yields most of its results at 
the expense of the entry level or apprentice level jobs on the ship.  This in turn provides a greater 
challenge to the ship in manning its watch bill and effectively fighting the ship.  To combat this, 
we factored two initiatives into our S-CVX manning analysis.  First, in most cases watches were 
assumed to be manned on a 4 section watch rotation.  This would allow for reduction to a 3 
section rotation temporarily until new personnel become qualified.  Secondly, in manning the 
deck department for S-CVX we utilized the CVX baseline numbers without reduction.  
Assuming a small (15-20%) reduction in needed deck department workload due to improved 
materials and procedures this would leave the department either over-manned or with extra time 
available for other duties.  It is our plan to man the deck department with a small, senior cadre of 
experienced Boatswains Mates for supervisory purposes and to then have the remaining 
department personnel be made of strikers and junior personnel from other departments.  These 
junior personnel would then utilize their extra time while in the deck department to gain their 
ship’s qualifications as well as to qualify at a basic in-rate watch station within their parent 
departments. 
While the items mentioned here are the highlights of the S-CVX manning estimate, many 
more manning reduction efforts have been proposed for S-CVX.  To understand the details of 
these other efforts we ask that you consult appendix C-2. 
4.8 Weight Reports 
The full load displacement for S-CVX concept design was 80,374 metric tons,  roughly 
20,000 tons less than the current Nimitz Class. The weight reductions were achieved though a 
few major systems’ modifications.  The S-CVX  has the same beam as the NIMITZ, but its 
length is nearly 71 meters (232 ft) shorter.  Other major areas of weight reduction include the 
omission of radiation shielding, the elimination of the catapult system, and the 50+ percent 
reduction in crew and personnel (below the NIMITZ).  There are a few regions in the ship’s 
design where the S-CVX has larger capacity and corresponding weight.  The MNS required that 
the ship have an aircraft fuel load of two times that of the NIMITZ, though our final concept 
design had a JP-5 fuel capacity of approximately one and a half times.  Additionally, because the 
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ship is conventionally powered, own ship’s fuel load is higher.  A full ASSET weight and SWBS 
breakdown is located in Appendix C-3, “Weight Module”.  The weight estimates were achieved 
using ASSET’S MONOCV version 4.1.0 weights reports.  These reports are based on historical 
data and user input. 
Unfortunately, not all field inputs are linked into the current version of ASSET’s Weight 
Report.  As a consequence, some items, such as payload, side protection system, and armor, may 
not be correctly or fully accounted for in the SWBS weight reports.  Further iterations in the 
design spiral and an in-depth weight analysis would be necessary to achieve more accurate 
weight figures. 
4.9 Naval Architecture Analysis 
A naval architectural analysis was completed on the hull form generated by ASSET.  The 
most significant discrepancy of the hull is that the Damage Control (DC) deck is partially 
submerged.  This can be corrected in the next design iteration by lengthening or widening the 
hull to decrease draft.  The team experimented with one option to widen the beam by 10 meters.  
This lowered our draft from 13.2 meters to 11.5 meters, putting our DC deck above the 
waterline.  The following calculations were all performed on the hull described in section 4.2. 
4.9.1 Body Plan 
The body plan is shown in Figure 4.9-1. 
BL
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 Figure 4.9-1:  S-CVX Body Plan 
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4.9.2 Isometric View 
The isometric view is shown in Figure 4.9-2. 
  
ASSET/MONOCV VERSION 4.1.0 - HULL GEOM MODULE -  12/18/97 20:47.43
GRAPHIC DISPLAY NO. 2 - HULL ISOMETRIC VIEW
 
  Figure 4.9-2:  S-CVX Isometric view of hull 
 
4.9.3 Section Area Curve 
A section area curve for level trim at the DWL is shown in Figure 4.9-3. 









FRACTION OF SHIP LBP FROM FPAP FP
ASSET/MONOCV VERSION 4.1.0 - HULL GEOM MODULE -  12/18/97 20:47.43
GRAPHIC DISPLAY NO. 5 - HULL SECTIONAL AREA CURVE
 
    Figure 4.9-3:  S-CVX Section Area Curve 
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4.9.4 Hydrostatic Properties at Level Trim 
Hydrostatic properties at level trim of S-CVX are shown in Figure 4.9-4. 
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Figure 4.9-4:  S-CVX Hydrostatic Properties at level trim 
 
4.9.5  Floodable Length Curve 
The floodable length curve is used to determine the allowable compartment lengths which 
will ensure that the margin line is not submerged, should the compartments spanning the defined 
factor of subdivision become flooded.  U.S. Navy regulations require ships to sustain flooding 
damage up to 15% of LBP, or 38 meters for S-CVX.  Figure 4.9-5 shows the floodable length 
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 Figure 4.9-5:  Floodable Length Curve 
 
4.9.6 Intact Stability with Wind Heeling Arm 
An intact stability curve with a 100 knot wind is shown in Figure 4.9-6.  Note that the 
maximum righting arm is 3.8 meters at 55°.  Also note that a positive righting arm extends well 
past 90°. 
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 Figure 4.9-6:  Intact Stability with Wind Heeling Arm 
  
4.9.7 Intact Stability with Turn Heeling Arm 
An intact stability curve for a turn at maximum speed (28 knots) with a turn radius of 400 
meters is shown in Figure 4.9-7.  Note that the maximum righting arm is again, 3.8 meters at 55° 
and that there is a positive righting arm well past 90°. 
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 Figure 4.9-7:  Intact Stability with Turn Heeling Arm  
A complete naval architectural analysis is given in the ASSET reports in Appendix C-3,  
particularly in the “Hull Geometry Module” , “Hull Subdivision Module”, and “Hydrostatic 
Analysis”. 
4.10 Cost Analysis 
4.10.1 Methodology 
The S-CVX cost analysis was calculated using the same  Cost Estimating Ratios (CERs) 
as the 1996 Arsenal Ship design [28].  Some of the CERs were modified to reflect the Arsenal 
Ship’s modified repeat design; these CERs were reverted back to their original values for use in 
the S-CVX analysis.  The weights used were derived from the SWBS weights from the weight 
module of the Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool (ASSET) computer model of the S-CVX.  
The weights were converted from metric tons to long tons for use with the CERs..  The manning 
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portion of life cycle cost was calculated for comparison to that of the USS Nimitz. This assumes 
about $55,000 per crew member for 50 years. 
Another consideration for life cycle cost compared to a nuclear carrier is the cost of 
disposal and refueling.  This cost was not calculated directly but it most certainly is significant 
and worthy of consideration. 
 
4.10.2  Results 
The lead ship cost for the S-CVX is $2.15 billion, with the airwing the total cost is $4.63 
billion. 
The total savings for life cycle manning over the Nimitz is: $7.6 billion 
 Table 4.10-1 provides the details of this analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.10-1 S-CVX Cost Analysis 
  WT   MAT  MATERIAL  Labor  
DESCRIPTION  (LT) OTHER  CER COST  Hours 
SHELL + SUPPORTS  5100.9   1181 $6,024,162.90 316 1,611,884
HULL STRUCTURAL 
BULKHEADS 
 6737.3   1181 $7,956,751.30 316 2,128,987
HULL DECKS  6893.4   1181 $8,141,105.40 316 2,178,314
HULL PLATFORMS/FLATS  961.3   1181 $1,135,295.30 316 303,771
DECK HOUSE STRUCTURE  2407.7   1028 $2,475,115.60 692 1,666,128
SPECIAL STRUCTURES  8491.3   1632 $13,853,555.95 251 2,131,316
MASTS+KINGPOSTS+SERV 
PLATFORM 
 34.2   6183 $211,458.60 164 5,609
FOUNDATIONS  1183.7   1028 $1,216,843.60 359 424,948
SPECIAL PURPOSE 
SYSTEMS 
 1290.4   4758 $6,139,723.20 404 521,322
        
ENERGY SYS (NUCLEAR)  0   0 $0.00 0 0
ENERGY GENERATING 
SYSTEM (NONNUC) 
 0   0 $0.00 0 0
PROPULSION UNITS  863.8 203950  144 $29,368,800.00 209 180,534
TRANSMISSION+PROPULS
OR SYSTEMS 
 166.5 203950  63 $12,848,850.00 162 26,973
SHAFTING  15.4   20003 $308,046.20 0 0
SUPPORT SYSTEMS  435.3   0 $0.00 412 179,344
PROPUL SUP SYS- FUEL, 
LUBE OIL 
 63.9   36916 $2,358,932.40 1412 90,227
SPECIAL PURPOSE 
SYSTEMS 
 45.5   0 $0.00 0 0




 322.5 32000  650 $209,625.00 4 1,290
POWER DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM 
 1243.1   98329 $122,232,779.9
0 
1294 1,608,571
LIGHTING SYSTEM  300.9   5450 $1,639,905.00 1329 399,896
POWER GENERATION 
SUPPORT SYS 
 153.5   14545 $2,232,657.50 1882 288,887
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYS  50.6   788 $39,872.80 471 23,833
        
COMMAND+CONTROL SYS  68   150000 $10,200,000.00 235 15,980
NAVIGATION SYS  43.1   150000 $6,465,000.00 235 10,129
INTERIOR 
COMMUNICATIONS 
 124.8   150000 $18,720,000.00 235 29,328
EXTERIOR 
COMMUNICATIONS 
 103   150000 $15,450,000.00 235 24,205
SURF SURV SYS (RADAR)  178.6   150000 $26,790,000.00 235 41,971
UNDERWATER 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS 
 0   150000 $0.00 235 0
COUNTERMEASURES  90.3   150000 $13,545,000.00 235 21,221
FIRE CONTROL SYS  57.1   150000 $8,565,000.00 235 13,419
SPECIAL PURPOSE SYS  29.9   150000 $4,485,000.00 235 7,027
        
CLIMATE CONTROL  934.7   32868 $30,721,719.60 494 461,742
SEA WATER SYSTEMS  571.2   50705 $28,962,696.00 679 387,845
FRESH WATER SYSTEMS  116.1   34033 $3,951,231.30 529 61,417
FUELS/LUBRICANTS, 
HANDLING+STORAGE 
 1395.4   42125 $58,781,225.00 271 378,153
AIR, GAS+MISC FLUID 
SYSTEM 
 173.2   70265 $12,169,898.00 647 112,060




 468.7   8035 $3,766,004.50 176 82,491
MECHANICAL HANDLING 
SYSTEMS 
 2158.5   16853 $36,377,200.50 259 559,052
SPECIAL PURPOSE 
SYSTEMS 
 669.8   1888 $1,264,582.40 282 188,884
        
SHIP FITTINGS  55   55033 $3,026,815.00 882 48,510
HULL 
COMPARTMENTATION 
 454.7   11160 $5,074,452.00 741 336,933
PRESERVATIVES+COVERI
NGS 
 1285.2   10789 $13,866,022.80 494 634,889
LIVING SPACES  373.2   29677 $11,075,456.40 1235 460,902
SERVICE SPACES  128.9   26174 $3,373,828.60 135 17,402
WORKING SPACES  346.7   27376 $9,491,259.20 292 101,236
STOWAGE SPACES  777.8   86901 $67,591,597.80 12 9,334
SPECIAL PURPOSE 
SYSTEMS 
 19.6   35511 $696,015.60 694 13,602
        
MISSILES+ROCKETS  13.9   100000 $1,390,000.00 235 3,267
SMALL 
ARMS+PYROTECHNICS 




 813.7   100000 $81,370,000.00 235 191,220
SPECIAL PURPOSE 
SYSTEMS 
 133.9   100000 $13,390,000.00 235 31,467
        
SHIPS FORCE  298.2      
MISSION RELATED 
EXPENDABLES 
 1603.3      





     
LIQUIDS, NON-PETROLEUM 
BASED 
 650.3      
FUTURE GROWTH MARGIN  453.6      
Total Payload weight:  23030.
3 
     
        
Total 1991 Material Cost:   $709,413,485     
Total 1997 Material Cost:   $847,076,801     
        
Total Reference Labor Hours:   33,474,837     Sum of Labor Hours:  18,016,597 
        Ship Assembly and Support Labor: 
Learning Curve Exponent:   95.00%        (=0.478*Labor)   
        Integration and Engineering Labor: 
Total 1997 Lead Ship Labor 
Hours:  
  37,091,202        (=0.186*Labor)   
Total 1997 Second Ship 
Labor Hours: 
  35,236,656     Program Management Labor: 
Total 1997 Third Ship Labor 
Hours: 
  34,195,104       (=0.194*Labor)   
Total 1997 Fourth Ship Labor 
Hours: 
  33,474,837     
Total 1997 Fifth Ship Labor 
Hours: 
  32,926,618     Total Labor Costs:  33,474,837 
Total 1997 Sixth Ship Labor 
Hours: 
  32,485,362     
        
1997 Labor Cost per Hour:   $25     
Total 1997 Lead Ship Labor 
Cost 
  $927,280,050     
Total 1997 Second Ship 
Labor Cost: 
  $880,916,403     
Total 1997 Third Ship Labor 
Cost: 
  $854,877,611     
Total 1997 Fourth Ship Labor 
Cost: 
  $836,870,920     
Total 1997 Fifth Ship Labor 
Cost: 
  $823,165,454     
Total 1997 Sixth Ship Labor 
Cost: 
  $812,134,058     
        
Non-recurring Engineering 
Hours: 
  1300000     




  $58,500,000     
Navy Program Cost Factor:   1.00%     
Total Non-recurring 
Engineering Cost: 
  $59,085,000     
        
Shipyard General & 
Administrative Overhead: 
  6.50%     
Shipyard Insurance:   1.00%     
Shipyard Contingency:   10.00%     
Shipyard Profit:   4.00%     
Total Shipyard Fee + 
Overhead Rate: 
  21.50%     
        
Total 1997 Acquisition Costs        
Nonrecurring Engineering 
Cost: 
  $59,085,000     
Lead Ship:   $2,155,843,574     
Second Ship:   $2,099,511,742     
Third Ship:   $2,067,874,611     
Fourth Ship:   $2,045,996,481     
Fifth Ship:   $2,029,344,340     
Sixth Ship:   $2,015,941,194     
        
Estimated Payload Costs:              MANNING  
Total Payload Weight:   23030.3   Nimitz  S-CVX 
Total Payload Cost:   $14,900,604    Crew:  5207  2445
      $14,319,250,000  $6,723,750,000
Sail Away Cost:   $2,229,829,178    Diff:   $7,595,500,000
airwing:   $2,400,000,000     
Total System Cost:   $4,629,829,178     
 
4.11  Conclusions 
The design put forth in this report is, we believe, an alternative worth considering for the 
future aircraft carrier needs of the Navy and the nation.  Our study combines many innovative 
approaches that add functionality, reduce manning, meet the unique requirements imposed on 
our design (e.g. STOVL, Gas Turbine, Humanitarian/OOW Ops, etc.) and still produce a ship 
that shows significant life cycle cost reductions below the current Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.  
We understand that our efforts represent only the first iteration in a true design process and that 
there are many areas in our design that require further work.  This said, we are very confident 
that most of the ideas and innovations we propose are feasible.  It is our hope that at least some 
portion of our efforts may prove useful to the actual CVX design program.  
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4.12 Faculty Assessment of Major Design Innovations 
 
The S-CVX design created by this year’s TSSE students contains several innovative concepts 
that deserve repeated mention.  Most are not unique to the STOVL-only airwing and provide 
such significant benefits that they merit serious consideration for incorporation into any 
advanced carrier design.  Specifically, the TSSE faculty believes the following concepts deserve 
special recognition: 
Super-Island with enclosed Pit Stops 
One-stop Pit Stops 
Tow-Bots for aircraft movement and positioning 
Automated weapons handling system 
Frame-Kit emergency berthing 
Azimuthing pod propulsors 
Jet-blast collectors 
Enclosed, slant motion elevators 
Mine avoidance sonar system 
 
Super-Island with enclosed Pit Stops. 
 
The super-island concept allows all aircraft turn-around functions except landing and take-off to 
be performed in a conditioned, protected environment.  This significantly reduces the hazard to 
the crew and minimizes protective equipment needed.  The few crew needed to perform minor 
repairs and checkout are shielded from the weather and direct exposure to blast, fragments, flash, 
chemical/biological/radiological contamination.  Aircraft are provided similar protection.  
Because all crew functions are performed within the shelters, they should take less time than in 
unprotected environments, reducing turn-around time. Contributions to radar and infrared 
signatures from aircraft on deck are reduced (although not eliminated because not all aircraft can 





One-stop Pit Stops 
 
The TSSE S-CVX concept has pit stops located in the super-island.  This is desirable, but not 
essential.  One-stop pit stops have advantages even when located on exposed locations on the 
flight deck.  The ability to safely refuel, rearm, make minor electronic repairs, and exchange 
flight crews at a single location eliminates the need for movement of aircraft from refueling sites, 
to arming sites, etc.  Specific fixed locations can have specialized automatic equipment which 
can allow multiple functions to be performed in parallel rather than sequentially.  This, too, will 




The robotic towing and tie-down vehicles called TowBots can eliminate many flight deck 
personnel.  By eliminating human error and human traffic they can speed up aircraft spotting.  
Coupled with automated pit stops they permit the virtual elimination of flight deck personnel 
with major improvements in safety and reduction in total manpower. 
 
Automated Weapons Handling System 
 
One of the most manpower-intensive functions on conventional aircraft carriers is the loading, 
storage, removal, assembly, movement, attachment to aircraft, and arming of the bombs and 
missiles carried by the carrier’s aircraft.  The automated system removes the necessity for each 
of these tasks to be performed by crew members.  Speed of operations can be increased by 
removing the human from the loop.  The probability of making a mistake in the assembly or 
arming which results in failed ordnance during mission will also be reduced.  An automated 
system will require weapons standardization.  This can result in less space devoted to magazines.  
The just-in-time character of an automated weapons handling system also means that the 
traditional bomb farm around the island can be eliminated with an enormous improvement in 




Frame-Kit Emergency Berthing 
 
The use of pre-fabricated, specially designed structures which can be stored in limited volumes 
and rapidly assembled into large-scale berthing and sanitation facilities for non-combatants or 
wounded, deserves serious consideration if missions other than war continue to be commonplace.  
It is not practical to devote too much space or resources to these occasional missions.  Yet failure 
to be prepared could have tragic if not catastrophic consequences, when those missions arise. 
 
Jet Blast Collectors 
 
STOVL aircraft will be developed for naval missions (the Marines will procure a STOVL 
version of JSF) even if the Navy procures a CTOL JSF.  The engines from such STOVL aircraft 
will significantly heat the flight deck.  Tire damage and personnel injuries may result.  The 
impact of the jet blast on the deck will also significantly raise noise levels.  By having areas with 
cooled grates to collect the STOVL engine down-blast and direct it overboard, both the heating 
and noise effects will be significantly ameliorated.  STOVL aircraft may also be spotted closer 
together because the blast effects are ameliorated. 
 
Enclosed, Slant Motion Elevators 
 
Traditional deck-edge elevators pose three serious limitations on aircraft carriers.  Flight 
operations must stop when the sea state is high enough to wet the elevator decks with green 
water.  The openings associated with deck-edge elevators make it nearly impossible to control 
the radar cross section presented to cruise missiles and attack aircraft.  The openings also make it 
difficult to button up the hangar deck to prevent contamination during a chemical, biological, or 
radiological (CBR) attack.  The openings are usually open regardless of elevator position unless 
under the immediate threat of CBR attack.  Deck edge elevators are desirable because they do 
not limit the deck areas available for landing and take-off operations.  The TSSE design team 
conceived of elevators which open onto the flight deck at the edges but retract into the hull at a 
slant, paralleling the slope of the sponsons.  In this design the sponson can totally enclose the 
elevator.  Radar cross section is determined by the shape of the sponsons, not by the cavity 
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reflectors inside the hangar deck.  Because the elevator is totally enclosed, sea state need not 
limit flight operations until green water wets the flight deck.  Other factors such as wind speed 
will probably limit operations before enclosed elevators do.  With the elevators closed it is 
possible to pressurize the hangar deck and preclude CBR contamination.  The only serious 
disadvantange of the enclosed, slant-motion elevators is that they will reduce the space available 
on the hangar deck.  This limitation does not seem to outweigh the advantages. 
 
Mine Avoidance Sonar 
 
Mines are becoming so numerous in the arsenals of our potential enemies that aircraft carriers 
will almost certainly encounter mined area.  The mined areas need not be localized or located in 
traditional choke points.  It is possible that mid-ocean transit routes might be mined by enemy 
submarines.  The United States does not possess the mine-clearing assets to ensure safety during 
higher speed operations.  Because it would be catastrophic to the Navy to lose a billion-dollar 
aircraft carrier to a thousand-dollar mine, some form of mine detection equipment should be 
incorporated on every major combatant to permit avoidance of moored or floating mines.  
Bottom mines would not be addressed but these are usually more expensive and less common in 
deeper waters where major combatants would sail.  The simple sonar system conceived by the 
TSSE students is merely indicative that a low-powered, high-frequency sonar could be 
developed which can localize mines but not increase the carrier’s acoustic signature to levels 
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10,000 infantry   100 MBT    
 100 APC   50 mobile SAM launchers 
 15 fixed SAM sites  200 mobile AAA 
 200 ARTY   40 MRL 
 24 attack helicopter  100 SS-22 ASCM 
 100 IRBM (widely scattered, NBC & conventional) 
 
AIR 
 48 fighters (MiG-29 and F-22 equivalent) (located at Bandar-E-Abbas) 
 144 fighters at two nearby bases (400 km) 
 
SEA 
 8 Japanese AIP submarines 
 6 DDG 
 12 missile PC 




 CVX Carrier Battle Group: 
 1 CVX    4 SC-21 
 1 AEGIS CG   2 SSN 
 1 AEGIS DDG  1 MCM 
 
 Amphibious Force: 
 1 LHD    1 LPD 
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 2 AEGIS DDG  2 SC-21 
 2500 Marines   2 MCM 
 
 Supporting Forces: 
1 CV Battle Group in central Arabian Gulf halting southward flow of Iranian troops and 
aircraft after destroying initial invasion force. 
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The tactical strategy in any amphibious landing is to first establish local air superiority; 
thus, it was assumed that all air threat would have to be neutralized before the landing.  Initial 
calculation showed that it was not possible to effectively destroy all three airbases and their 
aircraft with 60 JSF.  The strategy is to conduct massive and complete air strikes of each airbase 
individually.  TLAM (from escort surface combatants and submarines) with runways hindrance 
submunitions  would precede the air strike.  TLAM would also be used to temporarily neutralize 
the other airbases until the next air strike arrives.  Below is detail analysis of the three air strikes 
on the air bases [1] [2]. 
 




1. Enemy aircraft distributed evenly at the three airfields: 33 AC at each field: 
2. Enemy status at each field:  3 CAP 
6 on ready standby 
25 AC in hangars or revettes 
       9 air targets and 25 land targets at each field. 
3. Attack using Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) for each land target. JSOW PK = 0.7 
 
Use two JSOW per land target give PK = 0.91. 
Each JSF will carry two internal JSOW (stealth mode). 
25 strike JSF required for each field. 
 
Three strikes will be required for mission accomplishment.  The strikes will be preceded by 
TLAM with submunition to destroy aircraft parked in the open and to prevent the aircraft from 
taking off. 
 
Airfield #1  Airfield #2  Airfield #3  
 
Pre-strike 2 TLAM  4 TLAM  6 TLAM 
 
Strike #1 25 JSF strike 
  2 JSF ECM 
  4 JSF fighter 
  2 JSF (photo-JSOW) 
  4JSF CAP 
  2 V22 tanker 
  1 V22 AEW 
  2 SH60 
  119
  4 JSF standby 
  4 JSF down for repairs (assumed 90% combat ready status) 
  
Strike #2    25 JSF strike 
     2 JSF ECM 
     4 JSF fighter 
 2 JSF (photo-JSOW) 
 4JSF CAP 
 2 V22 tanker 
 1 V22 AEW 
 2 SH60 
 2 JSF standby 
 4 JSF down for repairs  
2 JSF combat loss from strike #1 (assumed 5% loss per 
sortie). 
 
Strike #3       25 JSF strike 
      2 JSF ECM 
        4 JSF fighter 
 2 JSF (photo-JSOW) 
 4JSF CAP 
 2 V22 tanker 
 1 V22 AEW 
 2 SH60 
 2 JSF standby 
 4 JSF down for repairs  
4 JSF combat loss from strike   #1 
and #2. 
      
A fourth sortie of the same mix was performed for a mop up operation.  All four strike missions 




The sortie rate for the hostile submarines was not determined by the number or type of 
ordnance required to neutralize the threat.  The number of sorties was calculated on the basis of 
maintaining two continuous concentrated search and prosecution efforts, which require the 
support of five V22 and two SH60.  These aircraft would remain on station until the arrival of 
their relief.  A second group of two V22 and 1 SH60 performed general search missions and 
additional support for the two other groups.  The V22 were assumed to require ½ hour transit 
each way and would have 2 hours on station.  SH60 required 1-hour transit each way and would 
have 1 hour on station.   Table 1 illustrates the flight requirement of each aircraft in support of 
ASW missions. 
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Threat:  9 DDG 
 -Response:  Standoff attack by JSF. 
 -Weapons: Harpoon (assume PK = 0.5) 
 -Required Sortie: Neutralize 100% threat. 
  Assume 3 Harpoon for each DDG, PK = 0.88 
  Assume 2 Harpoon/JSF = 14 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat:  24 Missile PC 
 -Response: Direct attack by JSF 
 -Weapons: Harpoon or Iron Bombs 
 -Required Sortie: Neutralize 100% threat. 
  Assume 2 weapon for each target 





Threat: 10,000 infantry 
V22 #1 V22 #2 V22 #3 V22 #4 SH60 #1 V22 #5 SH60 #2 V22 #6 V22 #7 SH60 #3
0 T/OS OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS T
1 OS OS /T T/ OS
2 OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS
3 OS OS/T T/OS OS
4 OS/T T/OS T/ OS /T OS/T T
5 OS OS/T T/OS OS
6 T/OS OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS T
7 OS OS /T T/ OS
8 OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS T/OS OS/T T/OS
9 OS OS/T OS OS
10 OS/T T/OS T/ OS/T /T OS/T T
11 OS T/OS OS
12 T/OS OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS T
13 OS OS /T T/ OS
14 OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS T/OS OS/T T/OS
15 OS OS/T OS OS
16 OS/T T/OS T/ OS/T /T OS/T T
17 OS T/OS OS
18 T/OS OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS T
19 OS OS /T T/ OS
20 OS/T T/OS OS/T T/OS T/OS OS/T T/OS
21 OS OS/T OS OS
22 OS/T T/OS T/ OS/T /T OS/T T
23 OS T/OS OS
# of Sortie 12 16 12
CONCETRATED SEARCH AND PROSECUTION ADDITIONAL SEARCH
Hours
ASW Group 1 ASW Group 2 ASW Group 3
Total V22 Sortie 28
Total SH60 Sortie 12
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-Response: Continuing direct air attack of marshaling areas, choke points, and other areas of 
concentration. 
 -Weapons: Air deployed cluster bombs and area denial munitions. 
 -Required Aircraft sorties: Neutralized 50% of threat; 5000 infantry 
  assume 100 infantry killed per sortie = 50 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 100 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and 100 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) 
               = 200 targets 
-Response: Standoff attack of marshalling area, choke points, etc. 
 -Weapons: JSOW B (24 sub-munitions per JSOW); 2 JSOW per JSF. 
-Required Aircraft sorties: assume JSOW PK = 0.5 therefore 12 target destroyed per JSOW. 
To destroy 50% of threat requires  8.5 JSF sorties. 
 
 
Threat: 15 fixed Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites 
-Response: Standoff attack. 
 -Weapons: JSOW A, Tomahawk, SLAM-ER, JASSM 
 -Required Aircraft sorties: assume 2 weapons per target = 30 weapons total. 
Assume 75% will be air-launched weapons = 23 weapons 
Assume 2 weapons per JSF = 12 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 100 mobile Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) 
-Response: JSF stand off attacks. 
 -Weapons: JSOW A, SLAM-ER (ATR) 
 -Required Aircraft sorties: To destroy 75% of threat 
Assume 2 sorties to acquire and destroy each target = 150 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 100 SS-22 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) 
-Response: JSF direct attack. 
 -Weapons: Dumb/Smart bombs. 
 -Required Aircraft sorties: assume 4 bombs/JSF with PK=0.8 
= 32 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 40 Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) 
-Response: JSF direct attack 
 -Weapons: JDAM, PK=0.5 
-Required Aircraft sorties: Assume destroy all MRLs with 20 miles of beachhead = 20 MRL.  
Assume 4 bombs per JSF = 10 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 50 Mobile SAM launchers  
-Response: JSF (stealth configuration) direct attack 
 -Weapons: HARM and cluster bombs 
 -Required Aircraft sorties: = 25 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 200 Mobile Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA)  
-Response: JSF direct attack 
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 -Weapons: Cluster bombs; PK=0.5; 4 bombs/JSF 
 -Required Aircraft sorties: Assume 50% detection probability = 50 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 200 ARTILLERY 
-Response: JSF direct attack 
 -Weapons: Cluster bombs; PK=0.5; 4 bombs/JSF  
 -Required Aircraft sorties: Assume destroy 50% threat = 50 JSF sorties. 
 
Threat: 24 Attack Helicopters  
-Response: JSF attack 
 -Weapons: Air-to-Air missile (PK=0.7), Cluster bombs (PK=0.7) , JDAM (PK=0.9) 
-Required Aircraft sorties: = Assume 30% kill in Air, 50% soft target on ground, 20% hard 
ground targets. 
8 air target = 6 JSF sorties. 




[1]  Operation Desert Storm, Evaluation of the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134, June 1997, 
www.gao.gov. 









 Appendix B-1  Island-less Carrier Study 
OVERVIEW 
 An island-less carrier presents the opportunity to lower ship RCS signatures and increase 
launch and recovery flight path options.  This study reviews the feasibility of  an island-less 
CVX design and presents possible solutions to inherent problems posed by removing the island. 
 While existing CVN island designs support many functions, the crucial functions 
identified in this study were aviation control; antenna farm; conning stations; and CO tactical 
plot.  Several other important functions such as the CO’s cabin, Flag Officer cabin have 
traditionally been located on the island, however, as long as the senior officers are provided with 
relatively close access to the aforementioned crucial functions, their location does not necessarily 
require a bridge and island.  
 The total deckhouse area of the NIMITZ Class CVN is less than one percent of the total 
available area.  Incorporating the function spaces lost due to island elimination into the ship hull 
and sponsons becomes only an exercise in arrangements.  Further, by implementing CVX 
manning reduction plans greater flexibility in arrangements may also be possible.  
 
CURRENT CVN ISLAND FUNCTION AREA REQUIREMENTS 
 The review of functional spaces housed in the carrier island is based the nominal Large 
CTOL Asset Carrier.  The Asset space module report breaks down the area (m2) and ship 
location (deckhouse, hull/sponson, or either) of all the ship’s functions.   Table 1 lists the 
breakdown of  deckhouse function areas.  The Large CTOL Carrier total area is 83780 m2  and 
the total deckhouse (island) area is 494 m2, yielding a ratio of deckhouse area to total area of 
0.57%.*  Clearly, finding room for island functions is not a problem.   But, functions such as 
aviation control and ship control necessarily require the ability to ‘see.’  Removal of  the island 
calls for a novel approach to fulfill these functional requirements. 
 The surface area required for the ship’s antennas is a small fraction of the total exposed 
surface area (above the waterline) of the CVN.  But, relocation becomes a problem for two 
primary reasons:  first, an unobstructed clear field of view must be maintained; and second, the 
potential for irradiating top side personnel must be avoided.  Another factor, not considered, is 
                                                 
* All area reports based on the output of Asset’s Nominal Large CTOL CVN model. 
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each system’s horizon range.  Horizon range is a function of height above sea level, eliminating 
the island would necessarily reduce this range. But, the carrier’s inherent size, flight deck 
approximately 60 ft above the sea, mitigates this factor. 
 
OPTIONS FOR AVIATION CONTROL AND SHIP CONNING 
To provide a view of the flight deck and local air traffic four options were considered:   
1. Balloon/dirigibles equipped with panoramic camera system  tethered to the port and 
starboard deck edges;   
2. Mast mounted panoramic camera system; this option assumes a “super-mast” is used in 
the CVX design;  
3. Deck edge mounted radar(s) or IRST linked to a computer simulation of the flight deck 
and local air space;   
4. Dog-house mounted panoramic camera system , IRST, or radar system; this option 
assumes a “small” flight deck structure which may house aircraft rapid refuel/reload 
facilities and or hangar deck elevator shaft.     
Options 1) and 3) assume no flight superstructures whatsoever, while 2) and 4) assume 
small optimally shaped structures, i.e., low radar cross section.    To accurately assess the 
feasibility of these options a breakdown of advantages and disadvantages for each follows. 
 
Balloon System:    
 Advantages: 
1. Real time, non simulated display. 
2. Multiple redundancy; two or more balloons and multiple cameras. 
3. Output display has look and feel similar to current island’s physical view. 
4. Better than current system, 360° degree coverage. 
5. Relatively cheap components. 
6. Not very technically demanding. 
7. Hardwire linked possible, high data rate capability, excellent image quality. 
 Disadvantages:    
1. Questionable ability to operate in high sea states or high winds. 
2. May not be a feasible options for ship control during in-port maneuvering.  
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3. Stability of camera system image may fluctuate, decreased ability to follow flight deck 
operations. 
4. Requires transponder and associated software for exact balloon location and camera 
orientation. 
5. Possible interference with flight paths. 
6. No inherent linkage to computer controlled flight deck and operation management. 
 
Mast Mounted Panoramic Camera System:    
 Advantages: 
Same as balloon system above plus: 
1. Flight path interference not an issue, assume super mast is pre-existing. 
2. Fixed camera system position. 
3. Operate in all winds and sea states. 
 Disadvantages: 
1. Presupposes incorporation of a “super mast.” 
2. Possible blind spot at base of mast, therefore, requires deck edge cameras. 
3. Mast may not provide high enough elevation for optimal view of flight deck. 
4. Shorter horizon than for balloon or radar systems. 
 
Deck Edge Radar(s) or Infrared Search and Track (IRST) and Computer Simulated Flight Deck 
Environment  
 Advantages: 
1. Possible to obtain exact coordinates, range, and azimuth of aircraft on flight deck and in local 
air space. 
2. More easily input/feed to other operations systems, e.g. IFF could identify plane and its 
location on flight deck.   
3. Computer simulated approach enhances ability to provide training and mock exercises in 
flight deck management. 
4. System is stable and accurate. 
5. No interference with flight path. 
6. Good performance in all sea states, except extremely heavy rain or fog. 
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Disadvantages: 
1. Possible for enemy intercept of radar. 
2. Non-traditional “feel” of computer simulated flight deck, complications with man-machine 
interface (MMI). 
3. System cost more expensive than the other options. 
4. Concern for prolonged exposure of pilots and flight deck crew to deck edge radar. 
 
Dog House Mounted Camera, Radar System, or IRST 
Advantages: 
1. Higher elevation than deck edge, therefore better horizon range for radar and IRST. 
2. Circular scanning possible, multiple systems not required for 360° coverage. 
3. Operate in all sea states. 
4. Fixed sensor sight and ease of access. 
5. Same advantages as Deck Edge Radar, except for some possible flight path interference.   
6. Dog house provides larger surface are for sensor mounting and thus greater design flexibility. 
Disadvantages: 
1. Presupposes incorporation of a “dog house.” 
2. Potential for “blind spots” at the base of the dog house, larger blind spot that for mast system. 
3. Depending on system chosen, cost and computer user interface may be  not be acceptable. 
  
OPTIONS FOR ANTENNA RELOCATION 
 The island functions as the mounting location for most of the carrier’s antennas 
eliminating the island presents some difficulty.  Three possible options may be considered for the 
next generation carrier:  deck mount the antennas;  use conformal arrays mounted to the hull and 
sponsons; or house all the antennas in a “super mast” structure similar to that proposed for the 
SC-21.    
Mounting the antennas on the carrier’s deck edge is simplest and cheapest option, but it 
would necessarily pose restrictions on flight deck operation areas.  Further, there would be an 
increased danger to irradiating crew and  also there would be a loss in horizon range of the 
applicable antennas.   
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Developing hull/sponson mounted conformal arrays for each of the ship’s antennas would 
likely be technically feasible by the timeframe of construction.  Conformal arrays would provide 
added directivity over existing antenna designs and would also mitigate some of the losses due to 
the decrease in horizon range associated with the lower mounting location.  Development cost 
would likely be the obstacle for this option.  To obtain 360° coverage, arrays would likely have 
to be placed on both the port and starboard side of the ship; this added redundancy would 
increase cost, but also would improve system performance.   
The set-up to most closely match the current carrier’s antenna configuration would be the 
flight deck “dog house” option.  The doghouse would provide a covered area for aircraft 
refueling and weapons loading and possibly a cover for an inboard elevator.  The large surface 
area on top of the dog house would allow for relatively easy configuration of a traditional 
“antenna farm.”  It is assumed that the dog house is designed to minimize radar cross section. 
Finally, a “super mast” structure mounted on the flight deck could be used to house the 
antennas.  The SC-21 design proposes to use such a mast, but the technical feasibility of the 
design remains to be proven.  However, success of the program would greatly influence the 
design for a CVX system.  Such a super mast could pose an interference to flight deck 
operations, but would have the added benefit of collocating all the antennas and increasing 
antenna horizon range. 
  128
Appendix C-1 Mine Avoidance Sonar Analysis 
 
1.  Question.  Is a mine avoidance sonar practical given our S-CVX design?  Specifically, 
a.  Can the carrier stop in time? 
b.  Will the mine avoidance sonar increase the carrier’s detection range by hostile 
submarines? 
c.  Are power requirements reasonable? 
d.  Are manning requirements reasonable? 
2.  Assumptions. 
a.  Normal cruising speed of 15 kts or 8.3 m/s. 
b.  4 propulsion pods @ 30MW each. 
c.  Propeller diameter is 6.2 m. 
d.  Astern propulsion is 2/3rds that of the forward direction. 
e.  Ship displacement is 80,000 metric tons. 
f.  Mine diameter is 1 m, and located just below the surface. 
g.  Mine detonation keep-out zone is 100 m. 
h.  Crew reaction time (= Detect + Track + Decision time) is 1 min. 
i.  Mine avoidance sonar has a Probability of Detection (PD) of 0.8 per pulse or 0.9933 
PD for a 2 out of 5 detection scheme. 
j.  The sonar has a Probability of False Detection (PF) of 1x10-5 per pulse or 1x10-9 PF 
for a 2 out of 5 detection scheme. 
k.  The sonar has a Directivity Index of 14 dB, and aperture area of 9 m2. 
l.  Hostile submarine will hear the carrier when inside direct path range. 
m.  Direct path range is 12 km. 
n.  Hostile submarine has a Detection Threshold equal to the mine avoidance sonar, and 
Directivity Index of 17 dB. 
2.  Mine Avoidance Sonar Detection Threshold.  This was by far the most difficult and variable 
characteristic of the sonar to define.  Using a processing time of 10 msec, the Detection 
Threshold becomes 31 dB. 
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3.  Mine Detection Range.  At 15 kts, the ship will stop in 1,200 m or approximately 4.5 ship 
lengths.  Adding reaction time and minimum keep-out zone, the minimum detection range 
becomes 1,800 m.  We added an additional 200 m for a “fudge factor”, and made our 
required detection range 2 km. 
4.  Detection Range By Hostile Submarine.  The goal here is not to allow detection by a hostile 
submarine further than it would without the carrier’s mine avoidance sonar in direct path.  
The assumption made is simple: if the submarine is within direct path range, the carrier is 
detected.  Using an average direct path of 12 km, this becomes our counter-detection range. 
5.  Choosing The Sonar’s Frequency.  Here, you have two separate problems: mine detection  
and counter detection.  Using the basic sonar equation at low frequencies (approx 1 kHz), the 
Source Level required to detect the mine (218 dB) is higher than that required by the hostile 
submarine to detect the carrier (162 dB).  This is not what you want.  Fortunately, as 
frequency increases, there is a cross over point where mine detection requires less power than 
counter-detection.  That cross over point is at 40 kHz (224 vice 238 dB). 
6.  Required Power.  Given a Source Level of 224 dB at 40 kHz, the necessary peak power is 
approximately, P A kWPEAK
SL
aperture= =
-( )( )( )/10 10 710 12 .  The maximum available power to 
the combat system is 32 MW so the mine avoidance sonar is feasible. 
7.  Basic Design.  The sonar will be a lowering array pod much like today’s pitsword.  It will 
have auto-detect/auto-track features with view screens and audio alarms in CVIC and on the 
Bridge. 
8.  Manning.  To support maintenance requirements, 3 sailors are probably required (one 1st 
Class Petty Officer and two 2nd or 3rd Class Petty Officers). 
9.  Conclusion.  Given a 40 kHz mine avoidance sonar, the carrier can successfully avoid 
surface mines without increasing counter-detection ranges.  Also, power and manning 











TSSE S-CVX  








EDITOR’S NOTE:    
The following document was prepared early in the process of the S-CVX design (during 
feasibility studies) and only the air wing descriptions have since been fully revisited due to 
improved data.  We realize that in many areas small shifts in the manning numbers have 
occurred as subsequent decisions about the S-CVX design were made.  While this document 
was not revised to match each of these changes, the manning estimates were monitored to 
ensure that no significant deviations were made to the overall numbers estimated in this 
report.  In any continuation of the S-CVX design, one of the next steps in the design spiral 
would be to fully revisit this document and ensure that the manning estimates it contains are 




Introduction and Process:  This report is designed to provide the baseline manning estimate for 
the TSSE S-CVX design.  This estimate was generated by analyzing  an earlier report (Ref (1) 
referred to in this document as the CVX manning study) prepared by John J. McMullen 
Associates, Inc in October 1996.  We examined each department and division presented in the 
CVX manning study concentrating on the watch station requirements identified.  We then 
adjusted these numbers based on what we believe is a reasonable assessment of what emerging 
technologies and processes can deliver by 2015 to aid in reduced manning.  In performing this 
analysis we made the following general assumptions: 
 
· Since we concentrated on the number of watchstanders needed, this may leave our design 
shorthanded with regards to maintenance manning.  To address this (unless otherwise noted) 
we add additional personnel equal to 15% of the division’s manning to support watch section 
requirements.  These personnel are  assumed to be exclusively non-watchstander 
maintenance personnel.  These personnel perform the bulk of each division’s maintenance 
but watchstanders are still expected to perform 10 hours of maintenance per week as well. 
· Except where noted, we assume four section watches for all departments and divisions.  This 
serves two purposes.  First it allows watchstanders to support their 10 hour per week 
maintenance requirement and still average only 52 work hours per week  -- less than is 
currently performed on ships.  Secondly, it allows for watches that are undermanned due to 
non-qualified personnel to still operate (hopefully at no less than a 3 section rotation) while 
the “non-quals” learn to stand the watch.  During this period maintenance requirements will 
drive up average workloads but this is no different than current practices. 
· The deck department will be manned by a core of Boatswain Mates and lead the division but 
with the remaining personnel being composed of additional junior personnel from other 
departments.  This practice is already used in Deck Divisions on submarines and provides a 
means for getting additional junior personnel to sea where they can spend at least part of their 
time learning their in rate job while still supporting the ship.  
· All personnel without an assigned Cond I watch will be added to the DC parties and will 
have secondary training to be an effective DC party member.  Once again this practice is 
already in use aboard smaller ships like submarines and ensures that all personnel are fully 
utilized at Cond I. 
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Below is our analysis of the CVX manning study results examined department by department.  
At the end of each section we present manning number summaries that are read as follows: 
· (#enlisted) + (#officers) at Cond I or Cond III (Cond III will be 4 section watch unless 
otherwise indicated) 
· # enlisted maintenance workers (usually 15% above the Cond III manning needs) 





OA Division:  Responsible for weather forecasting. 
· The CVX manning study calls for 5 Cond III watch stations and 15 billets.  Based on 
automated weather forecasting equipment already in existence for domestic forecasts, we 
assume that for this ship we should be able to reduce OA division needs to 1 senior 
watchstander per section (assumes that these personnel are trained highly enough to interpret 
received data effectively) plus one officer meteorologist assigned to supervise the operation. 
Cond I: 4+1,  Cond III: 1+0,  Maint wkrs: 0 Total: 4+1   
 
OI Division:  Responsible for detection/collection/analysis/display/tracking/dissemination 
tactical combat and operational information. 
· The CVX manning study calls for 32 Cond III watch stations and 96 billets.  These 
assignments are based on the current paradigm of stove piped functional areas.  By 
implementing the proposed new paradigm of integrated data gathering, analysis and 
dissemination we propose the following manning breakout: 
· Pilot House and Flag Plot:  In the pilot house we assume that the Navigation plot will be 
maintained electronically and that the Nav watch can call up the surface summary on the 
same or another console in the pilot house – thus no extra watch is added.  In the flag plot, 
we retain the one operator but give him a fusion plot. 
       Cond I: 1+0, Cond III: 1+0, Total: 4+0 
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· Air Control:  By increasing use of automation and expert systems software (such as systems 
which FAA should field soon) we believe that the ATC function can be handled with only 2 
Cond III watches vice the 3 proposed by CVX.   During flight ops these two operators would 
be augmented by a third person to strictly handle take-offs, approaches and landings.  This is 
down one more from what CVX proposed.  Finally,  during Cond I, we again would decrease 
the required number by one (to 5 vice 6). 
Cond I: 5+0, Cond III: 2 (plus 1 for  flight ops from offgoing section) +0, Total: 8+0 
· Decision and Display:  This is an area where we feel great reductions can be made through 
use of use automated track correlation tools, open systems that all share same track file 
database and advanced displays that eliminate the need for plotters and phone talkers.  These 
concepts are already being designed into programs such as NSSN and LPD-17.  Based on 
this we assume a reduction to 2 fusion plot evaluators during Cond III (+ 2 officer 
supervisor) and 3 during Cond I (+4 officer supervisors).  We also assume that these 
personnel will be assuming the functions of many other plotters/evaluators in the remaining 
OI division areas.  Note that the officer supervisors listed here will also assume a supervisory 
role over the remaining OI division functions. 
Cond I: 3+4, Cond III: 2+2, Total:  8+8 
· Surface/Subsurface:  This function should be dedicated to detection and tracking of surface 
and tracking of subsurface targets.  The supervisor functions of this area should be handled 
by the fusion plot evaluators and their supervisors.  Much of the standard surface contacts 
should be trackable using automated tools.  Advanced tools are also being developed for 
acoustic tracking of submarines.  Finally, the advanced displays and networking tools 
previously mentioned will alleviate the need for dedicated phone talkers and status board 
keepers.  Based on these assumptions, we envision this function requiring 2 track evaluators 
during Cond III and 4 during Cond I. 
Cond I: 4+0, Cond III: 2+0, Total: 8+0 
· Tactical Operations Plot:  With the advent of advanced displays linking data from all sources, 
this function becomes redundant with the fusion plots listed under Decision and Display.  For 
this reason, we chose to eliminate these billets. 
Cond I: 0+0, Cond III: 0+0, Total: 0+0 
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· Detection and Tracking:  We assume that much of this function will be automated and/or 
assumed by previously defined functions (fusion plot in particular).  The one remaining 
function that we can not replace is the radar control operator.  This function will be retained. 
Cond I: 1+0, Cond III: 1+0, Total: 4+0 
· Electronic Warfare:  With increased automation and better tie in to the rest of the Combat 
System, we feel that this function can be reduced to 2 operators during Cond III and 3 during 
Cond I. 
Cond I: 3+0, Cond III: 2+0, Total: 8+0 
· ASW/CCA:  This function is assumed to involve the receipt and processing of raw ASW data 
from airborne assets controlled by the carrier.  With advances in computing power, it is 
probably a safe assumption that the aircraft will be able to do more and more of this 
processing on board, yet with multiple sonobouy patterns possibly deployed a need could still 
arise for on ship processing.  The magnitude of this on ship processing should, however be 
lower than current levels.  By utilizing this fact and employing advanced ASW processing 
techniques currently being developed for the submarine force, the manning required for this 
function should be lower.  We envision reducing the needed watches to 2 during Cond III 
and 3 plus and enlisted supervisor during Cond I.  Note also that we move the function of the 
NIXIE operator to the OEM Division as part of the self defense operations station. 
Cond I: 4+0, Cond III: 2+0, Total: 8+0 
· ESM/ECM Equipment Rooms:  We retain the Cond I watches in these functions. 
Cond I: 2+0, Cond III: 0+0, Total: 0+0 
OI Division Totals 
Cond I: 23+4 Cond III: 12+2,  Maint wkrs: 7, Total: 55+8 
 
OS Division:  Responsible for communications intelligence, cryptology and ESM equipment. 
· Although automated tools and expert systems may improve productivity and allow for further 
manning reductions than proposed by the CVX study, we know of no imminent examples 
and therefore accept the CVX study numbers with 5 Cond III watches 14 Cond I watches and 
a total number of 15 billets in a three section watch.  It is assumed that at least one of the 
watches will be junior enough for newly reported personnel to qualify quickly and support 
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the watch while they train for other jobs.  We also add one cryptologist officers to run the 
detachment. 
Cond I: 14+1, Cond III: 5+0, Maint wkrs: 2, Total: 17+1 ( assume three section watch) 
 
OZ Division:  Responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence concerning 
the tactical and operational situation.   
· Once again we accept most of the CVX manning recommendations due to the lack of any 
known forthcoming tools that could improve efficiency.  The two exceptions involve the 
chart vault custodian and the security watch.  With the charts being stored electronically, the 
both of these jobs are easily replaced by electronic control and security measures.  This 
reduces the division watches to 8 during Cond III and 21 during Cond I.  Once again, it is 
assumed that some of the Cond III watches will be supportable by newly reported personnel 
and that all watches will be handled with a three section rotation.  Finally 2 officers are added 
to supervise the division. 
Cond I: 21+2, Cond III: 8+0, Maint wkrs: 4, Total 28+2 (assumes a three section watch) 
 
OEM Division:  Maintains and operates the ship’s self defense systems. 
· The CVX manning study has this division responsible only for medium and short range 
missile defense systems.  As part of the integrated systems approach assumed for S-CVX, we 
plan to combine all ship based self defense efforts within the same function.  This includes 
the anti-torpedo defenses, missile lures and decoys as well as the missile and/or gun defense 
systems.  The idea is for the operators at these stations to simply target the incoming threat 
and the system automatically assign the best weapon to engage that threat (with operator 
override still available).  This system is assumed to be operated in the semi-autonomous 
mode normally where the operator directs what to engage and concurs with the weapon 
chosen and then leaves it up to the system to prosecute the engagement automatically.  Fully 
automatic engagement would also be an option.  Another assumption made for this division 
is that all radar systems are integrated and under the control of the OI division radar control 
operator previously identified.  With these considerations in mind we reduce the Cond III 
watch load to 2 watches and the Cond I watch load to 4.  We add one officer to supervise the 
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division.  We also add an additional ten maintenance workers to maintain the defensive 
weapons  systems (above the 15% normally allocated). 
Cond I: 4+1, Cond III: 2+0, Maint wkrs: 11, Total: 19+1 
 
OED Division:  Responsible for all organizational and limited intermediate level maintenance 
for computers, computer networks and peripheral equipment.   
· In our maintenance scheme we have a dedicated group of non-watchstanders assigned to 
each division (in each department) that will be responsible for all division specific equipment 
up to the common computer network interface (assuming the equipment has data that needs 
to be routed and/or shared).  Once the data reaches the computer network architecture it 
becomes the responsibility of OED division.  OED division will also maintain and repair all 
office automation and data processing equipment around the ship  We intend to leave this 
division at the levels prescribed by the CVX study for watch station assignments (i.e. 20) but 
change the Cond III watches to 2 LAN supervisors to cover all network operations on board.  
It is also noted that with greater emphasis assumed for networked data and the reductions 
already made to the rest of the ship’s  departments, the relative maintenance workload on 
OED division increases.  We feel this is justified, however, assuming the more modular 
construction of future electronics and better built in diagnostic and test equipment.  Two 
officers are added to supervise the division. 
Cond I: 20+2, Cond III: 2+0, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 20+2 
(note: since OED division is primarily maintenance driven already, no additional maintenance 
workers are assigned) 
 
OC/OP/OEC/OER Divisions: 
· These divisions are given manning estimates in the CVX manning study but their functions 
and the watch structure associated with each division is omitted.   Without any basis for 
analysis, we applied a factor equal to the percentage change we made across the remaining 
Operations Department Divisions to reach our own manning estimate for these divisions.  We 
also assume that 25% and 50% of the division personnel will be assigned watches during 
Cond III and Cond I respectively.  Any additional personnel left over after allocating a four 
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section watch is assigned as a maintenance worker (no additional maintenance workers are 
added though).  Finally we add one officer per 20 division personnel for supervision. 
· Ratio scaling factor from all other Operations Dept. divisions is roughly 2/3 
OC Division: Cond I: 12+0,  Cond III: 6+0, Maint wkrs: 1, Total: 25+1 
OP Division: Cond I: 8+0, Cond III: 3+0, Maint wkrs: 3, Total: 15+1  
OEC Division: Cond I: 9+0, Cond III: 4+0, Maint wkrs: 3, Total: 19+1 
OER Division: Cond I: 10+0, Cond III: 5+0, Maint wkrs: 1, Total: 21+1 
  
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT TOTALS: 
Cond I: 125+11, Cond III: 48+2,  Maint wkrs: 32 Total: 223+19 
· Analysis and Justification:  Compared to the CVX manning study, we show a reduction of 
98 enlisted personnel and 1 officer within the operations department.  The largest of these 
reductions occur in OI Division (19) and OED Division (17).  Within OI Division we 
conclude that the cuts are justified based on implementation of the integrated data gathering 
and analysis paradigm proposed in the CVX manning study.  The numbers presented are our 
best reflection on what could be achieved by concentrating more on fused sensor data and 
emerging technologies such as digital charts and automated plots. With regard to OED 
Division we simply accepted the number of personnel required to support the Cond I 
manning needs outlined in the CVX manning study.  The additional 17 personnel assigned 
are not given any Cond III or Cond I work assignments and we decided that their elimination 
would not seriously impact the division workload.  The remaining Operations Department 
divisions should a fairly stable reduction of about 33% below the CVX manning estimate.  
For the most part these reductions are assumed justified by increases in technology that will 




· Note that because flight operations are not continuos evolutions throughout the ship’s 
deployment, the 4 section watch scheme utilized elsewhere is not applied to air department 
personnel.  Recognizing, however that air operations can indeed run constantly during 
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several days to a week, we still intend to improve upon the current scheme (only one section) 
and provide a 3 section watch for the air department. 
 
V-1 Division:  Responsible for aircraft handling on the flight deck. 
· Because of the excessive noise expected to be generated by the ATF’s engine, we 
approached the issue of flight deck manning with the goal of completely eliminating 
personnel being routinely stationed on the flight deck during flight operations.  To this end 
we incorporate several manning reduction initiatives such as: 
· An automatic aircraft restraining system such as the Coast Guard’s talon system.  This will 
eliminate 18 billets between ASW and flight operations. 
· Robotic aircraft tractors.  These units will have installed sensors to detect impending 
obstacles and will be directed by a central operations station as to where to move aircraft 
around the deck.  This will eliminate 17 additional billets (14 tractor drivers or supervisors  + 
9 A/C hand directors less 6 personnel (2 per shift) to manage the automated flight deck 
movement system.   
· Automated elevator operations.  Once again using automated lock down equipment and 
sensors to assure proper aircraft alignment on the elevator, we can eliminate the need for 
individual operators for each elevator. 
· The fly station petty officers will be moved from the flight deck to a remote viewing station 
where they will monitor aircraft hook-up, etc.  They will be equipped, however to enter onto 
the flight deck quickly, should a problem necessitate direct human intervention. 
· With the rest of the flight deck personnel removed from the area and an automated 
movement system, the tail safety man becomes obsolete and is eliminated saving an 
additional 9 billets. 
Combined these initiatives provide the following watch breakdown: 
· Primary Flight Control:  Here we use automation to combine the two flight recorder and the 
SPN tracker duties into one flight supervisor billet. We also replace the JA talker during 
Cond I with a second flight supervisor. 
Cond I: 2+0, Cond III: 1+0,  Total: 3+0 
· LSO Platform:  The LSO spotter role is maintained. 
Cond I: 1+0, Cond III: 1+0, Total: 3+0 
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· Flight Deck Control:  The A/C spotter board duty will be automated and all of the elevators 
will be supervised by the Flight deck chief and LPO as part of their remote supervisor 
function.  An officer flight deck supervisor is added.  Also these personnel are augmented by 
two additional enlisted supervisors and one more officer during Cond I. 
Cond I: 4+2, Cond III: 2+1, Total: 6+3 
· Fly One, Two and Three:  These stations are reduced by the above innovations to just the 
Petty Officer in charge.  These three watch stations are maintained albeit in a modified 
manner.  These watchstanders will remain below decks monitoring the flight deck operations 
at their station via remote sensors.  They will however be stationed with rapid access to the 
flight deck and be equipped with protective gear that will allow to operate safely on the flight 
deck should an anomaly occur which requires direct human intervention at their stations.  
During Cond I, these watchstanders are augmented by twice their number to ensure rapid 
response to emergencies. 
Cond I: 6+0, Cond III: 3+0, Total: 9+0 
· Equipment Crew:  The tractor drivers and their supervisor are replaced by an automated 
system that will require 2 supervisors per shift to monitor plus two additional monitors 
during Cond I. 
Cond I: 4+0, Cond III: 2+0, Total 6+0 
· Crash and Salvage (C&S) Team:  The C&S team is assumed to be stationed off the flight 
deck during normal operations and will only enter onto the flight deck in an emergency 
situation.  These personnel are assumed to have all the protective gear to operate on the flight 
deck.  Also since they only perform in emergencies, it is assumed that they will operate in a 2 
section shift during flight operations.  Other than this, no additional manning reductions are 
assumed beyond those identified by the CVX study. 
Cond I: 16+1, Cond III: 16+1, Total: 32+2 
 V-1 Division Totals: 
Cond I: 33+3, Cond III: 25+2, Maint wkrs: 9, Total: 68+5 
 
V-2 Division: Responsible for catapults and arresting gear operations and QA functions.   
· Since our requirements for CVX only require emergency catapult and arrested landing 
capabilities, these watches are not normally manned and would be handled as collateral 
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duties of V-1 division personnel with the exception that several additional maintenance 
workers (3) are added to maintain this equipment.  
Cond I: 20+2, Cond III: 0+0, Maint wkrs: 3, Total: 3+0 
(Note: Cond I watchstanders borrowed from V-1 division to handle emergency catapult take-
off/arrested landing needs) 
 
V-3 Division: Responsible for aircraft handling operations in the hangar bays. 
· Based on many of the same initiatives described under V-1 division, we propose the watch 
structure be reduced to the following: 
· Hangar Deck Control:  Here the hangar deck chief and LPO will be augmented by an officer 
supervisor but the talker, elevator operators and spot board operator are eliminated.  The hot 
suit men are also maintained.  Note that some coordination will be needed between the 
hangar and flight deck concerning aircraft movement on the elevators.  We assume that this 
will be part of an integrated aircraft planning and movement system that will identify what 
each aircraft’s position and needed movements will be to ensure it maintains a rapid sortie 
turn around time.  During Cond I all watch stations are doubly manned. 
       Cond I:  8+2, Cond III 4+1, Total: 12+3 
· Hangar bay #1, #2, #3:   Like the fly stations in V-1 division, automation will reduce these 
stations to 3 supervising petty officers plus 2 automated tractor monitors.  During Cond I 
these stations are doubly manned. 
Cond I: 10+0, Cond III: 5+0, Total: 15+0 
· Conflagration Station:  Since operations in the hangar bays are more of an ongoing evolution 
we still assume a 3 section watch for this area and accept the CVX study’s numbers. 
Cond I: 6+0, Cond III: 3+0, Total 9+0 
V-3 Division Totals 
Cond I: 24+2, Cond III: 12+1, Maint wkrs: 5, Total: 41+3 
 
V-4 Division: Responsible for aircraft refueling. 
· This is another area where we must use automation to dramatically reduce the number of 
personnel around JSF’s when their engines are running.  The Pit-stop refueling and re-arming 
concept seems to fulfill some of this need.  In our analysis, we propose using robots to handle 
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the hose man and nozzle man duties. The fuel crew leaders would remain to supervise the 
robots remotely but would also fulfill the talker’s responsibilities.  The 10 fuel crew leaders 
titles would also be changed to Pit-stop crew chiefs.  The crew chiefs’ roles are expanded to 
supervise both refueling and rearming of the aircraft.  See the discussion in G-1 division 
below for more details.  Below decks, all refueling operations would be consolidated into a 
refueling operations center which would consolidate the pump room operators, filter room 
operators and console operators into five watches:  an officer supervisor, a supervising Petty 
Officer, two combined console operators and a filters room operator (using remote filter 
shifting and control).  At Cond I, one additional console operator is added as are single 
operators (4 total) in the pump rooms and filter rooms to overcome any lost connectivity due 
to battle damage.  Finally the Cond I repairmen are retained but the JP5 sample runner is 
eliminated.  The sample runner’s job is expected to be automated.  Three officers are also 
added to supervise the division. 
Cond I: 19+1, Cond III: 14+1,  Maint wkrs: 6, Total: 48+3 
  
AIR DEPARTMENT TOTALS: 
Cond I: 99+8, Cond III: 51+4, Maint wkrs: 23, Total: 160+11 
 
· Analysis and Justification:  Compared to the CVX manning study, we show a reduction of 
423 enlisted and 8 officers in the Air Department.  These reductions can be accounted for 
based on two entering arguments of our design.  First, the S- CVX design will be for a 
STOVL carrier with only limited, emergency service for arrested landings and catapult 
assisted take-offs.  This effectively eliminates the V-2 Division function and accounts for 213 
of our enlisted personnel cuts within the department.  For the limited number of times that we 
would need to use the catapult and arrestor gear systems, we can draw needed personnel from 
other divisions.  The second driving factor is that we are striving to eliminate personnel from 
the flight deck entirely during flight operations due to the unsafe noise levels generated by 
the JSF’s engine.  This forces us to automate the current flight deck functions of refueling, 
rearming, moving and spotting aircraft on the flight deck.  This reduces many of the needed 
functions of V-1, V-3 and V-4 Divisions to remote supervision of the automated equipment 
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and emergency support for malfunctions of the automated gear.  These changes allow us to 





· In our analysis of the weapons department manning needs we made the following 
assumptions concerning available technology.  We assume that automated vertical and 
horizontal handling and transport of weapons will be available.  We also assume that many of 
the innovations discussed in the CVX manning for weapons department manning reductions 
will be implemented.  These innovations include: either preassembled or robotics assembled 
weapons, robotics delivery systems, computerized inventory systems, etc.  Once again, any 
weapons department divisions that deal predominantly with flight operations will be assumed 
to operate on a three section watch. 
 
G-1 Division:  Responsible for aircraft ordnance handling on the flight deck and the hangar deck 
as well as weapons stowage magazines on the main deck and above 
· For the G-1 division we propose replacing the mostly manual efforts of ordnance loading 
with an automated weapons handling system.  In our proposed system, an aircraft would 
arrive at one of several Pit-stop refueling and rearming stations along the flight and/or hangar 
decks.  The next mission for the aircraft would have already been determined and the 
ordnance required for this mission would have been ordered where they will be automatically 
loaded onto one or more robotic transports that will deliver the ordnance to the aircraft. For 
the main bay, the robot would approach low below the tail pipe and between the main gear 
where it would then rise up and load the stores.  For wing stores, the robot would approach 
from the wing tip and move in.  Each of these Pit-stop locations will have a human 
supervisor that remotely monitors the evolution and if needed can enter the flight deck and 
deal with any anomalies.  Since these supervisors perform roughly the same function as the 
fuel crew leaders identified in V-4 division, we propose that the two functions be combined 
with 10 Pit-stop crew chiefs that would supervise the combined robotic refueling and 
rearming evolutions.  Three additional crew chiefs would be on-call, fully equipped to enter 
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the flight deck.  Since the fuel crew leaders were already accounted for only the additional 3 
watchstanders per section (6 during Cond I) will be counted against G-1 division.  How the 
manning for the Pit-stop crew chief watch will be divided between the G-1 and V-4 divisions 
is beyond the scope of this study and is not addressed.  Other functions of G-1 division 
involve monitoring the automated ordnance delivery system.  Our results indicate that a 
central control station with 3 operators  (5 during Cond I) supervising the locations and 
movement of the automated ordnance handling system should be sufficient.  A standby team 
of 6 personnel (on a two section watch, both on duty during Cond I) is added to deal with 
trouble-shooting and correcting any system failures in real time.  Finally 3 officers are added 
for division supervision. 
Cond I: 23+1, Cond III: 12+1, Maint wkrs: 5, Total: 35+3 
 
G-2 Division:  Responsible for the issue of ammunition from the ship’s arsenal and the 
magazine sprinkler systems.   
· The only operational function identified for G-2 division is  “armory emergency issue” and is 
listed as requiring 4 watchstanders during Cond I and flight operations.  By the description of 
the division’s function, this tends to suggest that the CVX study assumed that it requires 
three personnel plus a supervisor to distribute small arms ammunition.  Our results reduce 
this number to only 2 during flight operations and reduce total division manning to 7 – 6 
watchstanders plus one maintenance worker. 
Cond I: 4+0, Cond III: 2+0, Maint wkrs: 1, Total: 7+0 
 
G-3 Division:  Responsible for the assembly of air launched ordnance and its transport from the 
magazines and assembly areas to the flight deck and/or hangar deck.  Also responsible for 
second deck and below magazines and linkless ammunition loading. 
· Our analysis assumes the availability of preassembled weapons and/or automated weapons 
assembly is available.  Our manning estimates reflect only those personnel needed to oversee 
the automated weapons assembly system.  We also conclude that the automated ordnance 
transport system outlined in the discussion of G-1 division will be adequate to handle 
ordnance transport through all levels of the ship, thus additional manning in G-3 division for 
ordnance transport is not needed.  Based on these decisions, the G-3 manning for Cond III is 
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reduced to 1 operator/supervisor for each of the 10 (four missile, two bombs, one ASW, one 
20mm and two other/special purpose) magazines plus two operator/supervisors for each of 
the four weapons assembly stations.  During Cond I each of these areas would be augmented 
by one additional person.  Three officers are added to provide divisional supervision. 
Cond I: 32+0, Cond III: 18+0, Maint wkrs: 8, Total: 62+3 
 
G-4 Division:  Provides technical expertise in the maintenance and operation of the ship’s 
weapons elevators.  Additionally, this division will be responsible for higher level technical 
maintenance on the ship’s automated ordnance handling and transport systems. 
· This division is considered entirely maintenance oriented with its only watchstanding 
requirements coming as emergency repair operators during Cond I and flight operations.    
With the use of palletized ordnance loading for aircraft it is envisioned that the ordnance 
elevators will become larger but less complex and thus require less maintenance.  Manning 
for this division is left intact, however, as it is also assumed that this division will serve as the 
technical expertise shop for advance level maintenance of the ship’s automated ordnance 
handling and transport systems. 
Cond I: 3+0, Cond III: 0+0, Maint wkrs: 14, Total: 14+1 
 
G-5 Division:  Responsible for the proper accounting and inventory of all ordnance and the 
operation of the weapons control center. 
· The CVX study proposes the use of a computerized inventory system for tracking ordnance.  
We fully implement this idea and include it as part of our integrated air planning system.  
This system, described briefly earlier, allows mission planners to decide what the next 
mission (and the required ordnance loadout) for each aircraft should be and then issues 
commands to the automated weapons handling and transport systems to ensure that the 
required ordnance is delivered to the aircraft’s assigned Pit-stop location as the aircraft 
returns for its next rearming and refueling evolution.  As part of this system, an automated 
accounting system will track the ordnance from the magazine to the aircraft and if necessary 
back to the magazine (for returned ordnance after a mission).  This system is no more 
complex than that used by Federal Express today to track delivery of packages.  
  145
Implementation of this system will reduce G-5 division manning to 2 persons per section  (3 
at Cond I) plus one officer to oversee the operations as a collateral duty. 
 Cond I: 3+0, Cond III: 2+0, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 6+0 
 
WEAPONS DEPARTMENT TOTALS: 
Cond I: 65+1, Cond III: 34+1, Maint wkrs: 28, Total: 124+7 
 
· Analysis and Justification:  Overall our manning estimate for the Weapons Department 
tracks fairly close to that proposed in the CVX manning study.  We cut the number of 
enlisted from 146 to 124 and the number of officers from 8 to 7.  Most of our cuts are 
explained by our assumption of an automated ordnance handling and transport system.  Our 
analysis also moves some billets from G-3 to G-1 Division in that we no longer split 
responsibility for moving weapons in different parts of the ship between these two divisions.  




· For most of the supply department divisions, no maintenance workers are assigned because 
these divisions are not responsible for significant amounts of operating equipment.  The 
obvious exceptions to this of course are S-2 division with all of its food preparation 
equipment and S-3 division with the laundry equipment.  The S-2 division items are expected 
to  be the maintenance responsibility of other divisions such as E and A division.  S-3 
division is provided with maintenance workers 
 
S-1 Division: Procures, receives, stores, expends and accounts for general stores including 
consumables, equipage, repair parts and other material as assigned. 
· The CVX manning study proposes several initiatives that could be used to reduce S-1 
division manning.  We see little improvement upon their analysis and accept their baseline 
figures of 17 personnel.  We distribute them to 4 store rooms on a four section watch with 
one enlisted supervisor as a non-watchstander.  The four storerooms are expected to be 
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collocated with those of S-6 division to provide storeroom complexes with the personnel 
assigned to each helping each other.  Finally, we add one officer to supervise the division. 
Cond I: 8+0, Cond III: 4+0, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 17+1 
 
S-2/S-5 Division:  Operates all phases of the general mess including: preparation, inventory and 
control of all food items as well as maintaining the cleanliness of food preparation spaces. 
· Many smaller combatants such as submarines have operated combined messes for years.  
Because of the economies of scale, we determined that the CVX should also operate in this 
manner.  Therefore we have combined the wardroom mess functions of S-5 division into S-2 
division.  In designing the messing facilities, we provide for two physically separate kitchen 
spaces (to avoid battle damage) as well as a separate, centralized baking facility that will 
operate continuously to supply the ship’s baked goods.  The CVX manning baseline assumes 
a total of 97 personnel to perform food service duties.  Since the number of food service 
workers needed is directly dependent on crew size, we scale this number to match our final 
manning estimates.  Our total manning estimate is about 65% of that given in the CVX 
manning study therefore we scale the allotted billets to S-2 and S-5 divisions (97) to reach 
roughly our number of 64 billets.   For purposes of Cond I manning, food service workers are 
assumed to remain in their normal role during Cond I. 
Cond I: 64+0, Cond III: 16+1, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 64+3 
 
S-3 Division:  Responsible for operation of the ship’s store and retail clothing, as well as, the 
laundry, barber shop, tailor, dry cleaning and soda fountain. 
· The CVX manning study calls for 42 personnel in S-3 Division.  We propose even further 
reductions based on the following analysis.  We consolidate ship’s store operations into two 
ship’s stores each with two clerks during the morning and afternoon watches and 3 clerks 
total to man the remaining two watches (i.e. only one store open on the mid-watch).  We also 
add two stockers per store and one dedicated bookkeeper.  This sums to 16 personnel.  For 
barbershop services, we allocate one barber per 500 personnel which equates to 5 barbers.  
For the laundry, we propose using a self service laundry (and tailoring)  system and assign 6 
personnel full time to maintain the equipment as well as to operate a limited dry cleaning 
system (only for use by senior personnel that need dress uniforms for official 
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entertaining/reception functions).  Three more personnel are added to manage and maintain 
the soda mess.  This equates to a division manning of 30 plus one officer.  None of these 
watches are manned during Cond I. 
Cond I: 0+0, Cond III: 7+0 (not balanced four section watches), Maint wkrs: 8, Total: 30+1 
 
S-4 Division:  Responsible for collection and disbursement of public funds as pay and allowance 
functions afloat. 
· The CVX manning study reduces this division manning to 3 personnel to serve as point of 
contact references between the crew and the full PSD contingent which is moved ashore.  We 
concur with this assessment. 
Cond I: 0+0, Cond III: 1+0 (3 section), Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 3+0 
 
S-5 Division:  Responsible for the wardroom mess. 
· Consolidated with S-2 division. 
Cond I: 0+0, Cond III: 0+0, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 0+0 
 
S-6 Division:  Performs all functions pertaining to the receipt, issue, storage and inventory of 
aviation material 
· By fully implementing the innovations proposed in the CVX manning study including: 
inventory control stations, standardized pallet sized aisles, and modular stowage aids we 
conclude that the number of personnel  (26) assigned to the S-6 Division in the CVX 
manning study to be excessive.  The work requirements to support  should be no more taxing 
than those required to support general stores for the ship (in fact it should actually be less).  
Based on this we allocate 17 personnel to this division, distributed over four store rooms 
(collocated with the general stores rooms) with one person assigned during each watch.  This 
gives 2 personnel per each stores room complex per watch which should be more than 
adequate.  The last non-watchstander is assumed to be a senior enlisted supervisor and/or 
inventory control specialist.  Cond I manning will be twice the Cond III level.  Finally one 
officer is added for division supervision. 
Cond I: 8+0, Cond III: 4+0, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 17+1 
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S-7 Division:  Responsible for operation of the data processing center.  Maintains supplies and 
records and prepares reports from the automated supply system. 
· With increased automation and inventory control, we  conclude that a separate data 
processing center is not required and we delete the need for this division. 
Cond I: 0+0, Cond III:  0+0, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 0+0 
 
S-8 Division/HAZMAT Work Center:  Responsible for the control, ordering and distribution 
of hazardous material.  Also responsible for ensuring compliance with all Federal and OPNAV 
requirements concerning the receipt, issue, inventory and preparation for transport of all 
hazardous materials. 
· By applying the same manpower reduction efforts that were described in the CVX manning 
study for determining the S-1 division manning, we propose a comparable reduction for S-8 
division personnel.  This leads to a 40% reduction in manning.  We again assume that the 
division will be equally divided for a four section watch and that ½ the division will be 
assigned duty during Cond I and one officer is added for every 20 personnel. 
Cond I: 20+0, Cond III: 10+0, Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 40+2 
 
S-12 Division:  Responsible for the postal service functions for the ship and accompanying ships 
and is responsible receipt and distribution of fleet mail.  
· The CVX manning study allots 9 personnel for this division.  While automation should allow 
for greater reductions to this number, we chose to accept the number proposed without 
further comment.  Eight of these personnel are assumed to perform postal services on a four 
section watch and the ninth person serves as a non-watchstanding supervisor. 
Cond I: 0+0, Cond III: 2+0,  Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 9+0 
 
Supply Department Totals: 
Cond I: 100+0, Cond III: 44+1, Maint wkrs: 8, Total: 180+8 
 
· Analysis and Justification:  In our analysis we cut 92 enlisted billets from the supply 
department.  Part of these cuts are explained by the fact that our overall manning numbers are 
significantly less than those projected in the CVX manning study.  This affects areas like the 
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S-2 and S-5 Divisions (food preparation specialists) which are sized according to the crew.  
Our reductions in these two divisions (33) came simply from scaling down the number 
projected in the CVX study based on the overall manning reductions around the ship.  We 
also eliminated the S-7 Division with the understanding that improved office automation 
tools make the need for a separate data processing center obsolete.  This saved 12 billets.  
Finally our other major cut came in the S-8 Division (hazardous materials) where we 
eliminated 24 billets.  We noted here that the CVX manning study made no efforts to reduce 
manning levels below those currently assigned to CVN-76 in this division.  Given that we 
will have the same improved inventory management tools in hazardous materials as we have 
elsewhere on the supply department, we conclude that this was an unwise decision.  Simply 
applying the same tools as are envisioned for the S-1 and S-6 Divisions (general and aviation 






· The CVX manning study assumes that the ship is nuclear powered.  This significantly skews 
the required numbers of engineering personnel upwards.  Another study, Gas Turbine 
Propulsion for the Fleet (ref (2)) outlines a proposed engineering department of 150 
personnel for a gas turbine powered CVX variant.  For our analysis we begin with the 150 
person baseline but add back additional personnel for monitoring and maintenance of 
electrical distribution equipment (16) and general maintenance  (23 - our standard 15% 
factor) because we conclude that the Gas Turbine Propulsion study does not elaborate well 
enough to ensure that these areas were adequately covered.  The electrical distribution 
personnel are assumed to stand two Cond III watches (four at Cond I) with the remaining 
personnel assigned as maintenance personnel.  The general maintenance personnel are 
divided as maintenance workers for the main propulsion, and auxiliaries functions.   
Divisional breakouts for the engineering department are not provided in the gas turbines 
study so none is provided here.  Instead the functional allocations described in the gas 
turbines study are provided.  We assume that the watches are on a four section basis and are 
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augmented to 1.5 their Cond III level for Cond I.  Finally, the gas turbine study does not 
mention officer manning for the engineering department so a factor of one officer per 20 
personnel is added as well as a chief engineer. 
· Main Propulsion:  Cond I: 20+3, Cond III: 12+1, Maint wkrs: 9, Total: 57+4 (CHENG 
included in this element) 
· Propulsion Auxiliaries:  Cond I: 12+2, Cond III: 8+0, Maint wkrs: 6, Total: 38+2 
· Aviation Support:  Cond: I: 12+0, Cond III: 6+0, Maint wkrs: 6, Total: 30+2 
· DC/Repair/Auxiliaries:  Cond I: 40+2, Cond III: 10+0, Maint wkrs: 8, Total: 48+2 
· Electrical Distribution:  Cond I: 8+0, Cond III: 2+0, Maint wkrs: 8, Total: 16+1 
  
Engineering Department Totals: 
Cond I: 92+7, Cond III: 38+1, Maint wkrs: 37, Total: 189+11 
 
· Analysis and Justification:  This area alone accounts for the bulk of  our manning 
reductions.  Combining the Engineering and Reactor Departments,  the CVX manning study 
proposes 567 enlisted and 29 officer billets for the two departments.  The Gas Turbine 
Propulsion for the Fleet study asserts that this could reduced to just 150 enlisted and 
unspecified number of officers.  While we concur that nuclear steam propulsion requires 
significantly more personnel than a gas turbine ship, even we were somewhat skeptical of 
this number and added back an additional 39 enlisted personnel to cover electrical 






· These departments were not analyzed closely due to their small size and inability to greatly 
impact overall manning.  Therefore the CVX manning study numbers are taken as is.  The 
first four of these departments are not assumed to have regular watches  (except Chaplains at 




Legal:  Total: 3+2 
Chaplain:  Cond I: 4+3, Total: 4+3 
Maintenance Management:  11+2 
Safety:  7+2 
Navigation: Cond I: 4+1, Cond III: 1+0, Maint wkrs: 6, Total: 10+1 
Medical: Cond I: 31+6, Cond III: 10+2 (three section), Maint wkrs: 1, Total: 31+6 
Dental:  Cond I: 13+5, Cond III: 4+1 (three section), Maint wkrs: 1, Total: 13+5 
 
Legal/Chaplain/Maintenance Management/Navigation/Medical/Dental Depts. Totals:   





· The CVX manning study proposes a staffing of 38 enlisted plus 3 officers for this 
department.  Our results indicate that this number is excessive.  Already NSSN and other 
smaller combatants are designing unmanned radio rooms.  We believe that while an 
unmanned radio room is not adequate for the S-CVX, technology can allow for significant 
manning cuts in this area.  With this in mind, we allow for 2 watchstanders at all times in 
radio to monitor the equipment (six during Cond I).  We also allow for six additional 
personnel to serve as non-watchstanding maintenance workers.  Finally we add a single 
officer to serve as the Communicator and supervise the department. 





· The Deck Department has only two identified Cond III watch stations (Helmsman and 
Messenger – BMOW combined with QMOW).  Most of the department functions however 
are maintenance or special evolution (UNREP, small boat operations, etc.) related.  Because 
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their is little data available to examine these evolutions, we decided to accept the manning 
numbers proposed by the CVX manning study with the following caveat.  Technological 
improvements should allow for decreased workloads in the Deck department for maintenance 
(due to better materials, etc.) and special evolutions (more automated small boats, etc.).  We 
choose to leave the current manning number unchanged, however, with the assumption that 
many of these personnel will also be cross training to support maintenance and operations on 
other systems.  In the submarine force, for example, their are no dedicated bosuns mates.  
Instead, the deck division is made up of strikers and other non-qualified personnel from other 
divisions and departments. 
Cond I: 2+0, Cond III: 1+0, Maint wkrs: 95, Total: 99+5 
 
 
AVIATION INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE DETACHMENT (AIMD) 
 
· The AIMD currently performs all non-organizational level maintenance attached to the 
embarked air wing.  The CVX manning study calls for 199 personnel plus 6 officers to 
perform this function.  We reduce this number to 113 personnel plus 6 officers based on the 
following analysis.  The newer aircraft (CSA, SH-60, and JSF) which are expected to be 
embarked on the CVX in 2015 will have greatly improved mean times between failures and  
therefore require less maintenance personnel.  This is already being seen on aircraft such as 
the F/A-18E/F which requires 28.5% less maintenance personnel than a similar F-14 
squadron.  Also these aircraft can reasonably be expected to incorporate much more 
enhanced on board test and diagnostics equipment.  These factors should enable the 
embarked aircraft to make due with a much reduced maintenance contingent.  In addition, 
since less types of aircraft are being embarked, we feel this would further reduce the needed 
workload since less unique items will have to be serviced.  We estimate this to be another 
gain of 15%.  Thus we propose to reduce the AIMD by a total of 43.5% which leads to the 
number listed above.  To ensure continued high levels of supervision, we do not reduce the 
officer contingent below the CVX proposal. 







· Trends in reduced maintenance manning from F-14 to F/A-18 will continue in the future.  
Analysis of  existing airwing data shows a reduction of 28.5% in maintenance personnel 
between these two aircraft.  By extrapolation we propose that the JSF will require 28.5% less 
maintenance manning than the F/A-18.  We also propose that the SH-60 of the future will 
require 14.25% less maintenance manning (since it is harder to reduce maintenance workload 
on an existing platform).  Finally we assume that the Common Support Aircraft (CSA) will 
have 28.5% less maintenance personnel  than the existing aircraft it replaces. 
· The CVX CSA study showed that by combining squadrons into single squadron savings in 
squadron overhead manning of between 13.2% and 21.4% can be achieved.  We intend to 
implement the same principle with the embarked JSF squadrens on S-CVX by combining 
them into a single JSF wing.  Since this represents a 3 to 1 reduction in functional elements 
we use the higher savings value of 21.4%. 
· Baseline manning for the embarked 10 element CSA squadron manning is based on the 12 
element CSA squadron proposed in the CVX CSA study corrected only for the above factors.  
This is not exactly correct since we embark two less aircraft (reducing aircrews needed and 
maintenance personnel needed slightly) but we also assume higher aircrew ratios for some of 
the CSA variants than was used in the CVX study.  These factors oppose each other and 
should just about cancel each other out. 
· Baseline manning for the embarked JSF squadrons (3) is based on the proposed manning of 
JSF squadrons in the CVX preliminary baseline manning estimates.  We add aircrews for the 
3 additional aircraft we carry and for the higher aircrew per aircraft ratio that we assume (2.5 
for S-CVX vice the 1.5 used by CVX).  Note we do not add additional maintenance 
personnel for the 3 additional aircraft.  This is a slight error and is accounted for by assumed 
increased efficiencies in maintenance workloads.  
· Maintenance personnel account for 66.4% of an F-14 squadron’s manning.  For an F/A-18 
squadron maintenance personnel represent 69.0% of the overall squadron manning.  For JSF 
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we assume that maintenance personnel will represent 67.7% of the overall squadron 
personnel (simply average of previous rates). 
· Due to increased sortie rates desired on S-CVX, we decided to increase the aircrew to aircraft 
ratio to 2.5 for all aircraft. 
· No data was given to break out the personnel for Cond I or Cond III manning.  For this 
reason we assume that all personnel assigned to the air wing are assigned to duties during 
Cond I and 1/3 of the personnel will be assigned during Cond III.  Note even though the 
maintenance department personnel would be better listed as maintenance workers, no attempt 
was made to break them out from the Cond III manning except in the SEAOPET where all 
personnel were listed as maintenance workers to match what was done for  the AIMD. 
 
JSF Manning:  CVX Preliminary Baseline Manpower Estimate  (ref (3)) calls for 14 plane 
squadrons consisting of  27 officers (21 pilots) and 257 enlisted personnel – 284 personnel total.  
Based on our above assumptions, we increase the number of pilots to 38 (2.5x15).  The total 
number of officers is then 44 or an increase of 17 officers. The number of maintenance personnel 
assigned to each squadron on the baseline study is assumed to be 67.7% of the total or 192 
personnel.  Our reduction factor for maintenance personnel is 28.5% which reduces this number 
to 137 personnel or a reduction of 55 people.  This brings our total squadron level manning to 
284 + 17 - 55 = 246 personnel.  We also propose combining the three embarked JSF squadrons 
into one wing of aircraft similar to what was proposed in the CVX study on the Notional 12 
Aircraft CSA Squadron.  This allows us to assume a decrease in personnel required of 21.4%.  
Thus the total manning required for the three JSF squadrons is (3 x 246) x (1-.214) = 580 
personnel.  The assumed officer/enlisted breakout for this wing is as follows: 
· Officers:  114 pilots (38x3) + 14 maintenance officers + 15 wing staff officers = 143 
· Enlisted:  580 - 143 = 437 
Cond I:  437+143, Cond III: 145+47, Maint wkrs : 0+0, Total: 437+143 
 
CSA Manning:  We accept the proposed manning for the notional 12 CSA squadron  (ref (4))for 
our manning level with the assumption that the reduced number of aircraft in our 10 plane 
squadron offsets the increase in aircrew manning that we propose.  This gives a manning 
estimate of 63 officers and 330 enlisted personnel.  The only changes we add are a reduction in 
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the number of maintenance personnel needed by 28.5% due to newer aircraft.  This forces a 
reduction of 72 personnel.  We assume all of these reductions will come from the enlisted ranks 
so this gives a final squadron manning of 63 officers and 258 enlisted personnel or a total of 321 
personnel. 
Cond I:  258+63, Cond III: 86+21, Maint wkrs : 0+0,  Total: 258+63 
 
 
SH-60 Manning:  For the S-CVX we propose a 5 SH-60 squadron.  To deduce the manning 
needed we extrapolated data from the CVX Preliminary Baseline Manpower Estimates for the  6 
aircraft squadron in the Large CTOL (series 2, 2A, & 2B ships) and the 4 aircraft squadron in the 
large STOVL (series 2C ships).  Since we assume a 2.5 aircrew to aircraft ratio, we accept the 6 
aircraft officer estimate of 23 officers.  For enlisted personnel we initially take the average of the 
2 values and use 155 personnel.  We then adjust the number of enlisted for assumed 
improvements in maintenance practices.  We estimate that this will be a factor of 14.25% or ½ 
the reduction we assumed for totally new aircraft.  Using a factor that 67.7% of squadron 
personnel are involved with maintenance this leads to a reduction of 18 personnel.  Thus the total 
SH-60 squadron manning is 23 officers and 137 enlisted or 160 personnel total. 
Cond I:  137+23, Cond III: 45+7, Maint wkrs: 0+0,  Total: 137+23 
 
 
SEAOPDET Manning:  The SEAOPDET are those personnel that arrive with the air wing to 
augment the permanently assigned AIMD personnel.   Since they are involved in maintenance 
activities, we take the proposed values given in the CVX Baseline Manpower Estimates for the 
different aircraft types and adjust them down by 28.5% to account for the ease in maintaining 
newer aircraft.  This results in the following manning estimates: 
· JSF SEAOPDET - 55 x .715 = 39 enlisted 
· CSA SEAOPDET - 58 x .715 = 41 enlisted 
· SH-60 SEAOPDET - 9 x .715 = 6 enlisted 
This gives a total SEAOPDET needed of 86 enlisted personnel. 
Cond I:  0+0, Cond III: 0+0, Maint wkrs : 86, Total: 86+0 
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AIR WING TOTALS: 




COMMAND ELEMENT/ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT 
 
· The command element is made up of the CO and XO.  As far as administration personnel, 
the CVX manning study proposes 42 personnel plus 4 officers.  We conclude that this 
number is overstated.  With much of the routine administrative work transferred ashore (in a 
virtual PSD establishment) we propose a manning formula based on 1 person per 100 
members of the crew plus an additional 8 personnel to support the command element and  
department heads.  Two officers are added to run the administration department. Five 
personnel are assumed to stand in a three section watch to handle crew interfacing needs.  
The command element personnel are non-watchstanders but are not listed as maintenance 
personnel since this department is not expected to maintain any equipment. 
Cond I: 0+2, Cond III 5+0 (three section), Maint wkrs: 0, Total: 24+4 
 
 
DAMAGE CONTROL MANNING 
 
· Our analysis shows that at Cond I, 812 enlisted and 233 officers are currently assigned 
watches.  This leaves 551 enlisted and 42 officers available to support damage control teams 
around the ship.  This number also neglects that some of the Cond I watches identified are in 
fact damage control watches for various systems around the ship.  By combining these 
personnel with improved , automated damage control systems we are fully confident that the 
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